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between material nature and ourselves, doing so by means of a 1st person approach to time. 
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 A radical 1st person perspective entails a number of serious problems – 
some would say insuperable problems – in that it attempts, perhaps 
imprudently, to go beyond the hard-enough task of seeking a way 
around the chasm between what we know first-hand, our concrete and 
experiential contact with the world, and on the other hand the 
knowledge obtained by inferring and abstracting from the immediate to 
the non-immediate, the non-immediate being commonly considered a 
better gauge of the “objective view of that same world”, to borrow the 
words of Thomas Nagel.1  The endeavor of this present book is, in 
essence, to apply that “objective” label to an aspect of time this book 
gives special attention to, namely the immediacy of now time, the 
immediacy of experiential contact that comes by being awake to the 
world now.  
 In this undertaking I give special mention and thanks to Harald 
Atmanspacher, The Mind and Matter Society, and its journal, for the 
range and depth of his and the Society’s innovative directions in probing 
questions of time and related issues.  More specifically pertaining to the 
subject matter of this book, I owe deep appreciation to Georg Franck for 
pointing out a number of significant hurdles I face by my elevating now 
time over numbered and clock time.  His comments were directed at my 
article “Is Present Time a Precondition for the Existence of the Material 
and Public World?” (Social Epistemology, 2015) that addressed themes 
taken up in this present work.  Also to be thanked is Jesse Butler, my 
sparring partner in an exchange published online in Social Epistemol-
ogy Review and Reply Collective, subsequent to the publication of the 
article mentioned above.  And most recently, I wish to thank Franz 
Jansen for his detailed critique of a preliminary section of this book, and 
Professor Roman Kopytko of this university and Professor Subhash Kak 
of Oklahoma State University for their helpful and commendatory 
comments.  As well, thanks are due to the director of the English 
Department at Adam Mickiewicz University, Professor Katarzyna 
Dziubalska, as well as to mgr Michał Jankowski, for arranging the 
university’s publication of this book, and to the former director, 
  
1 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 3. 
 
Professor Jacek Fisiak, for his help in other ways.  Lastly, I owe the 
Corras – Andrew, Eric, and James – an expression of gratitude for the 
layout of the cover page and Kelben Holbrook and Wames Carra for 
additional assistance. 
 Titles of other earlier articles I have written on time’s 1st person 
perspective hint at some of the initial groundwork and direction of this 
present work, titles like “Does Time Move? Dogen and the Art of 
Understanding the Moment” (Kluwer Academic, 2002), “The ‘Back-
ground’ Category” (Mind and Matter, 2010), and a version of chapter 10, 
“Do We Die?” (Ways to Religion Conference, Wroclaw, 2015), and as 
well a version of the final chapter of this book presented at the 
transdisciplinary workshop “Generalities and Particulars: A Fruitful 
Tension”, organized by the Society for Mind-Matter Research and held 
at the Zen Center Johanneshof, Herrischried, in May 2017, and most 
recently my paper “In Defense of One Now” presented at the Mind and 
Matter symposium preliminary to the Toward a Science of 
























“Is there anything more certain than the knowledge we have that we are 
present?”2 
 Craig Bourne, A Future for Presentism, 18. 
 
“[T]he present is not part of time.  Of course ordinarily in the schools, 
colleges and the universities you have been told and taught and your 
dictionaries go on saying again and again that time has three tenses: 
past, present, and future.  That is absolutely wrong – wrong according 
to those who know.  Past and future are in time, but the present is not in 
time; the present belongs to eternity.  Past and future belong to this – 
the world of the relative, change.  Between the two penetrates the 
beyond, the transcendental, and that is the present.  NOW is part of 
eternity.” 
 Attributed to Osho, cited in Jonathan Bricklin, The Illusion  of Will, Self, 
and Time:  William James’s Reluctant Guide to  Enlightenment, 155.  
 
“Again, the ‘now’ which seems to bound the past and future – does it 
always remain one and the same or is it always other and other?  It is 
hard to say.” 







2 More specifically targeted to the momentary now, a slightly modified version in our 
rendering would read:  “Is there anything more certain than the knowing we have of the 
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Introduction: What if there were such a thing  
as present time? 
 Consider the notion: a thing-like now. In other words, a now phenomenon of 
nature or of external existence (leaving aside a more precise source of that “of” 
and what it will come to mean in later discussion). The question is: How could 
there be such a thing as this – a present time that is only now, only this now? A 
present time that comes not from ourselves, our language, our minds or subjec-
tive states, but from outside of us, just as the thingness of that table. A now, 
moreover, that cloaks things in their concreteness, makes them manifest that 
way. After all, who could imagine a nowless table being concrete?  
 And yet, how could this present moment, without a past or future, be a 
thing at all or in any way thing-like, tangible, distinct from false impressions our 
senses fool us into believing, distinct as well from a mere gimmick of speech or a 
way of speaking about fractional time? How could there be such an entity of this 
sort – a now that answers to such description? In his book, The Character of 
Consciousness, David Chalmers writes,  
In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly 
acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were present-
ed to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true 
pristine glory.1 
This book argues the case for such an “edenic” now, or put more plainly – dis-
pensing with the Biblical metaphor – a now uncompromised by subjective con-
siderations or mental mediation. 
The challenge is indeed formidable, the stakes are high. For if what our 
very lucidity and sensory faculties inform us of is a presentness in our surround-
ings, as objectively real as that tree or any other thing, then it appears it is sci-
ence that fails in its characterizing as illusory that which it is constitutionally 
  
1 David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (Oxford, 2010), p. 381.  
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unable to explain. Either that or it is we who suffer the illusion – a massive one.2 
But if indeed the illusion is not ours, and there is this amorphous yet thing-like 
now, with no past or future, what happens to the past and future? What happens 
to the “then”, the universe with its 13.8 billion light years of age? What happens 
to ourselves, our past identities? What happens to the beginning, the very notion 
of a beginning? With such uncertainties as these, must they not call into ques-
tion this thing-like attribution, this co-physical aspect which is here being at-
tributed to the now, or must such uncertainties pull the now out from the physi-
cal to at best speculation about the meta-physical? On the one hand, it can be 
argued that nothing could be more physically apparent, more starkly exposed to 
our awakened senses, than the closeness of the present. “Is there anything more 
certain than the knowledge we have that we are present?” as the presentists’ 
manifesto puts it. But on the other hand, its inaccessibility to mathematical cal-
culation and measured configuration, as we shall see, would seem to endow the 
now with credentials of a more metaphysical kind.  
And yet, that is part of the appeal of this thesis of the now – its very 
closeness. Everything becomes close at hand, intimate, even the furthest reaches 
of time, even the uncaused causer. We ourselves take on a temporal significance 
because nowness gets posited as both part of us and part of the all, the cosmos, 
that changes from an indifference to a difference that we ourselves make. Not 
only that. The image of time reverses. Instead of this moment resting on the 
contingency of a transience in between an inscrutably distanced past and future, 
the opposite takes center stage: the time of all that belongs “in” time hinges on 
there being this very present moment, an enigma – it would seem – with no 
before or after, no sequentiality, being only now. What then, one might ask, be-
comes of time’s beginning, or any beginning in time, if time itself should rest on 
the foundation of a phenomenon that, by its very immediacy, precludes any 
attempt to calculate its “when”?  
 One might wager insuperable odds against such a notion, this thesis of 
an external – i.e. non-subjective – provenance of the now, a notion seemingly as 
farfetched as positing the devil in nature. After all, how could there be objectivi-
ty about something that has neither a past nor future? What thing does – ex-
cepting particle behavior in quantum physics? And furthermore, how could the 
now be thing-like yet spatially indistinguishable from ourselves the way things 
  
2 Posing the alternatives in this misestimating as either due to a blind spot of science 
or a massive delusion takes its cue from language in Miller. Miller uses the expressions 
“extrinsic presentness” and “a single moment that is objectively present” to describe the 
now that is uncompromised by subjective considerations, a notion she contextualizes in a 
passage-of-time framework, a framework she discredits as illusory, a “massive and perva-
sive delusion” given by our experience, rather than “reason to be skeptical of our best 
science”. Kristie Miller, “Time Passages”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 24/3-4 
(2017), 151, 174.  
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are considered to be? Odds whatever they may be, the wager of this book is that 
it’s so nonetheless, it is there outside where nature’s domain is, this beginning of 
time, this momentary now, unmeasurable, unrepeatable, thing-like yet already 
there, a beginning before anything else.  
 How, then, does one arrive at such an egregious conclusion? 
 It all begins on familiar grounds, the experience of waking up in the 
morning, where the having of that experience is the knowing that one does in-
deed wake up rather than a belief induced by causal (past-to-present) mecha-
nisms, this knowing being an assumption equivalent to the one we make about 
you, that you – the reader – are indeed reading this sentence right now rather 
than only being induced to believe so by causal mechanisms, neural circuitry 
and the like. It would seem we have no choice in the matter but to grant the folk 
truth of such assumptions if only to secure knowledge’s foundation, resting as it 
does on the certainty of one’s wakeful knowing.3 Science, then, becomes by deri-
vation a science we are awake to, nature as we know it likewise a nature we are 
awake to. 
And so it is from that unegregious starting point – the alarm clock that 
stirs us from sleep – that we proceed to plot a seemingly unnavigable course by 
taking on the world we’re awake to from a 1st person perspective, endeavoring to 
reorient our understanding of its temporality, its nowness, in keeping with a 
present-to-past readjustment that takes into consideration the immediacy of our 
experiential contact, rather than an exclusive rendering of things from one’s 
distanced appraisal, the 3rd person vantage point from which one normally ap-
plies standards of objectivity.  
The alarm clock rings, and the waking exposes us to our surroundings, 
to the world we live in and share, this waking that brings our attention to all that 
is other than ourselves, the otherness of our surroundings, the otherness of oth-
er people, the otherness of the world. Our cognitive faculties do much of the 
constructing and interpreting of this otherness, as does our phenomenology and 
psychology. The picture that comes through to sentient beings like ourselves 
varies to a degree, depending on our minds, our experiences, our evolutionary 
stage of development. Nevertheless, there is that bedrock we speak of here, that 
otherness we wake up to, a world that temporal nowness makes concrete and 
elicits as very different from a dream. Gibson once put it this way: “I should like 
to think that there is sophisticated support for the naïve belief in the world of 
objects and events, and for the simple-minded conviction that our senses give 
knowledge of it. But this support is hard to find when the senses are considered 
as channels of sensations; it becomes easy when they are considered as percep-
  
3 Denying the wakefulness of our knowing leaves us with nothing we can claim to have 
knowledge of, only the impression of knowledge. As the Greek skeptic Metrodorus put it, 
“None of us knows anything, not even this, whether we know or do not know, . . .”. 
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tual systems.”4 In essence, the distinction drawn here is between explanation 
that runs past-to-present (the sensations inducing us to believe we’re awake) 
and explanation that runs counter-wise – present-to-past – (the lucidity, the 
awakening that brings about the possibility of knowledge about sensations). And 
so the core significance that emerges from this unegregious starting point is as 
follows: The role of our mental constructing of this world-as-other is one thing; 
the fact that this otherness is present and present now to us who are awake to it 
is quite another. Working out what implications this distinction leads to, how 
the “present and present now” affects the objectivity standard applied to materi-
al nature, will be the challenge addressed in the first of our chapters in Part 1 – 
“Material Nature Here and Now”. The chapter that follows, “Material Nature-as-
Other”, will contest what it deems a false dichotomy, that between nature’s oth-
erness vis-à-vis our perspective and, on the other hand, the otherness beyond, 
which in any case cannot but be vis-à-vis our perspective. 
But now comes the focus on this centerpiece of our investigation, this 
“now”. In chapters 4-7 of Part 1, we move from the nature component of our 
conceptual framework to the component of this immediacy, the immediacy of 
one’s present perception. 
The standard positions taken on the now are that it is an outcome of 
consciousness, serves as an indexical marker, or a clock time we take note of. 
Where its source is taken to be consciousness, “consciousness” is generally un-
derstood to mean our cranium enclosed, brain-based housing of awareness. The 
indexical variation on that theme would argue that just as words like “here” and 
“there” reflect how the speaker or conscious observer perceives the surround-
ings, so also words like “now” or “then” do the same, being a habit of expression 
that reflects the viewer’s perspective, not the world as it really is. Alternatively, 
the momentary present gets translated as a specifiable clock time, time in a line-
ar or dimensional sense that can be measured and calculated. We will generally 
refer to these ways of speaking about time as linear, the time that takes time, as 
opposed to the time before the linear can even take off, the time of simply being 
awake to the world – this now in our sense of the word.  
But the topic of this now provokes questions on all sides. 
To begin with, we have contended that the now is thinglike and yet without 
a past or future. Incredible enough as a phenomenon of that description, it be-
comes even more perplexing when one considers the enigma of our having no 
memory of this now, finding no trace of it in the past. This would suggest, as an 
analogy, the effect of trauma on one’s capability to recognize a calamitous event at 
the time it happens. As Anne Whitehead puts it, citing Cathy Caruth’s work:  
  
4 Gibson’s notion of “perception” can be defined as “lucidity” as we shall use that term, 
the state of experiential access or having an open conduit to the world. James J. Gibson, 
“New Reasons for Realism,” Synthese 17:2 (June 1967): 167. 
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When the present was present, it could not be remembered; once it is past, its presence 
is only in recall. This is not the same presence that it had when it first occurred; in this 
sense, then, remembering involves the revival of a past that was never present.5 
That analogy suggests the puzzle before us: how a present that was never past 
can be recognized as present in the first place? What explains its astounding 
familiarity? Memory provides a past. It provides matters of content. But that is 
not the glue that holds the present together, gives us its signature quality – 
namely, its lived immediacy. And it is furthermore that which comes without the 
slightest shock. Yet how could that be so, that familiarity every morning we wake 
up? 
And what about this external source we’ve attributed to the now? One 
might compare such a notion to Max Velmans’ thesis about perceptual projec-
tion, his proposal that our perceptions extend outside the physical boundaries of 
our bodies, the projection being an “empirically observable effect . . . viewable 
only from a first-person perspective”.6 We illustrate with an example. You and I 
are looking at the same tree. We both see this tree while nevertheless neither of 
us can see each other’s observation of the tree. The seeing is restricted to the 
“first person”, meaning that for you to see my observation you’d have to get into 
my skull and see things through my eyes, or I get into yours to see your observa-
tion. This restriction notwithstanding, Velmans is saying it’s not just the tree 
that’s out there but our individual perceptions of the tree as well. This openly 
opposes the position that representative theory takes, according to which lucidi-
ty – what the eye’s observing makes visual contact with – gets translated as rep-
resentative constructions of our mental faculties by which the world gets indi-
rectly known to us.7 A sampling of reaction to Velmans from demurrers is cited 
by Velmans himself: 
It is a theory which cannot be falsified, because its prediction, that nothing will be 
detected, is identical to the null prediction, that nothing is projected. Therefore it is 
not a scientific hypothesis about how spatial experience arises from the brain, but ra-
ther, it is a theory that banishes the most interesting and challenging part of that 
problem into a spirit world of ghostly structures that have no mass, occupy no space, 
consume no energy, and have no physical presence in the world known to science.  
  
5 Anne Whitehead, “Trauma,” Theories of Memory: a Reader, ed. Michael Rossington 
and Anne Whitehead (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 188. 
6 [italics his] Max Velmans, “Where Experiences Are: Dualist, Physicalist, Enactive and 
Reflexive Accounts of Phenomenal Consciousness,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences 6(4) (2007): 557.  
7 According to Smythies, the debate over extended “phenomenal” visual sensations vs. 
representative theory lacks satisfactory answer. John Smythies, “Consciousness and Higher 
Dimensions of Space,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 19/11-12 (2012): 225. 
Chapter 1 18
Should we take projection seriously and interpret Velmans as saying that the brain is 
in fact projecting “stuff” onto the things themselves? This would amount to a world 
that contains the individual things themselves and further is smeared all over by pro-
jected phenomenal experiences belonging to all kinds of different creatures like for 
example Homo sapiens.8 
Even with that said, we go a step further than Velmans in postulating a thinglike 
now that, rather than being understood as an extension or projection of our 
sense perceptions, derives from outside, a temporal phenomenon arising in and 
from a realm our mental faculties do not engineer. 
 Along with this puzzle of the unrepeatable now, the untraceable now, 
there is the conundrum of how, from a 1st person perspective, there can be only 
the now of one’s immediate experience, not the now of my next door neighbor 
and those of other people. Surely the 1st person perspective must here give way 
to the distanced appraisal of 3rd person rationality. We all have our lived experi-
ences. Hence, we all must have concomitant nows by which to engage in our 
experiencing in the first place. And yet even to speak of “nows” in the plural 
presents somewhat strained usage. But in any case is it appropriate to do so? To 
a rational understanding, based on 3rd person assumptions that we have no 
doubt are true, it of course seems evident that we each have our nows. And 
among eminent proponents of an extrinsic now – or a version of it that is other 
than subjective or illusory – the choice is almost invariably in the plural, wheth-
er it be Barbour’s “nows”, Whitehead’s “occasions”, or Leibniz’s “monads”. That 
choice, however, bends to a 3rd person mode of inquiry, as if from a detached 
view, from nowlessness, by which to appraise what can only be fathomed by 1st 
person means, this now that first and foremost is experiential. So is it now or 
nows? That, it turns out, is the core of the challenge before us – that choice be-
tween the instant acquaintance view that informs us of the now directly vs. the 
appraisal view that abstracts from experience and from the now as well. 
 The chapters on the now begin their probe of such questions by taking 
into consideration what it means, in the first place, to speak of one’s experienced 
contact with the now. What exactly is this contact all about? A seminal figure in 
the field of consciousness studies, David Chalmers once commented, “Possible 
nonphenomenal cases of instance acquaintance include temporal properties on 
a view where we are acquainted with the time or duration of an experience, . . .”9 
This book shares that view to the extent that the now, or present time, is what 
we have direct acquaintance of by our simply being awake to the world, an ac-
quaintance of a nonphenomenal nature in that the now is externally derived, 
  
8 Comments from Lehar and Van de Laar cited by Max Velmans, “Reflexive Monism,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 15/2 (2008): 28, 41.  
9 David J. Chalmers, “The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke, and 
Siegel,” Analysis 73(2) (2013): 345-368. [consc.net/papers/contents.pdf]: 6. 
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from outside our consciousness. That evinces one clue as to where we are going 
with this now. Another comes from a question Peter McInerney asks in his book 
Time and Experience:  
[H]ow can consciousness at one time perceive the temporal extension of worldly en-
tities that extend beyond that time?10  
The answer proposed here? It doesn’t. Temporal extension being a matter of 
linear (i.e. sequential or before-and-after) time, the immediate time of a present 
perception (“at one time”) doesn’t encompass it. Instead, the immediate time 
that we mean by the now is portrayed, as we shall see, as an “in between”. Not 
what was a moment ago, not will be in a moment to come, but midstream in that 
nebulous in-between which teases our efforts to measure its momentary exist-
ence even as it is so intrinsically a part of what we’re awake to, so plainly shared 
by you and me, so implicit in the evidence of change from what was to what will 
be. Hence the now, as we shall advance the notion, will be shown to be a thing 
unmeasurable, resisting the calculations of minute and second, but a thing 
nonetheless.  
A final clue, a final paradox about the now, will be enough to flesh out 
this preview of the now chapters. And that is its ambivalence, the contradiction 
of an immediate present being both clear to anyone with a lucid mind yet inscru-
table, both transparent yet obscure. As for the now’s clarity, one simply has to 
query how it could be that anyone with a lucid mind could confuse the present 
with the past, or the present with the future. How could any civilization function 
where such confusion was the norm? On the other hand, lacking traces of this 
lived phenomenon in the past or in memory, how is it that one can even write a 
sentence about it, which would seem to presuppose enough of its memory to 
start the sentence and complete what one had in mind. And yet here is a book 
that proposes to do just that – give expression to the now in sentences. The 
question, in other words, is how one goes from an instant acquaintance of the 
now that purports to be just this instance, this now in the singular – so much so 
as to make comparison with any other now impossible –, to a conceptual level of 
discussion about this experience.11 The acquaintance is necessarily shared or else 
no one would know what I’d be talking about. How this gets explained poses yet 
another challenge in the pages that follow. What we will do is move in reverse of 
  
10 Peter McInerney, Time and Experience (Philadeplphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 
1991), 231. 
11 Acquaintance can be regarded as a relation involving immediacy and experiential con-
tact between a subject and an instance of a quality, such as a greenness, without the subject 
necessarily recognizing the green as belonging to a category or type of color that things have. 
Cp. Livingston’s definition (and his reference to Chalmers), in Paul Livingston’s “Phenome-
nal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 20/5-6 
(2013): n. 20.  
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common assumptions, assumptions that go all the way back to Plato and Socra-
tes, as in this sample of the latter’s syllogistic reasoning, “Then knowledge does 
not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, 
and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?”12 To the con-
trary, it will be found that, in the direction we take, knowing – the immediacy of 
one’s impression – provides a crucial link to “truth and being”, a link that 
knowledge – the mediating process of the mind – cannot grasp. And this will be 
further explored when we come to the discussion of acquaintance and the enig-
ma of the now in the singular that, on a conceptual level, makes no sense at all, 
but on an immediate level, the level of undetached sensory immersion, bears a 
coherency of meaning prior to reasoning. It can be illustrated, as we shall see, in 
a passage where William James speaks about the duration block of a perception, 
the holistic datum, and where the immediacy of that sensory perception gets 
subsequently decomposed upon being reasoned about in a detached way. What 
becomes important in all this is that conceptualization can only go so far and 
that the 1st person perspective, insofar as it delves into the terrain of the imme-
diacy of the now, requires the tolerance of one’s exposing oneself on that level. 
We shall call it the immediacy of a 1st person perspective, as opposed to a 1st 
person perspective in hindsight, the distanced appraisal one gives to one’s expe-
riential contact, or as William James phrases it, “attention looking back”.13 
Hence, throughout this book we shall generally have in mind by “1st person per-
spective” that which immediacy brings to awakened attention, prior to appraisal.  
While the subject of the now, given its immediacy to the 1st person perspec-
tive, may appear a daunting task to write about, it is arguably no more intractable 
than other phenomena of a configuratively elusive nature – phenomena like con-
sciousness, mind, body and spirit, the physical world’s ontology, transcendent 
realms. Such topics as these have not been beyond attempted description, however 
ineffable. So why not something as seemingly banal as the now?  
 About the converse of the now, or as we shall designate it, “the not-now”, 
various ways of speaking about its nuances will be brought out in discussion. 
Some of the neologisms we have given to variants in this category are “the just 
now”, “nowlessness”, “the not-now of extended time”. In Part 2: “Whatever 
Happened to a Moment Ago?” we will embark on an excursion round about 
these outposts of the not-now in search of that “moment ago” mentioned in the 
title of Part 2. By “moment ago” we mean that lived moment – not its linear 
designation, not the flotsam and jetsam of images as memory portrays it, but the 
immediacy of that moment as originally experienced. A task that seemingly 
  
12 Benjamin Jowett, Gramatica Arcana: Plato Theaetetus, trans. B. Jowett (Demosthe-
nes Koptis, 2016), 123. 
13 William James, The Principles of Psychology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1890), 610. 
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flouts everything we will and have said about lucidity and the temporal con-
straint. This peregrination to various islands of not-now territory eventually 
lands us in the chapter “Contra-lucidity?”, where we witness an unexpected en-
counter with what purports to be a moment ago. 
A sliver of time, this now. We take it to be evanescent, and yet evanes-
cent relative to what? A long time? It is these two counterparts, the sliver of now 
time and the not-now of extended time, that we will adjudge as comprising an 
archetypal distinction, primal in the sense that from them as a starting point all 
else follows. 
And what is this “long” time with its before and after? One has only to 
consider the overwhelming extent to which “material”, in most scientific par-
lance, is understood to refer to all that pertains to not-now dimensions of time, 
the persistence of things in temporal sequence, their existence necessarily prem-
ised on a before and after, the calculations that transcend the ephemeral, the 
predictions about what is presently not now but which come true in the future, 
the constancy implied by the laws of nature. As Wandschneider puts it: 
But what is ‘nature itself’? Certainly not the actual state of nature in its transient 
manifestations. For knowledge of nature, only the lawfulness underlying nature can 
be of interest; accordingly, the object of science is not any single natural object exist-
ing here and now but rather the law of nature: that is, a universal of nature that 
transcends time and space or – to use a classical philosophical term – nature’s un-
derlying essence.14 
Take a tree or any material object, or notions of a wider scope such as evolution, 
the earth and its history, the universe and its space/time, the past and future. 
Where in all of this does one detect a trace of the momentary now, or present 
time, except perhaps in the brevity of humanity’s glimpse at the all-
encompassing that surrounds us, this not-now? 
 That question brings us back to the question we started with, the puzzle 
this book is out to explore – the thinglike now. How something with such recalci-
trance to number, size, and quantity, and to configurations of any kind, can have a 
place in material nature? How something without detectible or at least specifiable 
duration, without a past or future, can be anywhere, let alone in the world that 
scientists investigate and mathematicians theorize about? It is a problem akin to 
attempting to bridge the gap, or epistemological hiatus, between psychological 
time and physical time. The historian Paul Ricoeur describes it this way: “Just as it 
seemed impossible to generate the time of nature on the basis of phenomenologi-
cal time, so too it now seems impossible to proceed in the opposite direction and to 
  
14 Dieter Wandschneider, “On the Problem of Direction and Goal in Biological Evolu-
tion,” Darwinism and Philosophy, ed. Vittorio Hosle and Christian Illies (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2005): 207. 
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include phenomenological time in the time of nature, whether it is a question of 
quantum time, thermodynamic time, the time of galactic transformations, or that 
of the evolution of species.”15 And more recently, the quantum theorist Harald 
Atmanspacher echos the same dilemma in pointing out, “Although various inter-
esting ideas in this direction have been published (also in Mind and Matter) over 
the years, there is no conclusive account of how the bridge between physical time 
and mental time could be built.”16 
How to bridge the gap? Our starting point in attempting to do this is not 
to use opposites like physical and mental time, or phenomenological time vs. 
time of nature, but to provide grounds for portraying the now, or present time, 
as having an external source and as being thinglike, not in a shape-like sense, 
but nonetheless objectlike in existing outwardly, in such a way as to be incom-
patible with mental or phenomenological characterizations. By Part 3 of this 
book – “Nature in the NOW” – this notion of nowness will have evolved from 
thinglike, in manifesting externally and concretely the way things do in nature, 
to something not conceivable in spacetime nature at all, that is to say not mate-
rial in the sense of being dimensionally, spatially, or mathematically accessible, 
but rather underlying all of that, it being the premise, the starting point, by 
which measurement and material descriptiveness in nature become possible. 
The now’s immediacy thereby comes to be seen as something alien and at vari-
ance with the linearity and the distancing configurations of a spacetime uni-
verse. And the very notion of distancing itself becomes antithetical to what the 
meaning of the now is all about.  
How then does all this translate into the layout of this book? As already 
indicated, the book is arranged in three parts, each part and the chapters in each 
as given in the table of contents.   
Part 1: “The Now in Nature” begins with an assault on a long established 
exclusion in the paradigm of a material and spacetime nature, an exclusion that 
would cede no ground to the notion of an external now, a now transparent to 
our senses yet intractable to a reductive analysis that would more or less 
relegate it to the confines of cognitive processing and subjectivity. And so we 
begin with this notion of nature conjoined with the now. What kind of nature is 
brought out here where the now, or present time, enters in? And so we begin 
with a contrary notion of nature, a nature conjoined with the now.  
Part 1 begins with chapter 2, following this introduction.  Chapter 2 
takes up the subject of this prototype of nature where both the now and linear 
time – the time that takes time – play a role. Entitled “Material Nature Here and 
Now”, the chapter explores the notion of things in relationship and of how objects 
  
15 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer, vol. 3 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990): 3: 91. 
16 Harald Atmanspacher, “Editorial,” Mind and Matter 11/1 (2013): 4. 
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in their linear dimensionality in spacetime entail a configural relationship, a con-
nectedness with other objects based on size and linear distances – however remote 
or near. The most elemental and necessary feature of this relationship is portrayed 
as its coming about, its being actualized, by a now connection to that which as-
cribes the usage of linear dimensions to the material universe, namely sentient 
beings like ourselves. And so, the question – are these linear dimensions there in 
the universe or not? The chapter proposes its answer, arguing the case for imme-
diacy as taking on the foremost aspect of object relationship. A nature that is con-
cretely here and now, and only secondarily – by abstraction and our cognitive 
extrapolation – there and then.  
Chapter 3, “Material Nature-as-other”, takes on a second feature that 
distinguishes this prototype of nature being advanced. It is, as it’s described, a 
nature that is invariably other with respect to every thought and observation, 
mental and visual, that humanity is capable of. Otherness implies nature’s for-
eign extract vis-à-vis the biases of our sense impressions, our subjective perspec-
tives and phenomenologies, all that our minds and neural complexities con-
struct about the world that’s present to everyone who’s lucidly awake to it. 
Hence, a dualist self/other framework is proposed here but only as to the what 
of this world and nature’s otherness, not as to the when – the immediate when. 
As it shall be contended, in terms of time – immediate time – there is not that 
duality but instead a connective matching or uniformity common to both self 
and other, or in other words, as we shall describe it, a self/other alignment. 
What comes out of this distinction between the what and the when amounts to 
an enigma, a paradox. On the one hand, the temporal alignment argues for in-
separability, familiarity. On the other hand, there is nature’s alien side, the fact 
that it is other to begin with. And yet, despite this otherness, the unfamiliar, 
alien, and strange about nature, there is much about nature that is understood, 
made possible by our configurative and abstracting capacities that dimensional-
ize nature in linear space and time, equations, and measurements. It is an un-
derstanding that science takes to be objective and yet, paradoxically enough, is 
postulated on our ability to stand outside of time – that is to say, outside of the 
predetermined causal mold of a past-to-present time. As Einstein once put it, 
“The eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibility.”17  
Having addressed this conjunction of a material nature that is both im-
mediate and other, the next four chapters turn our attention to the centerpiece 
of this self/other framework, the now itself that is the subject of this book. But 
how does one exactly proceed to do this? How does one describe what escapes 
configural description, eludes the way objects in dimensional space and time can 
  
17 Cited in Peter L. Galison, Gerald Holton, and Silvan S. Schweber, Einstein for the 21st 
Century: His Legacy in Science, Art, and Modern Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008): 36. 
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be described? Do we deem this presentness what our attention finds most con-
spicuous, or do we side with William James when he refers to the “present” as 
“the darkest in the whole series” [of past, present, and future]?18 
Many who have written on the subject adopt the position that the now is 
epitomized as a seamless flowing, or that it passes and moves sequentially and 
successively from future to past, or that in fact it is we who are doing the moving 
in time, or that in any case this immediate present, infused with memory, pro-
vides us with that sense of uninterrupted constancy and gradual fading from 
awareness, rather than “a stroboscopic succession of disconnected selves and 
worlds”.19 Our strategy, by contrast, will move in a somewhat different direction 
from all of these approaches. It will explore and assess in ways that might at first 
seem highly counter-intuitive even though our project aims at a close up en-
counter and, what comes out of that, namely a 1st person insider view of things 
rather than the distanced appraisal. 
Chapter 4, “The Now in Its Immediacy,” begins our scrutiny of this topic, 
the temporal present we awaken to, by pointing out how, first of all, the now 
confronts us with its unmeasureablility, nowness being itself a precondition for 
any measureable determination to take place. The temporal present that we both 
share, you and I, in conversing with each other is contrasted with the notion of 
simultaneity, the co-occurrence of two events based on measured time. This 
nowness I share with you or with my present surroundings stands as the self-
evident starting point, the premise behind the very act of calculating occurrenc-
es in linear or measured time. From the enigma of its unmeasureability – we 
assume that the immediacy of the now is brief, evanescent, and yet on what ba-
sis? – the chapter leads to a consideration of the now’s holistic character and, 
what results from this, its incompatibility with notions of divisibility, countabil-
ity, enumeration. And yet, can I deny that my neighbor experiences a now as 
much as I do? Two nows? And what about that now from yesterday? From such 
questions emerges a crucial distinction between what one has knowledge of as 
opposed to what one knows from a radical 1st person perspective. The first step 
in defining the meaning of that distinction begins in this chapter. Later chapters 
explore it further. In a final segment of discussion here, we turn to the aspects of 
tracelessness and the now’s familiarity. No matter how much we are awake and 
alert to presentness or seek to find it, there is no trace of it. No code, no message 
  
18 William James, quoting Shadworth Hodgson; cited in Jonathan Bricklin, “Con-
sciousness Already There Waiting To Be Uncovered,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
17/11-12 (2010): 66. 
19 Quoting Jason Brown, “Simultaneity & Serial Order,” Journal of Consciousness Stud-
ies 17/5-6 (2010): 10. For a sampling of the various strategies by which the temporal present 
has been schematized, particularly in relation to tense and aspects of past and future, see, 
for example, L. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith, eds., The New Theory of Time; (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994).  
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or information is divulged to our experiential contact with it, the now’s immedi-
acy. The trace of an object, a reflected piece of sensory data in the form of a light 
pulse, hits the retina of the eye and with it comes a time that was presumably a 
moment ago, a time already past belonging to whatever it was the light reflected 
from. And yet the now, given its makeup, can never take the form of that or any 
other trace, for a light reflected trace of something is always invariably in the 
past, always a record of what was, even just a fractional moment ago, whereas 
what is, temporally speaking, is unreplicable whether as a copy or effect, code or 
message, sequence or consequence, and hence cannot take the form of a trace 
from before. For if it could, the present would be in the past. 
This now that has no past is yet familiar to us, taken for granted. Why 
should we not be startled by something new, alien in its novelty, something that 
cannot be conceived of in the past or past tense?  
Chapter 5, “The Now that Stays Where It Is” reasons this way: Adopting 
the insider viewpoint – what we have dubbed a radical 1st person perspective –, 
one starts with what the immediate confronts us with, the experientially imme-
diate time of being simply awake to the world. Given that immediacy, we do see 
a changed, a difference that marks presentness, but we do not see borders that 
mark off the change itself, the differentiation between present and past or day 
and night. Framed insofar as it is immediate, the now is nonetheless borderless, 
without extent or countable configurations. As for the past and future, we re-
member the one and anticipate the other and consider them quintessential fea-
tures of time, yet in no other precinct of time except what is immediately before 
us, among and between us, does one find this now that stays where it is, given of 
course that one is in a lucid state of mind. And yet the paradox that this chapter 
presents us with: the changed itself, the dynamic sense that this now is not stat-
ic, not frozen in time, but has changed from what was a moment before. Unlike 
Herman Weyl’s famous dictum – “The objective world simply is; it does not 
happen”20 – the now does happen and it is part of the objective world, or at least 
that is the proposition this chapter will seek to support. Furthermore, it will be 
pointed out the distinction between “memory-linked” and “lucidity-linked” and 
why it is that the two key elements that bring about the now’s happening – the 
changed from and the changed to – must both be lucidity-linked, or in other 
words features of the world that our perceptions are exposed to, rather than 
aspects of memory or mind that we bring to the world.  
The title of the next chapter, “Con-temporaneity”, adopts a hyphenated 
spelling of this word to emphasize the enigma of our shared temporality, that my 
living in the present is the same, temporally speaking, as yours. Chapter 6 de-
fines this term “con-temporaneity” as a temporal uniformity or alignment that 
  
20 [italics his] Herman Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, trans. O. 
Helmer, rev. ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), 116.  
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undergirds society’s cohesion by making possible social and sentient interaction, 
communication, and knowledge exchange.  
One hypothetical challenge to this con-temporaneity is posed by a 
thought experiment involving a scientific scenario known as the twin paradox, 
based on how near light speed travel affects (linear) time, as postulated by rela-
tivity theory. As we shall see in this discussion, what the twin paradox is really 
about is distortions in linear time – the time that takes time, not distortions in 
now time.  
The chapter concludes by exploring two other scenarios of now interac-
tion and how they exemplify con-temporaneity and defy segmentation into mul-
tiples or before-and-after distinctions of time. The examples given are that of 
delayed responses in televised overseas interviews, as well as in overseas phone 
conversations. Instead of the TV viewer or listener on the phone experiencing 
the time lag as evincing distinctly separated nows, what gets communicated is a 
uniform field of present time despite the time lag. It is not that the time lag has 
been misconstrued as present time. Rather, it is that a lucid observer or listener 
can never be awake to a non-con-temporanenous world, a world that is other 
than in the present.  
“The Notion of a Beginning,” the title of chapter 7, takes on the task of 
extracting an answer from the proverbial “Which comes first, the chicken or the 
egg?” As applied in this instance, the question is about the now’s immediacy as a 
starting point and how that can be reconciled with the configural content given 
to one’s present perceptions, content recognizable only because of familiarity 
gained from past perceptions, past experiences. On the other hand, can there be 
even a past perception, a past experience, without the now already presupposed, 
already in place as a starting point? There is that chicken-and-egg question, but 
then there is the more notorious question about the notion of any nowness com-
ing before nowness. Must we necessarily assume that by “beginning” – let’s say 
of the universe –, we mean before the present, and if so which notion of “begin-
ning” are we adopting, one based on linear, measured time, or one based on the 
unmeasurable, the now that comes immediately, without a before and after? 
That the linear must necessarily come before the nonlinear is the very question 
at issue, the topic which this chapter addresses, drawing on various fields of 
inquiry in search of an answer. 
Back to the question: Which comes first, the now or the not-now? And 
what if we should find the answer, weird as it may seem, in this way: by stum-
bling upon the now at a time that is not now, be it the recent or remote past, for 
example? Achieving such a feat would at least accomplish the goal of determin-
ing that the now – this or any now – assuredly does not mark a beginning. For 
there would have been demonstrated a previous palpable now, something our 
eyes and ears have veritable evidence of. Such a curious speculation leads to 
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Part 2 of this book, “Whatever Happened to a Moment Ago?: Searching the Ar-
chives of Not-Now Time for an Answer”.  
Thereupon in chapter 8, “The Not-now in Its Various Designations”, we 
start the search for that palpable past, that “moment ago” as we shall call it – be 
it recent or remote. The quest undertaken here, one must bear in mind, is for the 
essence of that moment – that is, for the experiential occasion as it was lived, 
not for the aftermath, how one recollects or represents it in remembered images 
or words. With that goal specified, the chapter explores various alternative 
routes to not-nowness – the “just now”, the “lived past”, the “nowless” state of 
dreams – as we shall label them – and memory’s not-nowness considered as an 
experiential medium. The quest continues in chapter 9, “The Not-Now of Ex-
tended Time”, where knowledge itself, as a category of the not-now, is put to the 
test of extracting this concretized moment ago as originally experienced. And on 
down the road, a further probing for what we are seeking takes us to more nebu-
lous terrain – the scenario of a delayed response to trauma and the time lag 
experience of someone gazing at a stellar event. 
Chapters 10 and 11, entitled “Do We Die?” and “Contra Lucidity?”, bring us 
to even more bizarre territory in this search for nowness outside of the present. 
“Do We Die?” swings the direction of our inquiry from the not-now of the past to 
the not-now of the future. In the format of this questioning of a seemingly trivial 
truth, our search zeroes in on the far end of one’s life, at the divide between the 
now and the not-yet of one’s hypothesized afterlife. Within this narrowed focus at 
that end, an important distinction is made between the notion of “transition”, 
implying a changed (rather than the process of changing in linear time) and “ter-
mination”, evoking the sense of an end point in linear (or extended) time. The 
conclusion reached is that the witnessing of death, that witnessing itself gives evi-
dence of a transition that the not-now cannot inform us of, for the latter pertains 
to the arrow of time in either direction, the before and after, not to the immediate 
now of transition. Chapter 11, “Contra Lucidity?” takes up accounts of doppelgang-
er experiences from the canons of literature and history, ostensible palpable re-
trievals of segments from the past in the form of present, lived experiences. The 
question, of course, is how one determines the authenticity, as recounted, of wit-
nessings of the absent present brought into the present. The chapter turns the 
spotlight on what undoubtedly has been the most influential account of such a 
scenario from the archives of the past – namely, the resurrection of Jesus and in 
particular the touch of Thomas’ hand on the resurrected Jesus’ wounds. Leaving 
aside the question of historical veracity, the cameo scene provides a seminal ex-
ample of the retrieval of that moment ago, its lived concreteness, in the template of 
a present time. What comes out of this discussion are two considerations: (1) The 
historical gap between then and now, based as it is on linearity – chronology and 
measured time – loses pertinence when the scenario in question concerns an expe-
riential immediacy, the meaning of which lies in the nonlinear immediacy itself, 
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not in any distanced perspective apart from it; and (2) the question “Do the wit-
nessings qualify as history?” may not be the right question, but rather “Do the 
witnessings disqualify history as an arbiter?”  
Part 3 of this book, “Nature in the Now”, presents a reappraisal of the re-
lation between the two components of the conceptual framework we started 
with – nature and the now. Emerging from our exploration of the latter in Parts 
1 and 2, a key change in the form of a clarification is shown to be needed in de-
fining the relation between the two components, from that of a “Now in Nature” 
(Parts 1 and 2) to that of “Nature in the Now” (Part 3). “The ‘In’ Question Anew” 
(chapter 12) turns to this “in” word and its meaning as applied to that otherness 
that we have described nature as constituting, an otherness arising out of na-
ture’s alterity to ourselves. In sum, how the switch is explained from “now in 
nature” to “nature in the now” comes down to this: Whereas the mainstream 
scientific model of the linear or sequential universe portrays all but a sliver of 
that universe as out of reach, unbounded by what we know in the present, un-
bounded by the now constraint, in this chapter’s exposition of the relationship 
between nature and the now it is the latter that is beyond reach, unbounded by 
nature and our linear conceptions of it, unbounded by any conceptualization of 
an “in” – including the “in” that connotes a space and spacetime universe, in-
cluding the very linearity implied by “in”.  
Following this scrutiny on relationship, we come to chapter 13, “The 
Nonlinear (i.e. Non-Sequential) Universe vs. Metaphysical Variants”, where 
comparisons are made between our self/other schema and other metaphysical 
schemas where consciousness – loosely speaking the self in some non-material 
sense – plays a role in the makeup of nature. Particular aspects of Berkeleyan 
idealism and panpsychism, for example, are considered by way of exemplifying 
how the framework adopted in this book differs from these. The distinction es-
sentially spins on the radical 1st person perspective underwritten in our pursuit 
of an immediate knowing that comes by experiential contact with the now. 
This brings us to chapter 14, the final chapter of Part III. The gist of this 
final chapter of the book is to highlight the bifurcation between the two lives we 
live, the two natures we experience and learn about, and the two times – one 
extended, the other not – that cause this split in our lives and understanding. 
How this divergence comes about is illustrated in the comparison between what 
comes to us, that sensory knowing by which immediate contact is made with the 
world’s presentness, and on the other hand what comes from us, the knowledge 
we acquire by putting things in place and in order, given the distanced appraisal. 
The question is then asked how, given a distanced appraisal, the knowing by 
initial impression could possibly matter, given its limitations from a 3rd person 
perspective. The answer can be summed up in the chapter’s designation, “The 
Sun also Rises” – to adopt the title from one of Hemingway’s novels. 
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* * * 
 
In a letter to Carl Jung in 1953, quantum physicist Wolfgang Pauli writes dis-
missively about a conceptual framework that would assay nature from the start-
ing point of a here and now: 
What Mach wanted, but what is not feasible, was the total elimination of everything 
in the description of nature that is not detectable [feststellbar] hic et nunc. But then 
one soon realizes that one does not understand anything: neither that a psyche must 
be assigned to others as well (detectable is always one’s own) nor that different peo-
ple talk about the same (physical) object (Leibniz’s windowless monads). In order to 
satisfy the requirements of both instinct and intellect, one must therefore introduce 
structural elements of a cosmic order which are not detectable as such.21 
What Pauli claimed as being not feasible – to posit nature’s description on the 
foundation of the here and now – that in fact is the challenge of this book, to 
demonstrate the feasibility of such a thesis. In a nutshell, the line of argument 
proceeds in this way:  Given a lucid, normal functioning mind, we do wake up. 
a. That we do wake up exposes us to what is now in our experience 
– our surroundings, the world as we witness it, that which is other 
than ourselves. (Chaps. 2, 3) 
b. The nowness of what we witness, being immediate and holistic, is 
indivisible, unmeasurable and unrecordable, traceless, and 
unrepre-sentable except as translated in 3rd person terms.  Yet to a 
lucid mind, it is as familiar as the present field of view, as familiar 
as the distinction between present and past. (Chaps. 4-7) 
c. The now is not in measurable space and time and does not belong 
in that conception of nature. (Chap. 12) 
d. The not-now by comparison (Chaps. 8-11) is the time that takes 
time, is measured by scales and clocks, and is predicated on there 





21 [emphasis Pauli’s] Cited in Harald Atmanspacher, “Dual-aspect monism a la Pauli 













Material Nature Here and Now  
 The commonplace term “lucidity” will be the key as to how we go about uncover-
ing the meaning of “material nature” in its and our temporal aspect of the now. 
Thereafter, we will move deeper into the meaning of the now itself and see what 
our inquiry will uncover about that. 
 “Lucidity” – clarity of mind – is intended, in the application given 
here, to signify simply the state of being awake to the world, being in contact 
with it as it presently manifests itself. More specifically, we shall apply this 
term to describe our experiential contact with the presentness of the world, 
the presentness of our surroundings, the table we as a group are all sitting 
around, its presentness aligned to each of the group’s immediate sensory wit-
nessings of it. And, as further evidence of that lucidity, each of our witnessings 
of that table are as well aligned to that of each other, never skewed, never a bit 
off to the past or future from the nowness of all the other members’ witness-
ings of that table. That is one aspect of lucidity that concerns the meaning of 
nature proposed in this book. In the next chapter, we will take up the second 
aspect of lucidity that concerns us, the otherness of our surroundings, the 
otherness of nature, which we shall be referring to as “nature-as-other”. That 
too is an inherent part of what constitutes one’s clarity of mind, an inherent 
part of what it means simply to wake up and be awake. But we begin here with 
this first aspect of lucidity and probe how it affects the meaning of material 
nature. 
 Adherents of the past-to-present school of thought, as I call their theo-
retical premise, might question what we mean here by this clarity of mind. Some 
might even question whether we do wake up in the morning – as opposed to 
merely thinking – or being induced to think – that we do. For example, advo-
cates of the representational theory of perception have by and large argued that 
waking is no more than reacting to sensory stimuli.1 For them, the world apart 
  
1 Smythies, for example, points out the two contrary theories of perception – rep-
resentative theory, according to which “our sensations are representative construc-
tions of the nervous system, and are not direct views of external objects”, and on the 
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from our reactions exists only as inference. And yet the now in some respect 
would seem inescapable, even by way of those reactions. Constructivists, on the 
other hand, might make the “strong” constructivist claim that the “out-there-
ness” or objectivity of any scientific fact about nature “is the consequence of 
scientific work rather than its cause”.2 But then what do words like “comprehen-
sibility”, “effectiveness”, and “understanding” come to mean in assertions like 
Einstein’s “One may say ‘the eternal mystery of the world is its comprehensibil-
ity’”, Eugene Wigner’s “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the 
Natural Sciences”, and cosmologist Paul Davies’ “We do more than just watch 
the show that nature stages. Human beings have come to understand the world, 
at least in part, through the processes of reasoning and science”?3 We can sup-
pose there is an “out-thereness” of some identifiable kind which causes state-
ments such as these to be made.  
 This book will begin on that note by taking the position that there is an 
“out-thereness” we wake up to, and that the out-thereness we wake up to is a 
material nature here and now.  
 And yet, material nature here and now? How can that be material 
nature? The very phraseology would seem to flout the first things we know 
about nature, namely that it is for the most part not present, not here and 
now, but going on all the time behind our backs, with little about it elicited 
by the present, being by and large absent, eons absent from this or that pre-
sent time.  
 So how does one avoid the semblance of a kind of oxymoron by juxta-
posing “material nature” and “here and now”, the net effect of which would seem 
to bestow a transience to nature that, by contrast, is presupposed by science’s 
laws of nature to have the constancy that makes such laws applicable over ex-
tended time? It is this question the chapter addresses. As possible paths to an 
answer, let’s begin with two conditions which we shall specify as concreteness 
and the temporal present. Two seminal figures in science’s theoretical founda-
tions, Milic Capek and Ernst Mach, offer some helpful suggestions that bear on 
these two notions insofar as they apply to nature. We begin by first quoting a 
passage from Capek, an excerpt taken from a discussion of his on space and 
time: 
                                                                                                                                       
other hand direct realism, the theory that what we see are “literally direct views of 
external physical objects”. In his assessment, the problem has never been solved. 
Smythies, p. 225. 
2 Quoted from James A. Holstein and Jaber F. Gubrium, eds., Handbook of Con-
structionist Research (New York: The Guilford Press, 2008): 215 (citing Latour and 
Woolgar, 1979, 257). 
3 [italics his] Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why Is the Universe Just Right 
for Life? (Boston, MA.: Houghton Mifflin: 2006): 231. For the references to Einstein and 
Wigner, see the next chapter, no 58. 
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[A]ll physical properties of a body, even its inertial mass – which Newton called “vis in-
sitas” residing hic et nunc in a certain region of space at a certain time – can only exist 
in dynamical interaction with other masses and cannot be conceived without it.4 
The second remark that bears on these conditions comes from Mach:  
It is utterly beyond our power to measure changes of things by time. Quite the con-
trary, time is an abstraction, at which we arrive by means of the changes of things.5 
We begin with Capek. Simply speaking, his point is that everything in nature 
bears some intrinsic relation [“dynamical interaction”] with its surroundings. 
Try to imagine the opposite – an object devoid of any connection, relation, or 
interaction with its surroundings, even distantly. By what reasoning could one 
even identify it as an object or structure of some kind, given that any label of 
identity would itself betray a connection of sorts, an existence in relation at least 
to the identifier. In alluding to Newton, Capek uses the phrase “hic et nunc” to 
mean the location of physical properties (as Newton depicted it) in a certain 
region of space at a certain time. The essence then of Capek’s remark is that 
something can be said to exist as long as it is in “dynamical interaction” and not 
in total isolation. We might pause here a moment and extrapolate from Capek by 
adding that in those instances where there appears a dynamical interaction but 
not of a clearly specifiable kind, such as in the case of nonlocality or particle 
state indeterminacy in quantum physics, the dynamical interaction can be inter-
preted as between the quantum experimenter and the measurement performed.6 
There will be more to say about the Capek passage, particularly about this “hic et 
nunc” and his translation of it as “in a certain region of space at a certain time”. 
But first a few words about Mach’s passage. 
 As he speaks of it in this instance, the essence of Mach’s take on nature – 
epigrammatic in its terseness – is that change and changes do not in themselves 
demonstrate a measure of time, whether that be long or short. More accurately, 
our estimations of long or short are what we apply to the changes, measured 
  
4 [italics his] Milic Capek, The Concepts of Space and Time: Their Structure and 
Their Development, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. XXII, ed. R.S. Co-
hen and M.W. Wartofsky (Springer-Science-Business Media, B.V., 2014): p. XLI.  
5 Ernst Mach, Science of Mechanics (Chicago, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 1960), 273.  
6 For example, there is the question about how to define a subatomic particle’s exist-
ence before the measurement is performed. According to one interpretation of quantum 
theory, the “existence” of such particles “may not be conceived of in any specific form 
available to our thinking, beginning with those attributes of (wave or particle) motion 
that define classical physics, but ultimately extending to all conceivable attributes. Ac-
cordingly, the term ‘existence’ or any other term referring to quantum objects (‘quantum’ 
and ‘object’ included) is ultimately inapplicable.” Arkady Plotnitsky, “The Unthinkable: 
Neoclassical Theory, the Unconscious Mind and the Quantum Brain,” Brain and Being, 
ed. G. Globus, K. Pribram, and G. Vitiello (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), 31. 
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time being the product of our gridwork of abstract thinking, a notion that con-
curs with Bergson’s view that duration is a part of consciousness, not apart from 
it. 
 We shall have to consider a moment in the unfolding of the universe, that is, a snap-
shot that exists independently of any consciousness, then we shall try conjointly to 
summon another moment brought as close as possible to the first, and thus have a 
minimum of time enter into the world without allowing the faintest glimmer of 
memory to go with it. We shall see that this is impossible. Without an elementary 
memory that connects the two moments, there will be only one or the other, conse-
quently a single instance, no before or after, no succession, no time.7  
 This fusion, as Bergson sees it, of extended time with memory and conscious-
ness does not mean, however, that Bergson necessarily excluded their role (in-
cluding his pivotal notion of “duration”) as constituents of nature. What it simp-
ly means, in his case, is that measured and calculated times are not out there in 
an external domain separate from conscious experience.8 
 Taken together, these snapshots from Capek, Mach, and Bergson posit a 
seismic shift from the ordinary layman’s image of nature, where nature as gen-
erally – in fact almost universally – understood consists of time measures and 
space measures, a nature authoritatively described as going back eons to periods 
dated by measurements of past time and advancing forward by estimations of 
future time. Even so, one wonders how, given this everyday conceptualization of 
measured nature, such estimates can apply (except as a mental concept) to a 
future not yet in tangible existence, or how calculations that extend in reverse 
can track (except as a mental concept) a past whose existence is only detectible 
  
7 Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity (trans. Leon Jacobson) (Manchester, 
UK: Clinamen Press, 1999), 33. Note also how some indigenous cultures, such as the 
Amondawa, base time on events, not measured time. Among the conclusions of anthro-
pologist Chris Sinha from his study of the Amondawa is this: “[I]t is the constructed 
temporal schemas of linearity and cyclicity that permit the conceptualization of temporal 
relationships as existing in a domain of content abstracted from the events themselves. It 
is this (in some sense imaginary) content that we designate ‘Time as Such’.” Chris Sinha 
et al, “When Time Is not Space: the Social and Linguistic Construction of Time Intervals 
and Temporal Event Relations in an Amazonian Culture,” Language and Cognition 3-1 
(2011): 141. The implanting of time units as our way of constructing temporal distance in 
nature can be compared to how mathematics is portrayed as deriving from the embodied 
mind: George Lakoff and Rafael E. Nunez, Where Mathematics Comes from (N.Y.: Basic 
Books, 2000). 
8 Despite Bergson’s phraseology in one of his books “no duration in the exter-
nal world”, we shall see in chapter 5, the section “The Changed and the Mediat-
ed”, just how, for Bergson, memory can be understood as external, not personal, 
and relate to change itself. Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: an Essay on the 
Immediate Data of Consciousness, trans. F.L. Pogson (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Pub-
lications, 2001), 227. 
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in the tangible present by someone present and in a lucid state of mind. Into this 
question of abstract references and how nature fits into the picture, we intro-
duce Capek’s existence criterion again – namely, “dynamical interaction” – and 
along with that his allusion to Newton’s “hic et nunc”.  
We note here this “hic et nunc” and Capek’s translation. It would be a 
stretch of the imagination to suppose that “certain region” and “certain time” 
could be intended as a literal equivalence of “here and now”. Far more likely of 
what the translation is intended to give us is a “here and now” as defined by 
spatial coordinates and a calculating device of some sort that measures linear 
time, the time that takes time based on number. But let’s hold on, for a moment, 
to either possibility, and return to Mach.  
According to him, measurement computations of time are not out there 
in nature where events are. The computations surely are helpful for us but not 
indicative of a temporality inscribed in the events themselves. Given that prem-
ise that events are bereft of inherent linear or countable time designations, 
where – we might ask – does that leave the situation of nature as a whole, in-
cluding any and all of its properties, their existence bearing the necessary “hic et 
nunc” credential that Capek speaks about? That’s just it. If events in themselves 
lack inherent distancing protocols based on measured time, how could any of 
nature – excluding our mental concepts – be invested with inherent computa-
tions of time? Nothing of that sort, such as we can detect by our means, comes 
inscribed in nature, nothing in nature’s topography that would situate the hic et 
nunc at a calculable distance from ourselves today and now. And here by “hic et 
nunc” it becomes evident which meaning we are referring to: the here and now 
in a literal, uncalculable sense. Taking Mach as our cue, coordinates of space 
and time are not out there, inscribed in nature, so as to establish distance and 
differentiation of a “certain region of space” and “certain time” from the imme-
diate present, the here and now. Which is only as much as to say that “[f]or in-
stance, the unit of a second in physical time measurement is arbitrary in the 
sense that physical processes are not organized in such a way that a second 
would be a distinguishable measure of time.”9 Of course, one can retort that a 
second is obviously shorter than an hour, or that what happened three years ago 
is not happening today. The fact remains, nevertheless, that those determina-
tions are our determinations, successful in meeting our needs as humans, rather 
than being intrinsic to nature.10 That, at least, is what we can surmise, given a 
reading of the Capek and Mach quotations considered together.  
  
9 Georg Franck and Harald Atmanspacher, “A Proposed Relation between Intensity 
of Presence and Duration of Nowness,” Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli’s Philosophi-
cal Ideas and Contemporary Science (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2009): 213.  
10 McInerney writes that, “Although a de facto empty time may be comprehensible, a 
time that could not be occupied by real entities is not comprehensible and is impossible.” 
But this may mean nothing other than what we have just said, namely that the enumera-
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If we follow this direction of thinking, which we shall do in this chapter, 
where then does this put the time of nature? It puts the time of nature in the 
same ballpark as the time of the here and now, meaning here by “time” not com-
putational and clock time but the time we’re awake to, the literal time now that 
lived experience brings to our awareness.  
This much along in the chapter’s discussion provides us with an initial 
step in framing the basis for a “material nature here and now” – at least to the 
extent that the distancing from the present of what is not “here and now” is not 
out there, not distinguishable as a fissure or chasm between now and then, not 
evidenced as measured time except by the measurements we employ. Of course, 
we take measured time as a fact. But again, that’s our doing, not a feature of the 
landscape we witness. Moreover, our being informed about physicists entering 
“realms beyond our daily experience” and about phenomena being “discovered  
. . . that can no longer be mapped onto patterns accessible by our sense organs”, 
does nothing to implicate this distancing either. Instead, what it gives evidence 
of are detections by instruments of measure – our instruments.11 Likewise, such 
detections of realms beyond daily experience are always in the mode of here and 
now, not detections of distancing from here and now.12 To be more precise, a 
distancing of that kind – from the here and now – might be possible if we could 
sit down across from each other, you and I, with me thereupon engaging in a 
chat with a yesterday you or a you tomorrow. Hence, a brute distancing, in flesh 
and blood, detected from the here and now, unbiased by measurement readings 
on our part.  
 So, if there is no distancing of time (other than a calculable one) from 
out there in nature’s past and future pockets of events, why is it we can’t in fact 
sit down across from each other, you and I, and do just that – me proceeding to 
                                                                                                                                       
tion of measured time – while not intrinsic to nature – is intrinsic to our needs and com-
prehensible on that basis.  [italics his] McInerney, 223.  
11 The quotations are from Karl von Meyenn, “Wolfgang Pauli’s Philosophical Ideas 
Viewed from the Perspective of His Correspondence,” Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pau-
li’s Philosophical Ideas and Contemporary Science, ed. H. Atmanspacher and H. Primas 
(Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer: Verlag, 2009), 13. 
12 Nature in an abstract sense, non-experientially based and void of experiential im-
mediacy – in a word “nowless” – is the notion being attacked here and replaced by this 
appendage of the “here and now”. The reasoning against it presented above can be com-
pared to Strawson’s: “What evidence is there for the existence of nonexperiential reality, 
as opposed to experiential reality? None. There is zero observational evidence for the 
existence of nonexperiential reality – even after we allow in a standard realist way that 
each of us encounters a great deal in concrete reality that is not his or her own experi-
ence. Nor will there ever be any. All there is, is one great big wholly ungrounded wholly 
question-begging theoretical intuition or conviction.” Galen Strawson, “Mind and Being,” 
Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 94.  
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have a chat with you here and now, along with that yesterday you of yours and 
the you tomorrow – all three at the same time? That kind of rejoinder is remi-
niscent of Capek’s quip about a future history: “If the future history of the uni-
verse pre-exists timelessly (or, as it is fashionable to say, ‘tenselessly’) in its to-
tality, why is it not already present?” – and we might add, why not with the pre-
sent included, enabling us to be spectators to both future and present (and why 
not the past as well?)13 The effect of that totality on our perceptual awareness 
might run, in theory, like the purported “life review” instances of some who, 
near death or a death-threatening situation, report experiencing their past or a 
part of it as if present, suddenly, all there at once, the flash before their eyes. Or 
it might run something like this: 
I was in a place. Around me was flatness and barrenness. To talk about a sequence to 
the experience is to distort it. There was no time there. I now know that time is a 
convenient fiction for this world, but it did not exist in that one. Everything seemed 
to be at one moment, even when ‘events’ seemed to occur in sequence. . . .The . . . re-
experiencing of my life . . . was simultaneous and yet separate and distinct. There was 
no such thing as the sequence of events that we believe time to be.14 
As later chapters will explore in more detail questions concerning our temporal 
constraint to the present, the response we will offer here at this preliminary 
stage to this enmeshed challenge of past, present, and future will be limited to 
the following:  
First, this book is an exploration of the phenomenon of present time 
which, as will later be shown, is not an endorsement of tenselessness or time-
lessness. That clarification hints at part of the reason why present perception is 
not a perception of past, present, and future. Second, we can see from Capek’s 
question, previous to the quote above, that it is really about a future in the pre-
sent and why that isn’t so. Why, in a nutshell, are there not two present times at 
once, a bifurcated now that translates into two nows from two different (linear) 
time periods? The brief answer, the one that we will give here, is that, experien-
tially speaking, there is no such thing as a bifurcated now, a now that can be 
divided in half. To suppose otherwise, would be to rewrite the nature of human 
experience, the nature of the now as well. One might propose, as Bradford Skow 
does, that the analogy of split brain patients argues a basis for the presentness of 
one’s experiencing two different localities and thereby, in a non-spatially/tem-
porally divided spacetime universe, a basis for the presentness of one’s experi-
encing in different stages of one’s life – in short, two or more nows, even if such 
  
13 Capek, The Concepts of Space and Time…, p. LI. Capek points out Whitrow and 
William James as raising similar questions.  
14 Account given by Steven Fanning, quoted by William James and cited in Bricklin, 
“Consciousness Already There..,” 63.  
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even if such nows – though coexisting – would be inaccessible to one another.15 
The short answer given here is simply that the argument lacks observational 
evidence and, secondly, that the nature of nowness being advanced in these 
pages takes on an experiential immediacy (in the 1st person) that precludes no-
tions of (3rd person) measurement, division, and distance in spacetime terms. 
Later we will have more to say on the topic of such hypothetical bifurcation, as 
let’s say a present now and a now from the past conjoined. That will be taken up, 
for example, in the chapter “Contra Lucidity?” in Part 2 of this book. And third-
ly, another part of our response to the bi-temporal question Capek raises will 
emerge in how this book advances this notion of the now, or present time, we’re 
awake to, and the pivotal distinction between that and consciousness; between, 
that is, what comes to us and what comes from us. What will be brought out as 
we proceed is a description of the former, how it is that the now entails an im-
mediacy, direct contact with an otherness that comes to us and that in certain 
ways baffles and preempts our attempts at configuring it and, for example, for-
mulating it in terms of linear time, the before-and-after time that takes time. 
There is, in other words, no before or after that can come conjoined with present 
time for the reason that there are no two immediacies possible, a doubling which 
would imply countability. Present time’s distinctiveness in this respect will ne-
cessitate discussion on its uncountability, a subject we will have more to speak 
about in chapter 4.  
In the meantime, let’s take a further step in brainstorming what appears 
as an incompatibility: how nature can be both material, as mainstream science 
understands it to be, and nonetheless here and now; how in other words it can 
be both configural – measureable, divisible in spatial terms, sequential in linear 
time – and unconfigurable, unmeasurable, indivisible, unsequential. Our way to 
confront this issue is to do the following. We begin by taking a closer look at this 
“here and now” attribution, what it implies in giving us a 1st person approach to 
nature, how it contributes as well to satisfying an objective basis by which to 
understand nature. Next, we point out the distinction between nature’s here and 
now on the one hand and conscious awareness on the other, by which we mean 
that which concerns one’s state of mind in a privatized sense. We proceed from 
there by probing how a here-and-now material nature differs from conscious 
awareness, and from there we move on to show yet another way the “here and 
now”, distinct from conscious awareness, undergirds and serves to validate not 
only itself as an objective concept but “material nature” as well – a nature re-
sponsive to objective methodologies by which verifiable data can be obtained.  
Being the centerpiece subject of this book, the now, or present time, is of 
course a topic in itself we will have much more to speak about in the coming 
  
15 Bradford Skow, Objective Becoming, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 
223-224. 
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chapters. Our purpose here is to provide the opening scene by starting with the 
“here and now” and how that fits into the framework of nature. From there we 
proceed to an additional affixation of nature, this one proposed in the next chap-
ter – namely, a nature that is not only “here and now” but additionally nature-
as-other. Subsequent chapters of Part 1 will take up the profiling of the now 
itself as externally depicted, a now in nature, in the setting of such a nature as 
the current and next chapter describe. 
1. The here and now as a 1st person perspective 
And so now back to the task of expanding on that seeming incompatibility: how 
nature can be both material, as mainstream science understands it to be, and 
nonetheless here and now. Since “here and now” is inseparable from that which 
is given by 1st person means, we had best start with this latter term “1st person”, 
particularly in a context where its meaning is highlighted by comparison with 
“3rd person”. The definition given by Overgaard, Gallagher, and Ramsoy, is suffi-
cient for our purposes not only because it highlights the comparison but also 
because it passes on the standard downgrading, the standard suspicion about 
taking the 1st person perspective at face value:  
From a first-person perspective, objects appear in a certain way, with a certain expe-
rienced quality, to a given subject. Such observations are relative to the subject and 
may be influenced by personal history, so that one person cannot share another per-
son’s subjective point of view, and cannot from the outside “measure” what this other 
person is experiencing. The third-person perspective is generally taken to mean an 
“objective” perspective where information can be shared by individuals, or where any 
individual can make in principle identical observations (e.g., using mathematical 
measurements, counting, using an apparatus for scientific measurements, etc.).16 
The important consideration about “first-person” is brought out here. 
“[O]bjects appear in a certain way, with a certain experienced quality, to a 
given subject.” This is as much as to say that whatever it is one is awake to, 
having as it does a certain experienced quality, the experienced quality neces-
sarily exposes itself in an immediate sense, the objects necessarily here and 
now, not there and then, from that 1st person perspective. To an extent, one’s 
perspective can share another 1st person perspective when the two persons 
having them stand next to each other and observe the same objects, thus both 
participating in a similar experienced impression necessarily here and now. 
But on the other hand, the two observations in each case are relative to the 
  
16 Morten Overgaard, Shaun Gallagher & Thomas Z. Ramsoy, “An Integration of 
First-person Methodologies in Cognitive Science,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15/5 
(2008): 103.  
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subject. I cannot get into your body and mind and experience things from 
your perspective. Hence, the perspective is from the person who witnesses the 
scene directly. By contrast, the 3rd person perspective applies information to 
the scene or infers information from the scene, easily shareable, though less 
likely to be directly evident from the 1st person perspective. An illustration of 
how the two perspectives differ comes out in the following critique of neutral 
monism, a philosophic schema that – according to one interpretation – posits 
direct encounter as the conduit by which nature’s primal reality is exposed. 
The critique is from the standpoint of dual aspect monism, its perspective one 
that steps outside of direct encounter: 
 Assuming that the neutral can be apprehended directly, how could it be  apprehend-
ed if not mentally?17 
The information that the 3rd person perspective adds to the scene is in that word 
“mentally”. The 1st person perspective takes account only of the “directly appre-
hended”, whereas the “mentally” aspect is nowhere in sight.  
 And so where do we find the downgrading, the pejorative judgment to-
ward the 1st person perspective in the definition given by Overgaard, Gallagher, 
and Ramsoy? It starts with the imputed subjectivity of the 1st person perspective 
– “Such observations are relative to the subject and may be influenced by per-
sonal history” – and, following that, the deficiency implied by the fact that “one 
person cannot share another person’s subjective point of view, and cannot from 
the outside ‘measure’ what this other person is experiencing”. By contrast, a 
higher assessment gets ascribed to the 3rd person perspective in that it “is gener-
ally taken to mean an ‘objective’ perspective where information can be shared”. 
The discrepancy in how the two perspectives get evaluated comes down to this 
feature of shared information, which is deemed to make a perspective objective. 
But let’s contest that. Let’s take the example of a table that we’re all sitting 
around. If we’re all sitting around this table, we must be all sitting around this 
table now. Needless to say, that table’s existence is not relative to a particular 
perspective. We’re all sitting around it, and that information can be shared. And 
what about this table we’re all sitting around now? Is the now any less evidence 
of sharing just because its evidence is experiential, not informational? Can there 
even be what we call “information”, or access to it, without an implicitly shared 
now? And wouldn’t that consideration put the bedrock of objectivity in the  
  
17 Harald Atmanspacher, Dual-aspect, 99. This “directly apprehended” aspect of the 
neutral monist’s posited epistemic access to a primal (ontological) truth by direct en-
counter is further phrased by Atmanspacher as: “direct, basic, pure, raw modes of appre-
hending it [the underlying domain], for instance experientially or phenomenologically”. 
Atmanspacher, Dual-aspect, 99.  
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1st person perspective? Hence, it would seem necessary to provide a supplement 
to the initial definition of “1st person” given above, something like the following: 
Although first-person reports may fail to be self-sufficient pieces of knowledge (be-
yond acquaintance), they remain the unique and inescapable basis of any further 
empirical knowledge of ourselves and of our environment. First-person access is the 
testimony of our being-in-the-world, and the source of every claim of the availability 
of a surrounding world. . . . One also too often loses sight of the fact that even the 
“objective experimental data” of natural science are nothing else than convergent 
first-person reports of a certain type.18 
Thus “first-person”, in our usage, is intended to be understood, not as a byword 
for subjectivity and potential bias, but as (1) a way to describe experiential ac-
cess by the consciously aware subject, or in other words (2) being lucid, con-
sciously aware of one’s present surroundings. 
With this groundwork given for the meaning of “1st person”, let us now 
proceed to the next step in substantiating this chapter’s framework of nature by 
showing how the here-and-now, necessarily entailing a 1st person perspective, 
excludes in this given description the imputation of its being a mirage of some 
kind, a mere indexical marker reflective of one’s conscious awareness and sub-
jective state of mind, rather than a temporal immediacy attributable to what’s 
outside us. But then the question: On what grounds does one go about ascribing 
this here-and-now to material nature, as distinct from the realm of our own 
individual phenomenologies and cranium enclosed mental mechanisms?  
The answer requires, first of all, a brief backtracking to the definition of “1st 
person perspective” given by Overgaard, Gallagher, and Ramsoy, specifically the 
part about observations being relative to the subject’s perspective: “Such observa-
tions may be influenced by personal history, so that one person cannot share an-
other person’s subjective point of view, and cannot from the outside ‘measure’ 
what this other person is experiencing.” The key is “measure”. I, from my perspec-
tive, cannot measure what you are feeling and what tinge of personal background 
you are applying to whatever you are observing. Nor am I seeing objects in view 
from the direction you are seeing them. All of this ties into that aspect of a 1st per-
son perspective that can appropriately be labeled indexical and subjective. We 
each have our different angles of perception, give different coloring and emotional 
quality to whatever it is we perceive. To that extent the 1st person perspective is 
slanted individually, oriented by personal differences, and in those respects sub-
  
18 [italics theirs] Michel Bitbol and Claire Petitmengin,  “On the Possibility and Reali-
ty of Introspection,” Mind and Matter 14/1 (2016), 52. Their clarification avoids the 
ambiguity of such expressions as, for example, “subjectivity captures the first-person 
aspect”: Luis Favela, “Consciousness Is (Probably) Still Only in the Brain, Even Though 
Cognition Is Not”, Mind and Matter 15/1 (2017), 52. 
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jective. Likewise, the “here”, severed from the “and now” in our usage, admits to an 
indexical meaning insofar as the landscape one observes reflects one’s individual 
perspective, one’s angle of view. The question is how all this changes when the now 
comes into the picture – that is, the here and now of a 1st person perspective. The 
answer requires a further look at this “here and now” as a combined attribution. In 
how we are using the term, the combined designation implies neither a subjective 
perspective nor an indexical reflexivity, as we shall see.  
 The “here and now”, as a combined attribution, puts the brunt of mean-
ing on the now and its constraints. Lee Smolin describes that constraint in this 
way: “The world is presented to us as a series of moments. We have no choice 
about this. No choice about which moment we inhabit now, no choice about 
whether to go forward or back in time. No choice to jump ahead. No choice 
about the rate of flow of the moments.”19 While Smolin’s usage of “moments” in 
the plural runs counter to our description of the unmultiple now (as we shall 
later elaborate on), the constraint we have in mind is otherwise well depicted in 
his description. So where does that put the “here”, given its context in the “here 
and now”? A “here” in isolated usage is a here I can choose depending on where 
I want to be. By contrast, the here in “here and now” is fixed temporally to where 
I’m presently at – necessarily a here now, not a here yesterday or tomorrow. 
Hence, the implied indexicality of a “here” in usage by itself gets, in the com-
bined phrasing, impeded by a temporal factor, about which my 1st person per-
spective, in an indexical or subjective sense, is totally irrelevant. In short, when 
we speak of the “here and now” in this chapter, the “here” should be understood 
in that involuntary sense: necessarily a here now, as opposed to a here yesterday 
or tomorrow. We shall be carrying over that involuntary sense of the “here and 
now” when the focus of our discussion narrows to the now itself in the forthcom-
ing chapters of Part 1 that investigate it (chapters 4-8).  
Keeping in mind this temporal fixity of the “here and now”, in the way 
we have just explained it, the affixing of that phrase as a 1st person attribution of 
material nature can be seen as consonant and compatible with the picture that 
scientists give us of material nature, a nature responsive to 3rd person method-
ologies by which verifiable data can be obtained. After all, scientists do not con-
  
19 Lee Smolin, Time Reborn: From the Crisis in Physics to the Future of the Universe 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013 [First Mariner Books edition]), 92. Smolin 
implies a usage of the “here” that suggests indexicality and self-reference when that word 
is applied to space location and apart from the context of the here and now. His words 
quoted above continue: “In this way, time is completely unlike space. One might object by 
saying that all events also take place in a particular location. But we have a choice about 
where we move in space. This is not a small distinction; it shapes the whole of our experi-
ence.” Still, the notion of a “here” in isolation, or one’s moving in space in isolation, is 
little more than academic in the sense that, as the truism goes, no one has ever witnessed 
a here without a now, or a now without a here.  
Material Nature Here and Now 45
duct their research in a dream or by eluding their sense perceptions or 1st person 
perspective, but conduct their actions in a world they’re awake to, their research 
necessarily grounded in an actuality of nowness their minds are not simply con-
structing or inventing.  
So much for our opening salvo on the compatibility question – namely, be-
tween nature, on the one hand, and the attribution of “here and now”. The next 
step is how we go about plotting this here and now in material nature. If truly it is 
there, in material nature, the logical conclusion would seem to be that it too – this 
here and now – must possess thinglike attributes of some kind (configurability, 
measurability, and so on) the way other material things in nature do. But that 
seems impossible to maintain. The here and now – configurable? Measureable? 
For more on that, see chapter 4. On the other hand, being a phenomenon arising 
out of a 1st person perspective, the temptation is to go in the reverse direction, 
which tailspins us back to consciousness, situating the here and now as arising 
from there, an epiphenomenon of one’s state of mind. And then we are back to the 
incongruity of proposing that a subjective attribute could apply to an out-of-
subjective realm, namely that of material nature. A contradiction no less.  
2. Perceiver – perceiving – object of perception 
Another way to pose this problem of situating is to ask where might the tem-
poral constraint of this here and now be plotted along the sensory stream of 
perceiver – perceiving – object of perception. We have ruled out explaining it as 
a product of subjective influences and self-referentiality – that is, if we admit to 
a present world at all, a present world we wake up to, given a lucid state of mind. 
Still, we have not ruled out a possibility not quite in the same subjective league – 
namely, that what the “here and now” refers to, what it’s really all about, occurs 
at stage 2 in the profile of the sensory stream as shown above – that is, at the 
stage of perceiving. In that case, the temporal constraint would nonetheless turn 
out descriptive of a mental process after all, an effect of the mind, though not of 
subjectivity in the sense of biases, temperament, personal character, and back-
ground that frame the partiality of a particular outlook an individual has on the 
world. Even so, plotting the here and now at stage 2 resurrects the compatibility 
issue again, the problem in this case of attributing perceiving, understood as 
what’s in one’s head, to what’s outside one’s head. How, in other words, can a 
phenomenon at stage 2, a phenomenon that arises from us, be attributable to 
what arises apart from us, from material nature? More specifically, how can a 1st 
person phenomenon – the here and now – merit the same objective credentials, 
an equal object status, that other objects are shown to have from a 3rd person 
perspective? I observe my surroundings. Where exactly is this here and now? 
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How do I distinguish it as an object from my act of perceiving? Failing that, how 
then can I deny this second version of the subjectivity claim? 
It must be clear, at the onset, what this question is restricted to. We are 
not addressing a theory question about consciousness, speculations about its 
extended borders in the cosmos, which opens the door to metaphysical schemas 
about nature as found in panpsychism. Instead, we presume here the more fa-
miliar notion of consciousness, the consciousness delimited by one’s skull, and 
hence a conscious awareness contained within, and not outside, the confines of 
the individual self. Taking as our border one that delimits the demarcation be-
tween conscious perceiving and whatever aspect of nature perception takes in, 
our question becomes one of simply determining the basis for plotting the here 
and now at stage 3, where the objects of perception are, rather than at stage 2, 
the stage of perceiving. How do we counter, in other words, an effect-of-the-
mind adjudication, a stage 2 allocation of the here and now, on the basis of that 
subjectivity claim in its second version?  
We find the answer in the word “consensus”. There is this take-for-
granted consensus we all share, let’s say, in the stadium watching that football 
game, a consensus about what is now and what isn’t. One cannot imagine a 
football game without it, or any other human interaction without it, for that 
matter. That distant star? Maybe there’s a time lag of millions of light-years. 
Maybe that distant star is extinct. But on the other hand, the star you and I see 
is a present sighting for both of us, not a present sighting for me and a yesterday 
or tomorrow sighting for you. Today is today for me as well as for you, the here 
and now necessarily now. Why, then, this consensus and how does it argue – if it 
does so – for a stage 3 allocation of the here and now? 
One argument against a stage 3 allocation conforms to the pattern of rea-
soning typical for all of us, a cause and effect explanation that relies on a before 
and after, the presumption of a previous cause to explain a present occurrence of 
some kind. According to that argument, the common now – or consensual here 
and now – is pinned as a stage 2 phenomenon, a neural transmission effect of the 
conscious mind that brings about precise attunement to other minds or conscious 
states at this or that precise moment. This comes about, according to this line of 
reasoning, by means of a connective alignment to an information stream, a neural 
processing that converts the data into discrete perceptual episodes. Such a notion 
is totally at odds with the concept of a self/other alignment we will be discussing, 
an alignment that makes lucidity possible and that preempts by its very nature the 
notion of data or encoded information. About that we will have more to say in 
coming chapters. As for how, according to the schema based on information 
transmission, the impression arises that makes you think you’re in the world now, 
it is attributed to this processing mechanism in the brain. Hence, you’re not really 
awake to the world here and now. It is only an epiphenomenon, the effect of a 
brain mechanism that produces this impression, this illusion of momentness that 
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as well is propagated by other brains. Hence, a grand illusion – grand illusions that 
happen to match. The internal device responsible for this stage 2 phenomenon has 
been dubbed by one theorist on the subject a “temporal integration device”.20 The 
problem with this explanation is how one goes about verifying it. If it is all a sub-
jective manifestation at stage 2, how does one go about ascertaining that this is so, 
or determining that this theory about time is not itself just the product and con-
coction of a temporal integration mechanism? Perhaps a superior brain mecha-
nism of my colleague could inform us of what’s really the case, but then if his en-
lightened view as well is only the effect of a brain mechanism, where does that get 
us? There is no retrieving in this case an objective standpoint if there is no stage 3 
phenomenon of the here and now to begin with. In sum, by this accounting of 
things, the very notion of “cause” nullifies the authenticity of the effect. 
Another way to explain this temporal consensus is as a reflection of a cul-
tural norm, a standard adopted in a period of a society’s development by which 
notions of objectivity and justified truth are constructed, the implication being that 
the consensus in question – this consensus we have about the here and now – is 
just another one of those relative truths, relative to the values, social norms, 
standards of evaluating evidence in a particular period in any society’s develop-
ment.21 Here the problem is one of falsifiability. Could there conceivably be a time 
of no temporal constraint at all? But then there would end up being no consensus 
about present and past and hence no society, let alone a particular period in a soci-
ety’s development by which to promulgate relative truths.  
A more plausible way to explain this temporal consensus of the here and 
now is as evidence that what we are dealing with is a stage 3 phenomenon, a phe-
nomenon with objective credentials. We have only to take the perceiving, let’s say, 
of the here and now of this table we are all sitting around, to take that stage 2 per-
ceiving not as the point of origin of the here and now of this table but as the point 
of its reception. That explanation falls naturally in place when one considers how 
closely linked to a lucid mind the concepts of perceiving and conscious awareness 
are, and how closely linked lucidity is to this notion of a consensus about the here 
and now. What seems a tautology – one cannot be judged in a lucid state of per-
ceiving and being conscious of what’s going on if one is not perceiving and being 
conscious of what’s going on now – is actually evidence of a two-fold consensus: 
not only a consensus about the here and now but also a consensus about what a 
functioning human mind constitutes based on the here and now. In both instances 
  
20 Callender’s term. Craig Callender, “Explaining the Common Now”: 19, 35. 
[www.diffusion.ens.fr/databis/diffusion/bonus/2010_02_15_callender.pdf]: 19, 35; also 
C. Callender, “The Common Now”, [philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/ccallender/ 
Papers/The%20Common%20Now.pdf]: 12; Philosophical Issues 18 (2008). 
21 On this see, for example, John McDowell, “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity,” 
Richard Rorty and His Critics, ed. Robert B. Brandom (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2000): 117, 119, 125.  
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we are talking about convergent 1st person reports of a certain type. Such consen-
sus or convergence backs up the claim that the here and now does, in fact, belong 
in category 3, not category 2, as this attribution “here and now” is based on con-
vergent 1st person reports that qualify as “objective experimental data” as de-
scribed by Bitbol and Petitmengin, cited earlier –  
. . . even the “objective experimental data” of natural science are nothing else than 
convergent first-person reports of a certain type.  
By way of emphasizing the point, it should be noted that what adds weight to the 
ascription of the here and now as objectively based and in the same category as 
“objective experimental data” is that it meets equally the tests of consensus, 
repeatability, and falsifiability – three standards of the scientific method. One 
simply has to ask if a person could be alive yet not be witness to the here and 
now? Poellner has described a phenomenon that meets the repeatability test “as 
not exhausted by any particular experiential state which purports to represent it, 
and it is available for various numerically distinct experiences of it by oneself 
and others – ready to be experienced, as it were.”22 What could be more ready to 
be experienced? The temporal constraint common to sentient beings like our-
selves provides the consensus and never ceases to repeat – i.e. from a 3rd person 
perspective during one’s life -- the evidence of its presence, though how it mani-
fests is neither in measurable form nor as discrete data. And as for that third test 
– the test of falsifiability, as we shall see in the case of dreams the here and now 
is falsifiable, a subject we will get into in Part 2. 
The compatibility challenge we started with appears to have been success-
fully met. The here and now, it seems, does conform to a stage 3 description, and 
by doing so it falls in place as a constituent of material nature – being thinglike in 
that respect and compatible with third-person designations of what material na-
ture consists of and pertains to. We, however, apply this term “here and now” not 
only as a constituent of nature but as a characterization of nature as well. This is 
because, from a 1st person perspective, there can be no nowless characterization of 
material nature. The very characterization insinuates a presentness, the here and 
now of the nature being characterized – unless one resorts to a 3rd person perspec-
tive and treats nature in the abstract, the view from nowhere. But can such a na-
ture in the abstract exist without its concrete manifestation?  
  
22 Peter Poellner, “Affect, Value, and Objectivity,” Nietzsche and Morality, ed. B. Leiter 
and N. Sinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 233. [www2.warwick.ac.uk/ 
fac/soc/philosophy/staff/poellner]: 9. 
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3. The boundary question anew 
 Let us now proceed to exemplify much of what we have just said by taking up 
two 1st person accounts of what purportedly was witnessed as elements of the 
perceptual scene, though adjudged paranormal, at least in part, by most stand-
ards. In the one account we have neuroanatomist Jill Taylor’s published report 
of her altered sense of momentary time after a massive stroke on the left side of 
her brain, and in the other a former Jesuit priest’s recollection of a moment of 
stilled silence in the desert after a long drive and a heavy consumption of coffee 
along the way. Taylor’s account runs as follows: 
Time stood still. . . . I found myself floating from isolated moment to isolated mo-
ment. . . . When I lost my left hemisphere and its language centers, I also lost the 
clock that would break my moments into consecutive brief instances. Instead of hav-
ing my moments prematurely stunted, they became open-ended, and I felt no rush to 
do anything.23  
The second account by James Connor is described this way: 
At last I lost all thought of myself. I lost the sense of myself watching myself, and was 
just there as the desert and the comet were there with the stars, the cold, . . . Halfway 
through a single breath, the night revealed itself as joy. The joy did not rise up from 
me, nor was it in me – or if it was in me, it was only because I was in the night. It was 
more than a feeling; it was an understanding, a knowledge beyond words.24 
To what extent are these descriptions simply effects of mental aberrations (stage 
2) induced by injury or an overdose of coffee? To what extent do we find ele-
ments of potential objectivity that can be allocated to stage 3? 
As for Taylor’s stroke and Conner’s sojourn to the desert at night, a factual 
check of one kind or another would presumably verify that such events did occur. 
And so to that extent, consensus by independent investigation would warrant ob-
jectivity of those parts of each description and stage 3 designation, meaning that 
such incidents were actual and not simply divagations of one’s state of mind. As 
for Connor’s ambiguous allocating of the revealed joy, the ambiguous hovering 
between feeling and understanding, the knowledge beyond words, here there are 
the obvious failures of substantiation by consensus and repeatability. The experi-
ence, the claimed actuality of what happened in that desert, was virtually one of a 
kind, unavailable for a second investigator to relive and confirm. One might 
loosely compare it to the unrepeatability of a quantum measurement that gal-
vanizes an immediate effect on two entangled particles vast distances apart.  It 
  
23 Jill B. Taylor, My Stroke of Insight (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 50, 68. 
24 James A. Connor, Silent Fire: Bringing the Spirituality of Silence to Everyday Life 
(New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), 2. 
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can’t be redone or undone.  That limitation, in either case, is not, however, to 
disprove the attested descriptions.  It is only to deny them the kind of stage 3 
objectivity that attains when such verifications as described above have been 
carried out. But here is where we turn back to another place in Taylor’s description 
– where she refers to her moments – and find ourselves at loggerheads with the 
stage 2/3 border question anew.  
She describes those moments as open-ended, unstunted, unbroken by 
clock time, and herself as floating from isolated moment to isolated moment. 
The problem is essentially this: On the one hand, it would seem impossible to 
validate the objective standing of such moments as she experienced them subse-
quent to her stroke, and for the same reasons as expressed above – lack of con-
sensus and unavailability of the experience for others to repeat. Hence, lack of 
sufficient basis to assign her time perception to the stage 3 side of the border 
where we’ve plotted the here and now. On the other hand, one notes a curious 
resemblance between her experience, while in a brain-damaged state, of open-
ended, unbroken moments and the temporal constraint of the now we’ve talked 
about and shall be talking about throughout these pages, how it defies easy con-
figuration and breakdown into instances. Furthermore, in her case one can 
speak of repeatability at least to a limited extent – that is, the repeated experi-
ence of the state she describes herself as having been in prior to her recovery. In 
view of all this, how do we assess her description of moments and time? On both 
sides of the fence? Mostly deranged? The answer requires that we take a closer 
look at the nature of the now consensus in normal circumstances – a consensus 
on the here and now about which there is little dispute. As much of this gets 
further explored when we turn our attention exclusively to the now component 
of the self/other framework (chapters 4-7) put forth in these pages, we’ll give 
only a proposed brief overview here: 
Consensus: The now is a first-person phenomenon. 
Consensus: When awake to the world, every perceiving and experiencing is a per-
ceiving and experiencing now. 
Consensus: When awake to the world, the now is experienced as indivisible and 
unmultiple, without a beginning or end, and – however prolonged – yet not a mo-
ment ago or a moment after.  
Consensus: In any meeting or encounter with our surroundings, we and whoever 
or whatever we encounter share the same now. I cannot meet with a yesterday you or 
encounter a surroundings that are not here now – barring a simulation, but even that 
must be encounterable at a present time. 
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What immediately stands out in this overview is the idiosyncratic makeup of 
these four constituents. This is discerned by noting the absence of a “what”, the 
absence in other words of configurative content, not only of a measurable kind 
but even simply of a quality, like blueness, something that catches our sensory 
pick up. Instead, what these four constituents of consensus give recognition to 
are features of the here and now that essentially reduce to the via negativa, “not 
this, not that” – i.e., not past, not future, not divisible, not configurable, not 
countable, and so on. One might question how such a contentless instance – a 
moment of occurrence, a moment of presentness – can be distinguishable at all 
as an instance if it is not configurally distinguishable from any other instance, 
since it has only to do with time, not specifiable content. One encounters a com-
parable question of sorts in the philosophic way of speaking about quality in-
stance or property instance of anything, but there the question is how, from our 
being exposed to an instance or example of a quality such a blueness, it comes 
about that propositional distinctions about it are possible: “That is blue, not 
red.” In the case of the now, there is no sensory quality or property to get a han-
dle on. Instead, it is what defines the possibility of a sensory quality or property 
to begin with, by providing the possibility of concreteness. How then does this 
content-less instance – this temporal constraint of the here and now as we’ve 
been speaking about it – become graspable at all as the centerpiece concept of 
this book? Explaining how will be the ongoing aim of this book. 
 Expanding a bit on this aspect of quality or property, one can add to the 
mystery just posed, how there can be consensus about the here and now proposed 
in the overview above, by thinking about it this way: For there to be a quality or 
property of anything there must be an instance of it. Hence, the expressions “quali-
ty instance” and “property instance”. However, given our focus of concern, we will 
construe “instance” not as “example”, as is customarily meant by such expressions, 
but as a here-and-now occurrence. Consequently, our line of inquiry becomes not 
the expected one about content, not in other words about how a quality or proper-
ty – naked and brute-like in its exposure to perception – gets clothed into proposi-
tional statements that distinguish it, such as “that is blue, not red”, but rather 
about how this content-less instance (construed as moment of occurrence, mo-
ment of presentness) can be distinguishable at all as an instance if it is not distin-
guishable from? How does this content-less instance – this temporal constraint of 
the here and now as we’ve been speaking about it – become graspable at all? It is 
another way of highlighting the challenge we’ve just posed above.  
 In the meantime, seizing upon this criterion of “lack of distinguishable 
from”, one might find provocation yet again for raising the boundary question 
by inquiring how the here and now can be distinguishable, in conceptual terms, 
from a state of mind, that of the mind of a conscious perceiver. Both conscious-
ness and the here and now admittedly share elusive features, elusive boundaries 
as we have shown, resisting easy description in configurative and measurable 
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terms. Moreover, their interdependency seems indisputable. Can there be a here 
and now without consciousness? But equally, evidence points the other way – 
Can there exist the here and now without experiential and objective-based con-
tent at stage 3? The perplexity of this boundary question between consciousness 
at stage 2 and the here and now at stage 3 is exemplified by how one scholar of 
temporality, Georg Franck, defines “mental presence”: 
Mental presence is the feeling of being a conscious mind. . . . The state of mental 
presence is what we know best of all because it is what every act of experiencing is in. 
Yet it is completely alien to us because we cannot grasp it in its own reality. Mental 
presence is a byword for concreteness. Still, it is not a thing we can experience with 
our senses. Nor is it accessible by abstract thought. It ceases to be what we are trying 
to grasp as soon as turned into an object of thought.25 
How closely does this notion of “mental presence” identify the immediate pre-
sent of the here and now? It captures the sense of elusiveness, the alien aspect, 
and with it the paradoxical concreteness of the here and now, its familiarity – 
“what every act of experiencing is in”. On the other hand, as to its category – 
stage 2 or stage 3 – “mental presence” would suggest the former, and yet if it is 
what every act of experiencing is in how can it not be at stage 3, just as that table 
or any material object that manifests its concreteness by its presence? 
 How we have already shown the here and now to be attributive of mate-
rial nature, rather than an indexical reflection of ourselves, is suffice for the 
present distinction we are seeking, although more will be said on this as we pro-
ceed. We need only point out here how consciousness, when understood as the 
consciousness in our head, answers to a stage 2 allocation, and how, by contrast, 
the here and now serves a foundational role at stage 3 that satisfies various ob-
jectivity criteria we have applied to it.  
 Turning back to an earlier puzzle, it is the query that touched off “the 
border question anew”, namely the question of how insightful Jill Taylor may 
have been, even before her recovery, in her description of “moments”, as she 
describes them.  
Was her description, in short, insightful in portraying something at stage 
3? What we can say is that insofar as the moments, as she described them, de-
fied configurative description as clock time or definable breaks in time, it can be 
argued her attestation shows compatibility with at least the here-and-now con-
sensus profile we laid out earlier, in spite of (or perhaps even because of?) her 
  
25 Georg Franck, “Mental Presence and the Temporal Present,” (p. 48) Brain and Be-
ing: at the Boundary Between Science, Philosophy, Language and Arts. Ed. Gordon G. 
Globus, Karl H. Pribram, and Giuseppe Vitiello (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2004), 
47-68. 
Material Nature Here and Now 53
brain disorder.26 The compatibility seems elicited by how she describes mo-
ments, although in the plural, yet as unbroken, open-ended, lacking the struc-
ture of “consecutive brief instances”. More on those aspects when we come to 
the uncountable and traceless now in chapter 4.  
What we can conclude is that it is the very objective character of the here 
and now, its foundation in stage 3, which makes possible the determination, in a 
here and now, of everything else of an objective character, including material 
nature’s status as other, other than our own arbitrary ways of thinking, other 
than what our state of mind induces us to believe. Let us propose to legitimize 
this here and now by designating it a kind of Archimedian point that makes pos-




26 The suggestion here that one’s insight about nature and the external world may 
vary depending on one’s state of consciousness recalls Charles T. Tart’s notion of state-
specific science. 
27 That there is in fact an Archimedian point by which to adjudge nature was ques-
tioned, for example, by Rorty and Dennett. Daniel Dennett, “Back from the Drawing 
Board,” Dennett and His Critics: Demystifying Mind, ed. Bo Dahlbom (Oxford: Black-




“Each of us divides what is into two mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive parts: the part that one is and the remain-
der that one is not. That this distinction obtains is a meta-
physical mystery, a presupposition of the ordinary intelligi-
bility of the world. . . .”  
 Stephen Priest, “Radical Internalism”, p. 155, n. 6. 
Chapter 3 
Material nature-as-other 
 In this chapter we proceed to that second facet of lucidity that was indicated 
previously at the beginning of chapter 2. And by that we mean the facet of lucidi-
ty that sheds light on otherness, the otherness of the world and material nature. 
Much of what we take for “otherness” consists of what we ourselves bring to our 
sensory field, our recognition of shapes, the names for things, their functions, 
our feelings about them, associations, and so on. But that is not the kind of oth-
erness we’ll be discussing. What then is this world-as-other, this material na-
ture-as-other, we will be discussing? On the one hand, it is external. It is out 
there. The very fact that we recognize it as such, given our lucidity, implies a 
direct realist position that is being advanced here on this issue of otherness. 
Justification for this position is not difficult. It is one thing not to recognize what 
an object is and yet to be aware that it is other and apart from one’s mind. It is 
quite another to hallucinate or to take what’s in the mind for something that’s 
out in the world, or vice versa. That distinction between a contacted otherness 
and mistaking it or being oblivious to it forms the basis for this second aspect of 
lucidity we are targeting here, the kind of lucidity that informs us about other-
ness. This is not to imply any assessment about the degree to which lucidity 
about otherness, from a 1st person perspective, is informative about material 
nature from a 3rd person perspective. And here we raise a legitimate question. 
What exactly is the basis for asserting that otherness exists in the first place if, 
by its very immediacy of presentation, it precedes any of our ways to configure it 
in such a way as to identify what it is? One answer might be that the evidence for 
this otherness is change itself, the visceral sense of exposure to the just 
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now/now disjuncture. Another answer might be that the now itself, or the 
nowness of consciousness, is in two locations – self and other – entangled and 
nonlocal, and that you need both to be in a social condition with the world and 
to connect to our surroundings, just like the smile on my friend’s face. I am here 
and yet I am there where that smile is, sharing the experience of that smile ra-
ther than figuring out the cognitive significance of that smile, reportedly symp-
tomatic in cases of autism.1 
 What can be asserted is simply the trivial truth that without that lucidity 
which opens the doorway to otherness, there is no foundation on which infor-
mation and knowledge can rest, including what can be known about material 
nature. But from that modest claim we now proceed in this chapter to the more 
radical one – namely, that this otherness is not our lucidity per se but an intrin-
sic part of material nature. 
What we are about to say here unabashedly conflates two disciplines, 
merges them into one, i.e., epistemology – the study of knowledge and ways of 
knowing – and ontology – the study of being, ultimate reality, regardless of how 
or what we know. In what way then does this con-flating of the two disciplines 
come about? How is it justified? 
It starts with what may appear a trivial truth to anyone who concedes we 
are not simply a mirror or reflex of nature and that likewise nature is not a mir-
ror of ourselves.2 The trivial truth being this: Whatever it is we are aware of 
when awake to the world, whatever appears in our particular field of view, that 
field of view – unless it be a literal mirror – is not a mirror of ourselves, but en-
tails something else. Its source lies elsewhere, not in the perceiver’s mind. That 
difference of provenance, disclosed by the scene of objects that a lucid spectator 
perceives, is how we intend this term “otherness” and the title “Material nature-
as-other”. The trees, the landscape, the moon, other people, my own hands and 
feet – all specimens of otherness by the very condition of their being viewed and 
distinguished from our source of self. I am not that tree. That is what I know by 
looking at that tree. It is that mark or imprimatur of distinction that underwrites 
the confidence that my senses are intact, that I am in fact awake to the world. 
Precisely it is that otherness that comes into my field of view – world-as-other, 
nature-as-other – that likewise betrays the inescapable constraint of time. I can 
be in contact with otherness that is only now, not at other times. Whether this is 
due to my human condition, a structural defect intrinsic to knowledge itself, or 
whether indicative of a dualist metaphysics, what results from this temporal 
self/other constraint is a smudging over of the dichotomy between our epistemic 
  
1 For more on this, see for example Steve Torrance, “Contesting the Concept of Con-
sciousness”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 16/5 (2009), 119 et al., and Alex Seemann, 
“The Other Person in Joint Attention: a Relational Approach”, JCS 17/5-6 (2010), 178. 
2 As, for example, suggested in Richard Rorty’s Mirror of Nature.  
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foothold, our capability to know in an immediate sense, and material nature’s 
“being” in any ultimate sense. For I can only know its ontology likewise as an 
otherness I am directly confronted with – a view, a conception, a thought, a 
theory –, not as a being or otherness roped off from my temporal self. Hence, 
the mingling of the two disciplines. Analogous to this merger, we might borrow 
for our purposes one of Heidegger’s aphorisms in his writing about Dasein’s 
Being: “Dasein’s Being is itself a definite characteristic of understanding of Be-
ing.”3 
In a nutshell, aside from adding as a designation of nature the attribu-
tion “here and now”, which chapter 2 gave reason to do, this chapter will show 
the basis for a second appendage, why the attribution of “otherness” as well 
applies – “material nature-as-other”. The schema of nature that then emerges 
from this second attribution, as we shall see, can be likened to a seesaw effect, 
with nature-as-other at one end of the seesaw, balancing as a counterweight to 
what’s on the other end of the seesaw, another of nature’s appended trademarks 
– the here and now – that invokes the perspectives of sentient beings like our-
selves. Let’s see how this comes about. 
1. In defense of material nature-as-other  
How exactly does the notion of nature transform when we move from its consider-
ation as two words – “material nature” – to its designation as “material nature-as-
other”? As has been intimated above, what changes is a contingency gets intro-
duced – the seesaw effect. Instead of a nowless and indifferent nature suggested by 
the two words alone, a nature in which the scales of time stretch on relentlessly, 
leaving the transient present irrelevant by comparison, instead of that this second 
designation “material nature-as-other” throws an uncertainty into the picture. A 
cosmos that is not so oblivious to what happens now. But can it be believed?  
Can it be believed, for example, that the here and now might not only 
have some part to play in all that stands in contradistinction to ourselves – all 
that vastness of time and space, all that otherness – but might actually be the 
very thing that makes that vastness possible? And that, for example, nature’s 
autonomy, which we traditionally aver to be boundless and self-sustaining, 
might actually be in some way the outcome of the here and now? Can that be 
believed? 
Attempting to treat such proposals seriously requires that we begin, first 
off, by taking a closer look at this “otherness”, how it can be corroborated and 
what exactly it implies. 
  
3 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 32 [12]. On 
this convergence of the epistemic and ontic in the form of knowing (as distinct from 
knowledge), see chapter 4, sec. 4 and chapter 4,  n. 28. 
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We will start with how we have proceeded from the beginning, providing 
as a ground or first postulate that without which we end up with a self-defeating 
skepticism.  In other words, adding to what we have just said about “otherness”, 
we can define nature-as-other in terms such as these: this present world, our pre-
sent surroundings which all lucid minds are aware of, and most fundamentally 
that which we do indeed wake up to in the morning. Otherness comprises whatev-
er it is that confronts our lucid state of mind and that interacts with our sensory 
awareness. It locates on that side of things where an obvious distinction is recog-
nized – I am not that tree, that specimen of otherness –, it being on that side, that 
stage 3 side of things, where what we perceive as things in “nature” in the loosest 
sense of the word can be adjudged to be so based on objective assessments. This is 
where we begin.  
Now for the embarrassing implications of that above snapshot. Specifi-
cally, what gets excluded by way of implication? Indeed, it then seems all that 
comes from us is excluded, the cognitive spelling out and translation that we 
give to that otherness, the shapes and forms as part of our decipherment of the 
raw and mentally unconstructed outside, our ways as humans of recognizing 
and organizing things, such as ways of calculating time and measuring distance 
that reflect our own input, memories and expectations that color 1st person im-
pressions, as well as misconceptions and ideas that reflect simply our own inner 
worlds. 
Well, but does that leave any room for otherness? The classic question: 
Is there, in fact, a mind-independent reality? Or as Cooper has put it: 
(1) Is there a way the world anyway is, irrespective of how we take it to be? 
(2) Is an articulable world anything but the “product” or “construct” of human 
thought and attitude?4 
And so, we might ask, on what basis can an endorsement be made of otherness, 
and the proposition implied by it that what we wake up to, that source of con-
tent, lies in the otherness zone – that is, outside of ourselves? How is such an 
endorsement possible when the very semblance of otherness may be fallacious, 
at least to an indeterminable degree, an effect of our own minds doing the trick 
of constructing what we see, think, and believe to be other? 
Of course, one can highlight, as alternative, the self-defeating pit that the 
skeptical argument falls into. If otherness is but an effect of our minds, then even 
that conclusion cannot escape the same delusion – it too falling into the same 
category as an effect of our minds. Where does it end? The quicksand under the 
skeptical argument does nothing, in itself, to bolster the claim for nature’s other-
  
4 Quoted from David E. Cooper, The Measure of Things (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2002), 1. 
Material nature-as-other 59
ness. It comes down to this: Where can we find an independent means, outside of 
mere impressions of othernesss, on which to base this notion? Let us therefore 
proceed by setting out on this task of finding one, working out a strategy by which 
otherness can be independently established. We will pursue this in three steps, 
starting with (1) Otherness as a pre-condition, then (2) Otherness in via negativa 
terms, and finally (3) Otherness and the here-and-now.  
2. Otherness as a precondition 
 We start with the orange on that tree. Step 1: I see the orange. I touch the orange. 
It tells me, so to speak, that I have sensory experiences. Step 2: The orange is 
there. The orange is not me. That tells me, presumably, there’s an external world. 
Hence, there’s that otherness. But on the other hand, suppose it all starts with a 
dream of that orange, a dream of that sensory orange? How then can that orange 
in a dream tell me anything about the world, or about otherness? A world in my 
dreams? Where then, looking elsewhere, excluding the evidence of my own senses, 
do I find that independent basis, that justification, for the otherness I’m awake to? 
One route to an answer has been to dispense with the apparent futility of 
finding a justification – “justification” in this context being the attempt to build 
the case for external otherness on what reasoning powers construct as an edifice 
of logic leading to that end. Instead, the alternative proposed in recent years is 
to take at face value the obviousness of what strikes everyone as psychologically 
immediate and irresistible, everyone with a lucid mind, that is. How could any-
one doubt the obvious presence of the world? Bertrand Russell puts it this way: 
“Skepticism, while logically impeccable, is psychologically impossible, and there 
is an element of frivolous insincerity in any philosophy which pretends to accept 
it.”5 
 Belief based on acknowledgment of the obvious, or what is termed “enti-
tlement”, points to the key ingredient of this alternative approach, which goes by 
that name.6 The entitlement position would therefore find its basis or “warrant”, 
not in reasoning powers, but in the salience of otherness that confronts us, re-
gardless of our reasoning powers. Which stands as more warranted, that you are 
reading this sentence or that you only seem to be reading this sentence? Hence, 
the warrant of cogent confrontation. More technically, this entitlement position 
is described as an “externalist type of epistemic warrant”, which suggests a 
foundationalist epistemology – that is to say, the foundations of its system of 
  
5 Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1948), 9.  
6 Epistemic entitlement, as it is referred to, is overviewed by Jon Altschul (2016), who 
gives an account of the approaches of various of its proponents, such as Dretske, Crispin 
Wright, and others. (www.iep.utm.edu/ep-en/).  
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belief are deemed as self-sustaining (“foundational” in that sense), and not de-
rived from or justified by further beliefs or chains of reasoning. 
 We start with this entitlement position as an alternative route to otherness 
because it suggests immediacy and salience may be stronger indicators of the 
world – the world that the self perceives as other – than what reasoning powers 
come up with. It is an externalist viewpoint that coincides with the one to be laid 
out in these pages. Of course, one can always argue that immediacy and salience 
are aspects of dreams as well, especially nightmares. But this depends on how we 
construe the immediacy and salience of otherness. Let us turn here to that very 
question and in so doing move in the direction that delineates the position pro-
posed here on independent warrant, one that finds more compelling grounds for 
otherness than simply our face-to-face encounter with what we take it to be. 
 A key step in this undertaking is to propose that “immediacy” and “sali-
ence” signal a priority indicator in the likes of a precondition with respect to 
time. How does this come about?  
We have already spoken about how a 3rd person perspective has, as its pre-
condition, a 1st person perspective. Without that direct contact of, let’s say, myself 
or yourself being immediately face-to-face with a state of affairs, or in other words 
engaged in lived experience in the world, any other ways of referencing a situation, 
any derivative 3rd person perspective, rides on nothing. We live in immediacy, no 
escape. And that’s the priority indicator, the precondition, implied by words like 
“immediacy” and “salience”. But let’s go further. Here I am, measuring the speed 
and time it takes for light from an object to hit the retina of your eye. I thereupon 
conclude that everything you see is already past, fractionally past, the objects no 
longer immediate with the time of your visual recognition of them. A problem 
arises. I’m the time keeper. But how do I know what is present and what is past if 
everything that hits the retinas of my eyes is already past? What this question 
moves us to is the suggestion of that priority indicator, the precondition implied by 
immediacy. I do the measuring (even about myself) based on my present time, the 
immediacy and salience I’m awake to. That’s how come I can tell you’re living in 
the “past”, so to speak, by measurement standards.  
The radical constructivist Glasersfeld writes: 
[I]t is impossible to compare our image of reality with a reality outside […] because 
in order to check whether our representation is a ‘true’ picture of reality we should 
have to have access not only to our representation but also to that outside reality be-
fore we get to know it.7 (italics his) 
  
7 Ernst von Glasersfeld, “The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Con-
structivist Theory of Knowledge,” Piagetian Theory and Research, ed. I. Sigel, D. 
Brodzinsky, and R. Golinkoff. (Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1981) (http://www.univie.ac.at/ 
constructivism/EvG), 89. 
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But that’s exactly the feat the light-speed time keeper, and empirical scientists in 
that role, seeks to accomplish – gather representations of time from a 3rd person 
line of investigation, the investigation premised on an outside reality. And what 
is that outside reality? Timewise, it turns out to be precisely this immediacy and 
salience of the 1st person perspective which, as discussed earlier, any 3rd person 
perspective is predicated on. In other words, there is this precondition of imme-
diacy and salience that defines 1st person otherness, that defines it as the starting 
point of investigations, and that comes necessarily with the temporal constraint 
built in. That is to say, it – this 1st person otherness – comes here and now, and 
only here and now. Hence, it can be seen how that precondition of immediacy 
and salience suggests an independent basis for otherness, it being the stepping 
stone for the less immediate. 
 Let’s pose yet another scenario, this one in an excerpt from a piece by 
Robbins, who elicits this sense of a priority indicator by approaching otherness 
as “the problem of consciousness”, the problem of how this image of otherness – 
the image of the external world – comes to be ours. Robbins puts it this way:  
The problem of consciousness is the origin of the image of the external world. Yet, we 
know that nothing is stored or going on in the brain that even vaguely resembles an 
image of the external world – in the brain we just see neural-chemical flows. We can 
only ask, unsuccessfully, how these neural processes somehow “represent” the exter-
nal world or “encode” it, . . . What is the domain that the code is mapped to? And 
how could the brain map anything to this domain – the external world – without al-
ready knowing what the world looks like?8 
That “already knowing what the world looks like” evokes the priority indicator in 
yet another way. What seems to be hinted at here is the supposition that there is 
something in this immediacy and salience of world-as-other that comes as an 
already knowing, even before the brain’s encoding. Hence, we’re confronted here 
with the enigma of this predeterminer, an acquaintance already there prelimi-
nary to what the brain encodes or represents as world image. At least that’s the 
implication hinted at by the question that Robbins raises. A knowing inherent in 
the very precondition of that immediacy of world-as-other. We shall have more 
to say on that in a later chapter.  
For now, let’s summarize the essential point about the priority role of 
immediacy and salience by quoting Charles Taylor: “Our grasp of things is not 
something that is in us, over against the world; it lies in the way we are in con-
tact with the world, in our being-in-the-world (Heidegger) or being-to-the world 
(Merleau-Ponty). That is why a global doubt about the existence of things (does 
the world exist?), which can seem quite sensible on the representational con-
  
8 [italics his] Stephen Robbins, “Form, Qualia, and Time: the Hard Problem Reformed,” 
Mind and Matter 11/2 (2013): 169. 
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strual, shows itself up as incoherent once you have really taken the antifounda-
tional turn.”9 We need not discuss here his notion of antifoundationalism. It is 
enough, for our purposes, to point out, on the one hand, the concise contrast he 
makes between “our grasp of things” – a positing of that as the independent 
basis (indeed the foundation) upon which to believe the world exists –, and on 
the other hand “a global doubt” based on a representational construal. It brings 
out, in a nutshell, this immediacy of otherness in the form of “contact”.  
3. Otherness in via negativa terms 
 So now on to our second quest for an independent basis on which to support our 
defense of what we’ve referred to interchangeably as “otherness”, “world-as-
other”, “nature-as-other”. Faced with the problem Cooper raises of cognitive 
infiltration – namely, the possible extent what we take to be other and external 
turns out to be the effect of our mental constructions and ways of distinguishing 
–, given that quandary of concern let us see how well we can deal with it by us-
ing the exclusionary approach of via negativa. Accordingly, we rid from our no-
tion of otherness configurative details that distinguish how we see things in con-
trast to how other species do, shapes and forms that reflect how we humans 
perceive things. We rid from the landscape visible objects. What then might we 
say is left after such exclusion – or minus such infiltration of our cognitive in-
put? One might propose it to be mere open space, the optical field, or alterna-
tively the content as a whole in its transparency to our lived experience from a 1st 
person perspective. And even if one contends that dreams can elicit the same 
impression, there is still the consideration of a recognizable distinction about 
source that one makes in being awake, as when one says, “That was only a 
dream.”10 If that distinction itself were deemed a mental construction, and not 
externally based, we’d fall back into the jumble of self-defeating skepticism. 
 But let’s treat the exclusionary tactic another way by taking 1st person 
perspectival aim even at the very via negativa distinctions implied by “not this”, 
“not that”, so as to cleanse our field of view of even those conceptual and config-
urative distinctions. What we do to carry out this further aim is add a few words 
about this “otherness”, make explicit that by that word what is being asserted is 
what comes out of an experientially direct encounter, or in other words an oth-
erness that is so by the very fact of its confrontational aspect, its confronting our 
perspective, standing as it does in contrast to the subject, a sentient being such 
  
9 By being antifoundational, Taylor is intending this grasp to be understood as distinct 
from “a construction of knowledge from the ground up,” which is how he refers to founda-
tionalism. (p. 167) Charles Taylor, “Rorty and Philosophy,” Richard Rorty, ed. Charles 
Guignon and David R. Hiley. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 167. 
10 We exclude the issue of clairvoyant dreams. 
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as oneself. Hence, in that more explicit language “otherness” emerges as a veri-
table distinction in the form of that self/other duality as we’ve formulated it 
throughout these pages, namely in the form of:  
This present world (or present nature, present surroundings) we’re awake to  
Given this, then, as our template of otherness, can we find it possible to elimi-
nate from it even such distinctions as “not this”, “not that”? It would seem, on 
the contrary, that even in this rendition obvious distinctions of that sort crop up, 
however implicitly: “present” as distinguished from “past”; “we’re” as opposed to 
“world” (the duality), “awake” as opposed to “asleep”, “otherness” in contradis-
tinction to a presupposed opposite – self or sentient beings (again the duality). 
Hence, contrary to our stated aim, distinctions disclose themselves – or so it 
seems – of the very “not this”, “not that” character that we’re attempting to nul-
lify. 
But now let’s take a second look. We proceed by approaching the prob-
lem, as stated earlier, from a 1st person perspective because the otherness we’re 
talking about, the otherness under the rubric “This present world we’re awake 
to” is expressly “present” – immediate and salient. That level of direct experien-
tial contact with the world is what’s involved. So the question becomes what the 
above putative distinctions amount to in light of this 1st person perspective? 
From that perspective let us note what is discerned, or rather what is not 
discerned. There is, for example, a present state of affairs one is in contact with. 
In other words, this present world, but no past world, no “yesterday you” having 
dinner with a “present me”, nor a distinction in that immediate landscape be-
tween a today and tomorrow. One discerns in this 1st person landscape world-
ness, or a part of it, in a general sense and a “we’re” insofar as it applies to other 
visible people, but in both cases they apply interchangeably to this immediate 
landscape of otherness one is awake to. “Awake” and “asleep” are likewise not 
amenable to distinction in the 1st person landscape of otherness one is in lucid 
contact with when awake. Experientially speaking, one cannot be awake to the 
world and asleep at the same time (notwithstanding how lucid dreams con-
strued from a 3rd person perspective). As for the implicit distinction between 
otherness and its opposite – whether that be self, subjectivity, or private 
thoughts – again a dichotomy of this sort eludes detection in one’s 1st person 
immediate contact with the world. Even one’s arms or feet, even the mirror that 
reflects oneself, neither do these elicit an otherness/non-otherness distinction, 
though from a 3rd person perspective that draws on inferentiality an otherness in 
these respects can obviously be disclosed as distinct from the self, the “I”, that is 
having the perspective.  
The point of this exercise in elimination is to show how, by adopting a 
via negativa strategy, there can be found a second bulwark or warrant for oth-
erness insofar as it eludes configurable and distinguishable elements. It is one 
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thing to speak of our cognitive constructions defining distinguishable con-
tents. It is quite another to speak of the 1st person perspective that throws in 
relief the domain of otherness, as apart from the distinguishable input from 
our cognitive constructions. And even as for distinguishable input, what cog-
nition makes distinguishable obviously acts as a response to otherness from a 
source outside of cognition, a trivial truth brought out by John Locke when he 
facetiously remarks: 
If anyone say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced 
in us, without external objects . . . And if our dreamer pleases to try, whether the 
glowing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wondering imagination in a drowsy man’s 
fancy, by putting his hand into it, he may perhaps be wakened into a certainty great-
er than he could wish, that it is something more. . . .11 
This is only to underscore the fact that distinguishable input is not merely from 
our cognitive constructions. “It hurts!” is another way of saying the temporal 
redundancy “It hurts now!” – an immediacy inseparable from its otherness.  
And just as the heat on the hand or an earthquake is a distinguishable otherness 
“irrespective of how we take it to be”, likewise the distinction “that was only a 
dream” evinces by implication the non-cognitively carved otherness we’re awake 
to. And so it can be seen that the words “as-other” serves as a valid appendage of 
nature despite whatever cognitively based and configuratively based distinctions 
we ourselves apply to this realm. 
4. Otherness and the here-and-now 
Once we apply the attribute of “here-and-now” to material nature, which we 
have shown reason for doing so in the previous chapter, it becomes evident that 
yet another basis emerges for nature’s otherness, for its differentiation from 
state of mind or dream – taking into consideration this attribution of “here-and-
now” that we have given it. Quite simply that basis comes down to the temporal 
constraint. The fact that this “here” can only be “now”, that what directly con-
fronts us in an experiential way can only come in that mode of time, reflects a 
restriction on us rather than one we impose on nature. What this means is that 
this temporal constraint – this “here” that can only be “now” – constructs us, 
rather than the other way around. It defines the way we and our mental faculties 
operate in the world we’re awake to. There is nothing we construct, or can con-
struct, about this now. Hence, the temporal constraint is yet another demonstra-
tion of how world-as-other exposes itself, it doing this by a temporal kind of 
  
11 Cited in Galen Strawson, “Panpsychism? Reply to Commentators with a Celebration 
of Descartes”, Journal of Consciousness Studies 13/10-11 (2006): 267, n. 168.  
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distinguishing but not the kind of distinguishing that we’ve been talking about, 
the kind elicited by sensory detection of detail in the landscape. It is there, this 
temporal constraint – yet not in such a way that it can be spotted out there, 
mentally represented, recorded and retrieved from memory.  
It would seem from all this that what we are left with is a somewhat pre-
carious foothold, that of knowing about this constraint, having inside under-
standing of the present time it limits us to, but no understanding of it outside of 
our immediate acquaintance with it – and only insofar as that acquaintance 
lasts! Lacking a way by which to represent it (as a spotted detail), lacking a de-
vice by which to store it (as if the now could be at another time than now), we 
are left in the position of knowing it but only insofar as we are currently exposed 
to it. The words “temporal constraint” or “now” convey nothing in themselves 
without this current acquaintance and knowing. But the situation becomes even 
more precarious. One’s whole existence – that is, a person’s being awake to what 
is here-and-now – is likewise sustained in the same way, by this direct and im-
mediate knowing, and only insofar as that knowing lasts. Hence, that conflux 
again of knowing and being that we spoke about earlier. 
More on this in the chapter that follows. 
5. Material nature as both other and here-and-now 
 What we have brought out in the previous chapter is the objective basis for at-
tributing the here-and-now to material nature in the conceptual framework we 
are proposing for this book. One argument in favor of this attribution is that the 
here-and-now is not, as we have seen, in conflict with 3rd person methodologies 
that investigate material nature, but to the contrary such methodologies presup-
pose an immediate here and now in which to conduct one’s research. And fur-
thermore, we have seen that convergent 1st person accountings of data, which is 
the same thing as convergent here-and-now experiential accountings of data, are 
the basis for obtaining objective experimental findings in the first place. From 
this it would seem to follow that the here-and-now is a proper characterization 
of nature in the ways we have shown. And so we concluded. What the current 
chapter has endeavored to show are the merits of this second attribution – “ma-
terial nature-as-other”. The basis for this characterization of nature as other has 
been argued in a number of respects, specifically by showing (1) how the imme-
diacy and salience of the external world serve as precondition for measured 
time; (2) how this nature-as-other we are awake to exposes itself as a thereness, 
an external field, by the very fact that we are awake to it, apart from the way 
distinctions in the sensory landscape are cognitively construed; and (3) by show-
ing how the temporal constraint defines the limits of our cognitive capabilities, 
and not the other way around. 
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 Still, with this new element of “otherness” introduced, and precisely be-
cause of it, an uncertainty thereupon arises as a consequence, an uncertainty about 
nature’s overall significance. We spoke earlier of this uncertainty, dubbing it the 
“seesaw” effect, with nature-as-other at one end of the seesaw and our 1st person 
experiential perspective, with its temporal constraint, at the other.  
 And so again, can it be believed? Can it be believed, for example, that ma-
terial nature is in some respect in balance and in coordination with its own here 
and now, an attribute we have shown it to have, and that this here-and-now that 
constrains the temporality of our 1st person perspective likewise constrains, not 
just our perspective, but the cosmos itself? The implication would then seem to be 
this: that (1) the cosmos, far from being oblivious as commonly believed to what is 
happening now; and likewise (2) the vastness of space and time, far from being 
indifferent to the temporal constraint of the here and now, both the cosmos and its 
vastness would then be seen to partake of a common ground, they bearing the 
same temporal constraint that constrains us. Given this scenario, the “here-and-
now” comes to entail not only a temporal limitation imposed on us from the out-
side, but as well a temporal limitation that weighs on the uncertainty of nature’s 
otherness, on its determinable state in any fixed way.  
 More on that probing of the seesaw effect in the chapters which follow. 
What we will do here is merely pick out, by way of summary, two classic state-
ments, and their contexts, that can be shown to have bearing on this schema of 
nature’s otherness as we’ve presented it. One is from Eugene Wigner when he 
speaks of “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the physical scienc-
es”, the other from Einstein, his remarking that “the eternal mystery of the 
world is its comprehensibility.”12  
 At first glance it would appear that both statements shed little light on 
the notion of a seesaw effect, nature’s otherness being at one end and the here-
and-now at the other. Wigner’s remark appears to concern a nature grasped by 
mathematical description exclusive of its otherness and the temporal factor 
we’ve weighed in. And in similar fashion Einstein’s comment points to the 
world’s comprehensibility unqualified by time. In the article his statement 
comes from, Wigner speaks of the “fantastic accuracy” of mathematics in formu-
lating certain of nature’s regularities in the form of laws, their validity – by the 
very fact of being a law – unconstrained by the here and now. But then further in 
his article, Wigner notes that laws of nature may change, a theory or law proven 
  
12 (1) Eugene Wigner, “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Physical 
Sciences”, Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13/1 (N.Y.: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc., 1960) (https://www.dartmouth.edu/~matc/MathDrama/reading/wigner.html); 
(2) Albert Einstein, “Physics and Reality,” Journal of the Franklin Institute 221 (1935): 349-
382; reprinted in Out of My Later Years (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1967): 58-
94. Peter L. Galison et al, ed., Einstein for the 21st Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 36.  
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false by a subsequent model that takes cognizance of more inclusive data. 
Hence, that contingency of a present time and a present description, a point also 
stressed by Thomas Kuhn in the structure of scientific paradigms. Einstein, in 
the context of his statement, underscores the “miracle” of how our minds give 
“order” to our sense impressions, “this order being produced by the creation of 
general concepts, relations between these concepts, and by relations between 
concepts and sense impressions, . . .” Here again we have an intimation of how 
the here and now enters in. Sense impressions are momentary, immediate. The 
order, the comprehensibility, comes out from this immediacy and through the 
mediation of our minds. More significantly, it is Einstein’s major contributions 
in understanding nature which have pointed out the role that time – relative 
time – plays in nature’s comprehensibility. As Einstein has shown, insofar as 
nature at near light speed is described by measured time, that time itself is de-
termined by the place and position of the perspectival view, the here and now 
one starts with. 
These illustrations serve merely as starters in the direction our radical 1st 
person perspective is heading toward and the type of questions we will be con-
fronting along the way – all related to that egregious suggestion already made, 
that it is possible the vastness of space and time might itself be actually con-
strained, in the way we’re constrained, to the here and now, an otherness of 
space and time bounded by the present and ones’ present perspective. Taking 
that suggestion seriously, what then becomes of the past and the future, and 
how are they to be conceived? And what then happens – taking as our stepping 
stones the here and now, along with its 1st person perspective and nature-as-
other –, what then happens to the out of sight and the not here and not now, to 
your past, my past, our future? What then happens when we’re asleep and van-





“Having allayed fear of logical contradiction, he 
does not stop to agonise over the ontological sig-
nificance, let alone the possibility, of the present’s 
being always the present, yet having always a dif-
ferent position in the fixed series of instants.” 
Sarah Waterlow, “Aristotle’s Now,” p. 104 et al. 
Chapter 4 
The Now in its Immediacy 
 In the conceptual framework we’ve been presenting, we started with the task of 
proposing a particular mapping of “nature” and its ambiguous territory, and 
making that the stepping stone for our next concern, the temporal aspect of the 
self/other framework we’ve introduced. And it is that aspect of nowness that 
here becomes our particular concern. The “nature” given our attention in the 
two previous chapters was appended in such a way as to extend the parameters 
of the material nature familiar in the sciences, the investigative content of which 
is data oriented and approached by 3rd person methodologies. By such extension 
as we have given there was added the two labeled appendages – “here and now” 
and “as other” –, the net effect of which was to throw in relief the relative cer-
tainty of objective research against a backdrop of time. This extension was moti-
vated by several considerations. First of all, objective research is, to a degree, 
counterbalanced by that first appendage we have added, the here-and-now, 
which we have appraised as having objective credentials as well. Such research, 
needless to say, is carried out in the here-and-now, not in someone’s sleep. 
There is, therefore, this delimited temporality, this constraint, which weighs into 
the picture of how nature is to be seen and understood. The turn of phrase we 
used to describe this weighing was the “seesaw effect”. Impressions come as 
immediate otherness, as a starting point; the mind’s organizing takes place; and 
out of this comes a version of otherness that is comprehended, with nature-as-
other situated on the other side of the seesaw. One way to suggest how the 
moorings to the traditional notion of material nature get loosened by this term 
“nature-as-other” is to compare it to the loosened connection drawn between 
“knowledge” and “behavior of particles”, as Heisenberg once described it in 
quantum physics: 
The conception of objective reality of the elementary particles has thus evaporated 
not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept but into the transparent clari-
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ty of a mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of particles but rather our 
knowledge of this behavior.1 
Our version of this loosened connection to traditionally understood “nature” can 
also be compared to the following blanket statement expressing another quan-
tum perspective. Here the role of observation – necessarily a here-and-now ob-
servation on some or other occasion – is adjudged to transmute and actualize 
what, before observation, is depicted as constitutionally unconfigured and am-
biguous in material nature and which, after observation, is transmuted and ac-
tualized by that act of observation into definable and material concreteness. 
Hans van den Hooff puts it this way: 
In quantum physics the idea of an objective world in which objects possess unam-
biguous properties independent of their observation has become untenable.2 
Having said that much by way of introduction, this chapter and the three that 
succeed it move the focus from the “nature” part of our conceptual framework to 
this temporal constraint that we’ve referred to as the “here and now”. However, 
from this point on we’ll refer to this constraint simply as the “now” or “present 
time”. Singling out this “now”, and in particular its temporal constraint on the 1st 
person perspective our senses provide us, we thereby make emphatic the direc-
tion of our inquiry, which as well has the purpose of distancing the non-
indexical now (in our usage of the word) from indexical and self-reflexive sug-
gestions that arise in such words as “here” and “there”, “this” and “that”. The 
“now” in our usage is not reflective of an inside self but of an outside source, 
even though the “here” and the “now” are both designators to the selfsame sen-
sory field of view.3  
Being a presentness I am awake to, a presentness which defines my be-
ing awake at all, the now in its immediacy cannot be an object one views in the 
abstract. Necessarily presentness involves the participant in the very viewing, 
and that viewing is necessarily one that comes by 1st person means. Without, 
for example, myself as participant, there is no separate knowledge by which to 
edify me or you about it – even as I write this word! It stands as a truism that 
participation involves presentness or the now, and without it no book on the 
shelf, no reference, no knowledge is going to help me say anything about it. 
But here we are already anticipating our exploratory path of the next four 
chapters. Let us, therefore, begin with this chapter and what it sets out to do, 
  
1 Cited in Henry P. Stapp, The Mindful Universe. 2nd edition (Berlin, Heidelberg: 
Springer Verlag, 2011), 11. 
2 Hans van den Hooff, “Genesis of Conscious Mental States,” Mind and Matter 11/1 
(2013): 47.  
3 “Nobody has ever noticed a place except at a time, or a time except at a place,” as H. 
Minkowski once put it.  
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which is to propose some inroads into the enigma of this temporal constraint 
we call the “now”. That groundwork will set the stage for what follows in the 
next three chapters. 
1. The measureless now 
As for the first inroad, let’s start with this feature of the now’s inaccessibility to 
measurement. It may appear that right off we are postulating a contradiction – a 
thinglike now, yet measureless! How could that be? First of all, it must be kept in 
mind what we have understood “thinglike” to mean in the context of the now, 
namely that which manifests in the concreteness of things, but not object-like (in a 
traditional sense) in having itself extension and configuration. Or to put it another 
way, thinglike in the way the now confers immediacy and salience to the world, as 
opposed to a world abstracted from any experiential contact, a world in a state of 
nowlessness. It may seem that our notion of “thinglike” takes considerable license 
with the way “thing” is traditionally understood to comprise extension in space, 
but that license we have allowed is comparable to the evolution of “thinglike” in 
the sciences and their investigation of material nature: 
[E]ven the answer to the apparently easy question “what is matter?” has changed dra-
matically several times since 1644, when Descartes characterized matter as extended 
substance (res extensa) in his Principia Philosophiae. Science has developed in a way 
leading to the refutation of the original arguments of Descartes. According to modern 
physics matter cannot be characterized by any concept of “extension” – besides local-
ized matter there are nonlocal manifestations of matter and physical energy.4 
The second point, one that ramifies from this evolution of “thinglike”, is that 
while all the sciences use measurement of some kind to access the facet of mate-
rial nature they investigate, it does not follow that a particular phenomenon that 
may qualify as thinglike will be accessible to measurement. The notion of “po-
tential particle” in quantum physics, for example, resists measurement, for the 
very reason that it is in that state of potentiality. One can treat it as thinglike if 
one assumes its having a state of existence. To cite one other example from this 
same discipline, the multiverse interpretation of the measurement problem. 
According to that interpretation, the act of particle measurement itself produces 
multiverses of different versions of the experimental results, each version con-
taining the outcome of a probability. Yet where are these multiverses? No meas-
urable detection of them has of yet been found.  
  
4 Harold Atmanspacher and Hans Primas, “Pauli’s Ideas on Mind and Matter in the 
Context of Contemporary Science,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13/3 (2006), 30. 
Chapter 4 72
That same inaccessibility to measurement is how we begin this chapter’s 
description of the now. What, then, is the evidence that gives us the outlawing of 
this measurement protocol? Take the criterion of lucidity. When one is awake to 
the world, one is awake to the present, not to the past or the future, not three 
minutes ago or one minute to come. And when we say “the present”, we mean not 
presence as a conscious state but present time, namely something we are awake to 
and constrained by, a transient in-between, already there before any measurement 
is initiated, already eclipsed by the time any measurement is made.  
How does one make sense of this inaccessibility to measure? Aristotle set 
us on the right track when he took stock of the difference between the nonlinear 
now and linear (i.e. measured) time: “But of time, though it is divided into parts, 
some of them have been and some of them will be, but no one of them is. Nor is 
the now a part; for the part also measures, and it is necessary for the whole to be 
composed of parts. But time does not seem to be composed of nows.”5 And later 
Saint Augustine added this stroke of simplicity in pointing out the incongruity of 
applying extension – time beyond the transient in-between – to the present: “For 
if it is extended, it is then divided into past and future” (and hence no longer con-
strained to being what it is, the transient in-between).6 What comes out of this is 
not that the now occurs so briefly in time, so transient, as to escape our notice 
altogether, but rather that it translates purely as a part of the experiential – as part 
of our contact with the world we’re awake to –, not as part of any mental calcula-
tion. Hestervold sums it up nicely when he takes the example of someone saying, 
“I have a headache now.” The question: What is the “now” referring to – the clock 
time of the headache, say 3:15 p.m.? Hestervold’s answer: The now points to “It 
hurts” – i.e., the experience of pain that is being felt when the person in pain utters 
the “now”, not to what time it is.7 Needless to say, a headache at 3:15 p.m. is not a 
necessity, but a headache that is not now would not be a headache at all. 
When we speak of the measureless now as having an experiential significa-
tion, there are two considerations that help to explain this. The first is that “experi-
ential” is to be understood as that which we are lucid to, lucid to that which bears 
objective credentials, the same as we have characterized the here-and-now in 
chapter 2. This therefore puts “experiential”, as we discuss it here, on an entirely 
different footing from subjective responses, such as how you or I might rank the 
duration of a dull or exciting moment, or the role the infusion of memory plays 
  
5 Aristotle, Physics, Bk. 4: 9 (10); See further, Nathanael Stein, “Aristotle on Parts of 
Time and Being in Time,” The Review of Metaphysics 69/3 (March 2016). [ques-
tia.com/library/journal/1G1-446932631/Aristotle-on-parts-of-time-and-being-in-time]. 
6 Augustine, Confessions, trans. Albert Outler, intro., notes, rev. Mark Vessey (New 
York: Barnes & Noble Classics, 2007): 195 [Bk. XI, 15:20]. Cited in Ricoeur, 1: 231-232. 
7 H. Scott Hestevold, “Passage and the Presence of Experience,” The New Theory of 
Time, ed. L. Nathan Oaklander and Quentin Smith (New London: Yale University Press, 
1994): 333-334. 
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when one recognizes the wave of the sea as a wave or a musical melody as an in-
stant whole. By contrast, the experiential now that we’re awake to is not derived 
from us, or from our mental input on time, and therefore to apply extension to it 
raises the contradiction – if we hold fast to this now in a purely extrinsic or non-
phenomenological sense – of experiencing different present times at once by virtue 
of the prolongation of now time into not-now time that Augustine speaks about, 
thus violating the temporal constraint and the lucidity that ties us to what is im-
mediate present, our immediately present surroundings.  
Equally important is a second consideration pertinent to the measure-
lessness of the experiential now or present time. Not amenable to extension, 
there is no way to speak of this lived and immediate now in bits and pieces, a 
part here in the present, a part yet to come or already past. This non-divisibility 
implies that the phenomenon we are dealing with is to be understood in a holis-
tic sense. William James, who, on the basis of a sense datum rather than direct 
realist approach, believed that the now itself was inscrutable and that what we 
experience is not the actual now but only its specious version, nonetheless gives 
us the following description of the experiential now – namely that of a “duration 
block”, an experienced wholeness, inaccessible to our ways of fitting time in 
place, except in hindsight, i.e. from a distanced (3rd person) perspective. That 
experienced present, as he expresses it, fits in precisely with our description of 
the now as unmeasurable:  
It is only as parts of [a] duration-block that the relation of succession of one end to 
the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, 
and then from the perception of the succession infer an interval of time between, but 
we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its two ends embedded in it. The 
experience is from the onset a synthetic datum, not a simple one; and to sensible 
perception its elements are inseparable, although attention looking back may easily 
decompose the experience, and distinguish its beginning from its end.8 
  
8 William James, The Principles of Psychology (Henry Holt & Co., 1890, 610.) (Christo-
pher D. Green, “Classics in the History of Psychology” [psychclassics.yorku.ca/James/ Prin-
ciples/prin15.htm]). Also close to this immediacy we have in mind is James’s attribution in 
the following: “The instant field of the present is at all times what I call the ‘pure’ experi-
ence.” (cited in Silberstein and Chemero, 2016, 185) What these excerpts from James are 
intended to illustrate is a 1st person experiential reading of the now’s non-measureability, 
understood in the way Capek does when he says this about the duration-block description: 
“But psychological experience is decisively and unambiguously opposed to the concept of 
infinitely divisible time and the concept of the mathematical present, but he [James] gave to 
this denial probably the clearest expression in a passage which has since become a clas-
sic….” [i.e., the passage quoted above]. [brackets mine] Milic Capek, Bergson and Modern 
Physics: a Reinterpretation and a Re-Evaluation. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, VII, ed. Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 
1971), 133.  
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Rather than being bordered, James is depicting the interval of that moment, the 
experienced now, as “embedded”, an enfolding at each end (to speak of it in a 
spatial way). Hence, no parts to it – no beginning, middle, end. In attempting to 
explicate such a notion that seems illogical because this depiction of intervalness 
is such that it cannot be grasped as a discrete unit, one might cite a statement 
from Stokes: “The ‘first-personal mode of givenness’ that characterizes self-
experience does not contain in itself any sense of temporal extension.”9 Or one 
might allude, as well, to the Zen master Dogen’s way of speaking about mujo 
(impermanence) – “the purposeless and selfless totality of each and every mo-
ment encompassing before and after. . . .”10 Dogen notes that there is no way to 
gauge or compare the impermanence of this moment because it is not relative to 
anything which is not impermanent (i.e., anything discrete and sequential). 
Added to this significance of “embedded” is as well that of “decomposing” in the 
above passage. “Decomposing” is an appropriate word in this instance for what 
happens when one shifts in this case from the 1st person experiential perspective 
to a 3rd person perspective, which imposes a mental reconstruction by way of the 
distanced appraisal. Here is where segmentation is brought into the picture, the 
proclivity to think of nows as sequential – It is there; it is there; it is there – as if 
a countable feature could be ascribed to the now. But then again that would not 
be a now we’d be lucid to. For any now to be experientially countable, we’d need 
to be living concurrently, and as well serially, yet all at once in the present and 
past, or present and future. 
  Although Metzinger uses the phrase “subjective NOW”, contrary to how 
the now has previously been shown to be objective, the following passage of his 
additionally conveys the essence of why, experientially speaking, the notion of 
the uncountable “It is there” makes sense when applied to this phenomenon of 
the measureless now: 
I always experience the wholeness of reality now. . . . The whole is always given to us 
in a single psychological moment, that is to say in the experienced present of a sub-
jective Now. The phenomenal presence of the whole springs from this “now”, i.e. 
from the temporal identity of a diversity of experiential contents.11 
The fact that our experiential now cannot come divided or in two or more pieces 
brings out another aspect of its measurelessness. Being holistic, there is no way 
  
9 [italics his] “Patrick Stokes, What’s missing in episodic self-experience?”, p. 125 (citing 
Zahavi and Parnas) Journal of Consciousness Studies 17/1-2 (2010), 125.  
10 Steven Heine, Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and 
Dogen, SUNY Series in Buddhist Studies, ed. Kenneth Inada (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 
1985), 90. 
11 [italics his] Thomas Metzinger, “Faster than Thought: Holism, Homogeneity, and 
Temporal Coding,” Conscious Experience, ed. Thomas Metzinger (Schoningh/Imprint Aca-
demic, 1995), 429. (www.imprint.co.uk/online/Metz1.html). 
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we can witness it in such a way as to compare it to the timing of another now, 
or to the measured timing of any event, for that matter.  Any determination as 
to simultaneity, for example, requires that we step out of the immediate situa-
tion in order to appraise it by taking a measurement. But that’s clearly impossi-
ble in the case of the now. Once you’ve stepped out and taken the time to meas-
ure, you’ve lost the now you’re trying to appraise, along with the putative simul-
taneity an event might be deemed to have with it. A measuring device faces the 
same obstacle. It can measure the simultaneity of two events but not the now of 
the event I’m awake to as compared to an event outside of that now. To do that, 
the measuring device would have to be part of my experience of “the wholeness 
of reality now” that Metzinger speaks about. 
2. The now that leaves no trace of itself  
Here we proceed to the second of what this book proposes are some inroads to 
this temporal constraint we call the “now”. This second basic consideration, one 
that ramifies from the measureless feature we have already talked about, is the 
tracelessness of this enigma of presentness. The now that our experience brings 
us in contact with is traceless, a now without a past – unlike the continuity that 
objects in nature are generally conceived as having. 
Various paths lead to this notion of a traceless now. Some of them, such as 
measurelessness, we have already discussed. Obviously if present time cannot be 
extended into the past or future, how could it have a traceable lineage, a record of 
its existence? On the other hand, from a 3rd person perspective, one can easily 
implant a linear dimension on the experiential now, introduce segmentation, ex-
tend these units of now sequentially or as a succession of perceptions. After all, life 
does go on. We experience today, we experience tomorrow. It’s not an all-at-once 
affair, minus a before and after. But this is to take us down a different path, using 
cognitive inferencing and relying on memory. The problem is that cognitive infer-
encing is not an inferencing from the evidence of nowness and what that now con-
tact tells us, but an inferencing that draws primarily on memory and reasoning. 
But as we have seen, the now is not in memory. If it were, we’d be living in our 
memories instead of memory providing grist for our living. Kierkegaard captures 
the difference in this anecdote of one of his fictitious narrators:  
It would be of real interest to me if it were possible to reproduce very accurately the 
conversations I have with Cordelia. But I easily perceive that it is an impossibility, for 
even if I managed to recollect every single word exchanged between us, it neverthe-
less is out of the question to reproduce the element of contemporaneity, which actu-
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ally is the nerve in conversation, the surprise in the outburst, the passionateness, 
which is the life principle in conversation.12 
The problem is not just the missing details. The problem is the missing 
spontaneity, the spur-of-the-moment interplay and actuality that mark an 
involvement and participation that can only be lived, not recalled. Hence, the 
two impossibilities: that of a now that is impossible to recall because it is still 
now, and that of a now that is impossible to retrieve because it is no longer now. 
These are really none other than variations on what we have spoken of as the 
temporal constraint that pins us to present time. A useful analogy in this respect 
might be Poellner’s, who from a phenomenological perspective speaks of the 
failure to identify and reidentify “experiences as they are lived through”, which 
is only another way to refer to the traceless now: “Experiences as they are lived 
through – what Husserl calls operative consciousness or absolute subjectivity – 
cannot in principle be identified and re-identified in their absence and therefore 
cannot be objects and cannot be conceptually represented.”13 Applied to our 
subject, we might put it this way: The lived-through of present time, once gone, 
cannot be literally re-presented by mental means – since the only way to do that 
would be to again present it live – today – now, rather than merely to recall it as 
a mental representation.   
But even so, for those nostalgically inclined there is still the Beatles’ 
question: Whatever happened to yesterday? To a moment ago? It is a question 
we shall come back to in Part 2. 
3. The now in its immediacy 
Another facet of the now confronts us here, moving from its measureless and 
traceless aspects, the first two of the proposed inroads to the now we’ve 
discussed. This third feature of the now on our agenda we shall term its 
“immediacy”. The notion of immediacy yields nothing about linear or measured 
time. This is why we cannot speak of the now, in the sense advanced here, in 
terms of plurality and multiplicity, as for example Barbour does.14 Instead, what 
the now’s immediacy does is tell us about one’s lucidity of contact – awakenness 
– that makes possible the calculations that go into measured and computed 
time. We refer, and will be referring, to this experiential contact with the world 
  
12 Cited in Patrick Stokes, What’s Missing…, 128-129. 
13 [italics his] Peter Poellner, “Non-conceptual Content, Experience & the Self,” Journal 
of Consciousness Studies 10/2 (2003), 53. 
14 Julian B. Barbour, The End of Time: The Next Revolution in Our Understanding of 
the Universe (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), 45-50. 
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as “precondition” or starting point.15 Whatever time it is that I wake up to 
(according to clock time), that already presupposes experiential contact, namely 
that I or somebody is already awake to the world now – i.e. self/other alignment 
is already intact – as a prerequisite to checking the time. Immediacy, in other 
words, is to be taken in that sense – as a temporality that precedes any 
determination of facts. An offhand analogy might be the entanglement scenario 
according to Bell’s theorem in quantum physics. Two particles can be separated 
by billions of light years yet both instantly affected by changes in the quantum 
state of either. Rather than cause and effect in a spacetime universe, it is more 
analogous to a now alignment already in place and preceding the act of 
measurement, with no 3rd person strategy – no before-now access route – to 
determine otherwise.  A determinable effect that eludes any determination of 
cause.  “Spooky action at a distance” – as Einstein once referred to it.  
Consider the converse – the non-immediacy of the now. Can one imag-
ine how there could be any capability to take measurements if one’s temporal 
present were not a prerequisite, already aligned and in tune with the temporal 
present of the world one is living in? What efficacy would science have, for ex-
ample, if the temporal present of scientists and the temporal present of what 
scientists investigate were not aligned, were not uniform? By uniformity we do 
not mean, of course, simultaneity. We mean that which makes possible any cal-
culation of simultaneity or otherwise. Another word for this uniformity might be 
simply the word we’ve been using – lucidity – one’s properly functioning percep-
tual processing such that the present time of one’s perceiving matches the pre-
sent time of that which is perceived. A bystander watching me observe that star 
in the nighttime sky may know that the star I now see is not there now. It’s ex-
tinct. But on the other hand, if I see that star and the bystander does not, or the 
other way around, the issue of cosmology is premature. The question is rather 
one of lucidity or on the other hand hallucination: Whose perceiving matches 
the present time of the perceived in nature, and whose doesn’t? That matching 
or uniformity as a starting point is another way of describing the now’s immedi-
acy. One might add that that uniformity, distinct from simultaneity as we have 
seen, nonetheless answers to an alignment in time, being a temporal juxtaposi-
tion of present self with whatever present other one observes at whatever dis-
tance, that star included. And even though there is no way to measure such 
alignment, there is no measurement without it.16 
  
15 For more on this, see the author’s (Dwight Holbrook’s) “Is Present Time a Precondi-
tion for the Existence of the Material and Public World?” Social Epistemology 29/1 (Janu-
ary, 2015). 
16 On the question of non-alignment, of experiential present-to-past or seeing into the 
past when we see a star that is now extinct, McInerney writes, “The complications are two-
fold. First, commonsense perception does not portray the entities as temporally distant 
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Another way to illustrate this, and specifically the discrepancy between 
the now and measured time, is to take the example of the twin paradox, a theo-
retical scenario based on Einstein’s theory of relativity, according to which 
measured time slows for objects approaching the speed of light. In consequence 
of that theory, Isaac Newton’s notion of a universal cosmic now was deemed 
disproven – his cosmic “now” being conceived along the lines of a cosmic-wide, 
measurement-based simultaneity. In the twin scenario exemplifying relativity 
principles, a voyager in outer space, after traveling near light speed, discovers 
upon his return to Earth that his twin brother on this planet is already an old 
man, chronologically much older than the voyager. Relative to an Earth-bound 
perspective, measured time and chronological age had slowed for the voyager 
twin traveling near light speed. And yet, despite this huge discrepancy in meas-
ured time, meeting back on Earth the twins discover a common ground, a 
matching compatibility of their perceiving and present time of perception that 
enables them to communicate, share ideas, make calculations and comparisons 
about measured time, and talk about such things as relativity theory. In other 
words, they share the same now. Without that bedrock of a uniform now, it 
would have been like one twin watching the other from five decades ago, as if in 
a TV science fiction movie. In short, neither twin has been uprooted from imme-
diate present time or the uniformity of their respective self/other alignments 
once they meet and share information, despite the discrepancy of their chrono-
logical ages.17 The fact of their re-encounter does not constitute one twin’s future 
and the other twin’s past. They’re both in the present or they wouldn’t have been 
able to meet again in the first place and communicate about such things as 
                                                                                                                                       
from us. We understand that the entities are temporally distant, but we do not perceive this 
temporal distance in the way that we perceive spatial distance. Second, in the case of very 
distant occurrences, such as stellar events, we would ‘see into’ a past before our own births.” 
McInerney, 231, see also 276, notes 2, 8.  
17 As our concern is about alignment time and not other modalities of time that draw on 
simultaneity (in a measurement or other sense), we need not delve into the paradox issue 
based on those other modalities of time. On the single vs. multiple times question in the 
twin paradox debate between Einstein and Bergson, our alignment thesis fits in closer with 
Bergson’s linkage of real time – its “contenporaneity” – with the flow of the duration of 
consciousness. Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian 
Universe, ed. R. Durie (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999), pp. ix-xi, 34, 46, 54-56; Elie 
During, “Durations and Simultaneities: Temporal Perspectives and Relativistic Time in 
Whitehead and Bergson”, 19. But note also Capek’s comment:  
“[N]o asymmetrical aging can ever occur unless some acceleration occurs at a certain 
point and instant in the path of the traveling twin. This occurs at the point where the 
traveling twin reverses the direction of his motion and where his acceleration – not 
only with respect to the twin ‘at rest,’ but also with respect to the larger masses of 
the universe – takes place. This is . . . what Bergson failed to see.” 
[italics his] Milic Capek, “On an Alleged Inconsistency in Whitehead”, Process Studies 
20/3 (1991), 175-178. [http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2814], 4.  
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chronological and relativistic discrepancies. Hence, that bedrock immediacy 
we’ve been speaking about, in the form of a self/other alignment of time that 
undergirds and makes possible other notions of time. 
One might add that the connective temporal immediacy between the two 
twins in this mind experiment constitutes as well, a “co-presence” by the very 
nature of their sensory contact. Let us suppose, however, that the two twins 
were in the theoretical situation of both being in rockets at near light speed, 
speeding by each other in vastly different time zones as measured by linear time. 
The situation is in some ways no different than their physical, experientially 
immediate contact on Earth. Even to estimate vastly different scales of linear 
time between them in space presupposes a concrete base of some sort, a 
self/other alignment of nonlinear time, by which to do the estimation. But aside 
from that, in the scenario just portrayed, any sensory contact or face-to-face 
communication between the twins, even in that circumstance, would be dictated 
by the temporal constraint.18 That is, what would make their contact or commu-
nication possible in the first place would be their alignment in a shared present 
time, an experientially shared immediacy. To suppose otherwise would be to 
entertain the possibility of oneself moving into an experiential zone which one is 
present to and present in but which has long ago occurred or will occur – i.e. an 
experientially based non-present –, a scenario that veers into self-contradiction. 
And yet, cannot one contend that a valid notion of time, time independ-
ent of the now, is sustainable nonetheless, one that encompasses measurable 
distances in space, even in the abstract, cut off from the self-other alignment of 
sentient beings?19 Such a proposal leads to the broader consideration we next 
consider, that of a nowless universe.  
  
18 Compare Capek’s note on Whitehead’s definition of of co-presence. He quotes White-
head: “I call two event-particles which on some or other system of measurement are in the 
same instantaneous space ‘co-present’ event particles. Then it is possible that a and b may 
be co-present, and that a and c may be co-present, but that b and c may not be co-present.” 
(79) But then Capek notes the ambiguity of co-presence when he states: “Essential is that 
there are two distinct observers and that their corresponding present moments remain 
distinct physical events,…” [italics his] Milic Capek, “Whitehead’s Definition of Co-
presence,” Philosophy of Science 24(1) (1957), 82. 
19 The underlying issue is one of starting point and whether the 3rd person perspective and 
the knowledge it gives us precede the 1st person perspective and the knowing it provides. We 
mean “precedes” in an ontological sense. Is there an out there, a world, a universe, prior to, and 
irrespective of, a knowing that marks one’s awakenness to the world? Here again the con-
fusion of knowing and being. It is a subject we turn to in chapter 7, “The Notion of a Begin-
ning”. On this, see also Craig Callender’s critique, “The View from No-when,” British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science, 49 (1998), 157. (http://74.125.77.132/search 
?q=cache:_OmWzjAG8EsJ:philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/c...). The critique is in the form of a 
review of a book by Huw Price, Time’s Arrow and the Archimedes’ Point: New Directions for 
the Physics of Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
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4. Contra a nowless universe 
One reads that most of the universe is empty, an apparent void that, at infinitely 
small quantum scales, contains a sea of particles popping in and out of exist-
ence.20 Where in such conception as this could sentience, or the now’s immedia-
cy, possibly fit in here? Barring that, how could it be other than that the universe 
is nowless, having all but a pittance of itself out of reach of the here and now? It 
was the question in chapter 2 provoked by Capek’s quip about a future-in-
present scenario which we indicated we’d get back to, and here is where we do so 
in the form of another of our proposed tenets about the now, a fourth considera-
tion, which applies to its purview and extent. Namely, it is this: There is no now-
less terrain, no territory outside of the now. 
How do we mean this? 
Granted, the notion appears outlandish at first glance (and perhaps at 
many glances), especially if one’s conception of nature remains steadfastly “mate-
rial nature”, rather than “material nature-as-other”. But we have only to consider 
this as a start: However compelling and convincing is the conclusion from a 3rd 
person appraisal that the knowledge we gather from observations, calculations, 
and collected data is but a mere infinitesimal piece of the hidden mysteries in the 
cosmic expanses of an essentially lifeless and nowless material universe, there is 
nonetheless another compelling and convincing factor to consider, which is that 
no one (to my knowledge) has ever delved into a realm such as a nowless universe. 
On the contrary, it is, and always has been, a universe that is axiomatically a pre-
sent universe that one is awake to, a universe that inveterately stands as other to 
our investigations, and whose otherness in the form of its degree of comprehensi-
bility is likewise constrained by the present, namely “the here and now of the per-
spective on the other side of the seesaw”, to adopt our previous figure of speech. 
“Constrained by” goes a long way to explain the “captured” in the title of this book, 
Material Nature Captured by the Momentary Now. 
One might dub this counterclaim expressed above “an epistemic con-
straint”, deeming it heavily biased against the 3rd person capability of the human 
mind to distance intellect and reason from momentary and immediate consider-
ations. The follow-up question then becomes: Are there any 3rd person defenses 
that might weigh in favor of this postulate being advanced of a “nowful” uni-
verse? 
One such defense might be the argument we’ve been emphasizing, that 
whatever the approaches to an understanding of the universe, they presuppose – 
explicitly or implicitly – a concrete basis of some kind, an experienced otherness, 
an implied duality whereby nature’s manifestation is not simply our own subjectiv-
  
20 To cite a recent example of this outlook: James O. Weatherall, Void: The Strange 
Physics of Nothing (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). 
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ity or theoretical conceptualizations. Even when the notion of nature is founded 
mathematically, as exemplified by these comments of Tegmark’s – “I single out 
math as the underlying structure of the universe. . . .” “The human mind then 
emerges from math, as a self-aware substructure of an extremely complicated 
mathematical structure”21 – even so, there is Tegmark’s own experiential contact, 
the world and nature he is awake to. Without that, where is the math? What could 
possibly sustain it? Our argument then continues that while our knowledge about 
the universe is partial and piecemeal, so much as we have knowledge at all it 
comes invariably platformed on the now, an experienced awakenness that is nec-
essarily now and that exposes everything observable and outwardly experienced in 
a now framework. That there could be a nowlessness apart from this is to beg the 
question by assuming that there could exist nature as a mere structure, concrete 
even though abstract, absent of any nowful accessibility by observation, and yet 
accessible to some kind of truth determination by awakened experiencers such as 
ourselves. 
Adopting that neologism “nowful” echoes the phraseology of the quantum 
physicist Henry Stapp and others in his ballpark who apply such terms as “mindful 
universe” and define the “primary reality” as “a sequence of psychophysical 
events”.22 Explaining in detail his quantum direction of self/other interaction 
would take us off track as for the most part it deals with microscopic nature and 
does not specifically concern the now. However, there is one aspect of his quantum 
direction that does. It is found in the critique he makes of the notion of causal 
closure in classical physics. Causal closure, as commonly understood, is the idea 
that nature and our interaction with it are causally determined. That is to say, the 
outcome of everything we do and everything we find out is predetermined, 
mapped out and designed in various ways, such as by mathematical laws, natural 
forces, systems and patterns that are potentially predictable, and by genes and 
neurons that go into making us think the way we do, and so forth. What we discern 
here in this tendency to past-to-present reductivity, to reduce explanation to prior 
cause, is the human proclivity to think in terms of a before and after, a cause gen-
erating an effect, and the linearity of past-to-present that this implies. Stapp’s key 
objection to this classical notion of cause is summed up in his phrase “causal gap”, 
referring to what cannot be predetermined, which in his research field is the exper-
imenter’s involvement in how a quantum experiment is performed, and how the 
choices made in that experiment define a state of affairs in nature that, in effect, is 
hovering until those choices are made. The mind, in other words, becomes partici-
patory, a part of what’s out there. What connects this to our line of inquiry is that 
  
21 Piet Hut, Mark Alford, and Max Tegmark, “On Math, Matter and Mind,” Founda-
tions of Physics 36 (2006) (arXiv:physics/0510188v2[physics.pop.-ph]), 2,8. 
22 Henry Stapp, “The Mind Is Not What the Brain Does!” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 17/1-2 (2010), 203.  
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those choices of the experimenter are immediate in the sense that they do not en-
ter into a programmable past-to-present schema of time that can be embraced by 
the design set-up of the experiment. They fall outside, just as the immediacy of the 
now falls outside of linear time.  
This analogy from Stapp at most gives us the suggestion of a nowful uni-
verse on the quantum level. But what about the macroscopic universe, nature in 
its scale of vastness? Again we are back to this inquiry of how a 3rd person per-
spective can clue us to an answer, or at least that shows nature as nowful rather 
than nowless. 
One place to find evidence of this is where past-to-present reasoning 
gets misapplied. Schwindt, for example, points out the mistake in construing as 
past-to-present explanation what in fact derives the other way around, from 
present-to-past:  
It is sometimes argued that our conclusions (concerning the laws of nature) are very 
likely correct in most cases, since natural selection forced us to develop correct think-
ing. Otherwise we would not have survived. This argument is, however, intrinsically 
wrong, since our theory of natural selection is itself a result of our conclusions.23 
Another place where this preemptive immediacy of the now wedges into the 
picture is in the search for a complete unified theory of nature. Stephen Hawk-
ing challenges such an endeavor, arguing that a pre-set design of the universe, 
according to a so-called complete theory, would undermine the very search for 
it, by in effect denying the immediacy of the present as a starting point by which 
to measure, calculate, and verify the accuracy of the search.  
But there is a fundamental paradox in the search for such a complete theory. . . . In 
such a scheme it is reasonable to suppose that we might progress ever closer toward 
the laws that govern our universe. Yet if there really is a complete unified theory, it 
would also presumably determine our actions. And so the theory itself would deter-
mine the outcome of our search for it! And why should it determine that we come to 
the right conclusions from the evidence? Might it not equally well determine that we 
draw the wrong conclusion? Or no conclusion at all?24 
  
23 Jan-Markus Schwindt, “Mind as Hardware and Matter as Software,” Journal of Con-
sciousness Studies 15(4) (2008), 6 n.1.  
24 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 12. 
Dummett, as well, points out the problem that a complete description of reality is confront-
ed by if time is “real” – that is, if whatever knowledge we are capable of is constrained by 
one’s temporal perspective, the bias imposed by the particular period of time the knowledge 
is attained. In that case, a complete theory, or the behavior of a phenomenon throughout all 
of (linear) time, becomes impossible – independent of the time of the theorizer. Dummett 
describes that temporal limitation as “token-reflexive”. Michael Dummett, “A Defense of 
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A material nature deemed governed solely by structure, law, and design – with 
the now’s immediacy thrown out – reduces to a simple quip about how know-
ledge defeats its own attainment: “If my mental processes are determined whol-
ly by motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs 
are true . . . and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed 
of atoms.”25 Similar contradictory outcomes arise simply in the way scientific 
language is sometimes syntactically expressed, where for example – in the literal 
reading – principles construct sentences and investigations are imputed to have 
goals. In their Language as Ideology, Kress and Hodge give this example from 
Chomsky – “Syntax is the study of the principles and processes by which sen-
tences are constructed in particular languages”. As opposed to this, their version 
would orient the sentence in a present-to-past direction, the way it is intended 
to be understood: “Syntax is the name for how someone studies the principles 
according to which people construct sentences and the processes which re-
sult.”26 Another example comes from Richard Dawkins who, in commenting on 
the proposed comparison of science and scientific ideas to a computer virus 
generated by a form of “spread me” coded instruction, rejects such a viral-like 
suggestion that would conceive of science as a pawn of past-to-present deter-
ministic forces. And yet, the language by which he describes the advances of 
science is put in the phraseology of “memes”, “natural selection”, “the selective 
forces that scrutinize scientific ideas”, “exacting, well-honed rules”.27 This would 
suggest a return to the very viral-like comparison he rejects where the human 
starting point is subordinated to a programmed script.  
On the other hand, one may interpret “selective forces” and “exacting, 
well-honed rules” not as impersonal processes that, viral-like, supersede what-
                                                                                                                                       
McTaggart’s Proof of the Unreality of Time,” The Philosophical Review, 69/4 (Oct. 1960), 
503.  
25 C.S. Lewis quoting J.B.S. Haldane. C.S. Lewis, Miracles (New York: HarperCollins, 
2001), p. 22. One response: “The whole point about science is that it’s not about what is true, 
it’s about what works.” (asktheatheists.com/questions/625-is-physicalism-self-defeating). 
26 Gunther Kress and Robert Hodge, Language as Ideology (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1981), 29-31. 
27 The Dawkins example is cited by Dennett: Daniel Dennett, “Back from the Drawing 
Boards,” Dennett and his Critics, ed. Bo Dahlbom (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 
1993), p. 204. A similar contradictory semantics arises when Daniel Dennett, in seeking to 
elucidate the Dawkins passage, acknowledges, on the one hand, that there is no Archimedi-
an point from which to deliver a “benediction” on science: “How clever of some memes to 
team together to create meme-evaluators that favor them!” [italics his] On the other hand, 
he contends that such bias does not incapacitate people – those created by the culturally 
inherited genes [memes] of Western rationalism – to judge the virtue of Western rational-
ism. It is unclear in these statements how the past-to-present causal direction of such genes 
accommodates the present-to-past implications of judging and evaluating. Dennett, 204-
205. 
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ever choices or evaluations scientists might otherwise make, but rather as an 
expression of the knowledge and acquired judgments that scientists draw on in 
their decision-making and evaluating. Knowledge, in this reading, becomes in-
separable from the tangible knower here and now. This puts the onus of objec-
tive judgment-making on the scientist’s role, not on deterministic forces that – 
for all we know – might predispose a scientist to reach “the right conclusions”, 
“the wrong conclusion”, or “no conclusion at all” – to borrow from Hawkings 
above. Knowledge, in this reading, becomes that which one considers appropri-
ate at a particular time and place, not that which determines what one considers 
appropriate. It becomes, in other words, no longer an impersonal force, no long-
er abstracted from its concrete manifestation in some present time. The net 
effect is to understand by “knowledge” not any semantic suggestion of an auton-
omous realm of authority that would leave us in the role of obedient subjects 
carrying out the will of the landlord, but rather an appendage of ourselves that 
bears important pragmatic value.  
In Part 2 of this book, as we shall see, “knowledge” will be temporally 
situated as a category of linear time – namely “the not-now of extended time”. 
This is explained by knowledge’s organized path in time, its temporal exten-
sion and applicability extending over the time that takes time (as we refer to 
linear time) and in that sense “not-now” – i.e., not confineable to the transient 
moment, the immediacy of one’s experiential contact with the world. Howev-
er, this later categorizing is aside from the emphasis we have given here on the 
human component that knowledge derives from, the present participant’s role 
in determining the past rather than the other way around, where impersonal 
forces (past-to-present) are deemed to determine our choices and the outcome 
of our knowledge (however accurate or inaccurate that might be). In short, our 
later categorizing of knowledge as the “not-now of knowledge” in Part 2 re-
lates merely to the abstracting that knowledge undergoes in being applicable 
to the before and after, rather than to the now. The human participant re-
mains the center of its gravity even so, and not some autonomous realm of 
nowlessness.28 
  
28 Sarah Waterlow (among others) points out the distinction that can logically be made 
between “what it is that we claim to know” and “the conditions of our knowledge” – i.e., the 
need to verify statements “in some present time or other”. “Of course all our statements 
about events and their order are made and verified in some present or other. But that is a 
fact about the conditions of our knowledge, not about what it is that we claim to know.” 
Sarah Waterlow, “Aristotle’s Now,” The Philosophical Quarterly 34/135 (April 1984), 116. 
Another expression of that distinction runs as follows: “Although acts of knowing are causal-
ly dependent upon some NOW or other for their occurrence, the actual representational 
content of propositional knowledge, the truths or facts of which it is comprised, are not 
fundamentally constrained or constituted by the NOW through which they are known.” 
Jesse Butler, “Knowledge and the NOW: What Is the Epistemic Standing of the Present 
Moment?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3/10 (2014), 7. He gives the 
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5. The now’s familiarity 
Should we be amazed? Freaked out when we wake up from a dream – or just 
simply when we wake up? Nobody seems to be. Instead, total equanimity at the 
news our eyes and ears and other senses tell us of being awake. And anyway, 
what would make one so incredulous about it? One would think this perfunctory 
acquaintance with our surroundings in the morning, the world instantly familiar 
to our opening eyes, is all about learning from birth, memory, about sensory-
motor development, adaptation. So the past-to-present argument would have us 
believe. The problem, however, is the now’s tracelessness. 
Of course, if this familiarity is not about a traceless now that opens our 
eyes to this world as being a present world, if it is not about a now that we are 
lucid to, but about how memory has portrayed it, or how language has repre-
sented it by such words as “now” and “present time” (words conceived as bridg-
ing more or less the gap between the past and future of extended time), then the 
enigma of familiarity vanishes. We remember places, images, and of course we 
remember words and what they refer to. Nothing unfamiliar about that. The 
problem then becomes simply one of semantics, the now’s misleading sugges-
tion of referring to a category of experiential time that in its immediacy cannot 
be known otherwise or outside that immediacy. But that is precisely how we are 
intending the now to be understood – namely as original, not as copy or 
memory’s representation – and consequently this vexing enigma of familiarity. 
The enigma we are posing is precisely about immediate experience, namely the 
temporal aspect of what we are lucid to, not so-called higher orders of lucidity 
itself, what it means to be aware or aware of being aware, and should we be 
amazed about that?29 Our enigma here concerns the strictly temporal one – this 
presentness we awaken to, this presentness of our surroundings, and why it is 
we find ourselves unsurprised by this presentness, why we are not totally dumb-
founded by something utterly new – an experience we are lucid to now.  
Let’s take something arguably analogous to this now we wake up to, this 
now that comes without a trace of the past. We’ll take as our analogy the con-
scious experience in the debated colorblind Mary scenario, according to which a 
hypothetical neuroscientist named Mary, colorblind since birth yet an expert on 
brain processes responsible for color vision, suddenly sees color for the first 
time. The debate that question is intended to be centered around is: Does Mary 
                                                                                                                                       
example of 2+2=4. But in fact, where is this “2+2=4” if not in some present time? For more 
on my response to Butler, see “What Is an Object?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply 
Collective 3/11 (2014), 35-38.  
29 For more on that issue, see for example, Sam Coleman, “Panpsychism and Neutral 
Monism,” Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig 
Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 270-272. 
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learn something new by consciously experiencing color? And yet on the other 
hand, considering that what strikes her is something totally new and different, 
traceless in her memory, an experience she can’t connect to any other experi-
ence she’s had, shouldn’t instead the question be about her stunned emotional 
response, even shock, at witnessing this feature of experience for the first time? 
And if so, how much more so one would think our reaction should be, when 
what we open our eyes to in the morning is experiential contact itself, lucid 
awareness that there is this present world, a now that was never before! Con-
sidering that there are no such things as “before nows” in our memory, wouldn’t 
that leave us in a state that can be as aptly described as stunned and startled, 
and even more profoundly so than what we would expect Mary’s reaction to be?  
Learning, memory, sensory-motor development, adaptation take us only 
so far. If they told the whole story about present time and human interaction in 
the present, we’d be products of the past – i.e., puppets of the past –, a quandary 
illustrated in the passage from Steven Hawkings above where the notion of a 
complete unified cosmic design becomes something we’re unable to step out of, 
unable to free ourselves from so as to make conscious decisions in the present, 
objective assessments about any putative theory about nature. 
But then back to the question. Is it really so amazing that we wake up? 
Should we be stunned? And if so, why aren’t we? The answer – or rather the 
question – brings us to this chapter’s fourth distinctive feature of the temporali-
ty we’re awake to: namely, the now’s familiarity. 
Memory can’t help us here. Experiential and mental development that 
rely on our gradual psychological and mental attainments from the past can’t 
help us here either for the reason that the now – being our immediate, experien-
tial contact with the lived world – is nowhere to be found in the past. Immediate 
present time lies only in immediacy and not in hindsight, as we have seen. Any 
clue from the past can’t help explain our recognition of the difference between 
the past and the present, or between the immediacy of a dream and the immedi-
acy of the now. On the other hand, without memory – as a case of Alzheimer’s 
demonstrates – the present world we understand by cognitive and interpretive 
means becomes ever more reduced. But these are two different issues. On the 
one hand then, there is our lucidity to what is immediate, traceless and without 
a past, which the world exposes us to. There is that unexplained familiarity we 
have. And on the other hand, there is that kind of familiarity that our memory 
and adaptive learning give us, that recognition of things based on what our cog-
nitive and mental capabilities represent as the past. Our question pertains to the 
former – why that lucidity should be one of familiarity, not shock, considering 
that any explanation by past-to-present reasoning fails to surf the answer. A 
useful analogy to our question is the one posed 1,700 years ago by Augustine 
when he queries about the presenting of God to oneself, absent one’s faculty of 
memory: “Where, then, did I find you so as to learn about you? For you were not 
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in my memory before I learned of you. Where, then, did I find you so as to be 
able to learn of you – save in yourself beyond me.”30 How, in other words, can 
an experience be found which memory does nothing to prepare one for – i.e., 
how can it be identified and recognized for what it is – so as to “learn” of it?  
The puzzle of the now’s familiarity can be likened to the problem in phi-
losophy of how one goes from a “token” to a “type”, a query raised in an article 
by Paul Livingston. A token – otherwise referred to as a quality instance – is a 
species of experience that one has yet to categorize as demonstrating this or that 
type – i.e., as having this or that property. It is, in other words, individual and 
particular – a singularity in its uniqueness. To return to that example of the 
color that colorblind Mary sees for the first time, how does this token acquaint-
ance Mary has with the sensation of color – let’s say the color red – move from 
being a yet-to-be-identified instance of a sensory experience to a recognizable 
type or property of color identified on multiple objects – a red picture, a red 
rose, the red light, a red car? Or, to take the examples that Livingston gives in 
his article on this subject, how does one go from the weakly identifiable “now is 
the current time” or “that object [demonstrating a particular object] is as tall as 
that object [demonstrating the same object again]” to the more cognitively as-
certainable “now is 3:15” or “that object is tall”? Is it our cognitive faculties mak-
ing this type casting possible or simply our direct acquaintance?31 
The questions serve as an illustration of the problem before us: How are 
we to grasp the now’s familiarity? We detect the answer in the weakly identifia-
ble “now is the current time” above. But then, how does one move from this 
instance, from this token of “current time” to type casting, or from the weakly 
identifiable “now is the current time” to the more cognitively ascertainable “now 
is 3:15”? 
                                  Answer: One doesn’t, not if the now is understood as given in these 
pages. 
The now, as its basic features have shown us, remains only as a token, a 
manifestation of temporal instance. One test for determining a type is to remove 
one’s immediate exposure to a quality instance, or token, and recognize the 
identical quality elsewhere, as a property of miscellaneous objects. Try doing 
this with the now – removing yourself from it. Even when waking from sleep, 
there is no property trait or distinction one can make between this now and the 
one before sleep since, as we have shown, the now is traceless and, being so, 
there is no such thing as a now before sleep. Nonetheless, there is that natural 
  
30 Saint Augustine, Confessions, 167 [10.26.37]. 
31 Paul Livingston, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance”, Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, 20/5-6 (2013). [unmedu/~pmliving/Livingston-Phenomenal%20  
Concepts%20and%20the%20 Problem%20of%20Acquaintance.pdf], 19. For an overview of 
definitions of “knowledge by acquaintance”, see Jesse Butler, “Introspective Knowledge of 
Experience,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 18/2 (2011), 135. 
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tendency to liken the now to a succession of impressions, to think of it as – “It is 
there; it is there; it is there”. Even so, given our acquaintance we have of it solely 
as an instance or token, given its fixture on that level that precludes any cogni-
tively attainable comparison or repeated property application, there can be only 
this now, only this instance, only “It is there” without repetition.  
Given its status solely as a token, there is no category it can be said the 
now belongs to, no property it illustrates that we can cite here or there. This, 
however, does not prevent us from saying what categories it does not belong to, 
namely the past construed as chronological measured time. This exclusion 
makes it evident that in the example above – “now is 3:15” – what this purported 
example of property or type casting of the now is really doing is not defining the 
now as a reoccurring property but misapplying what can only be known as an 
instance, a lived particular, to another species of time altogether, a system of 
measurement that we bring to the world and that ties numbers to a linear scale 
of time that extends from past to future. The now’s familiarity is precisely other 
than that. It is about a lived particular, a singular uniqueness that cannot be 
accounted for by anything prior or subsequent in time. More aptly, it can be 
compared to an experience such as the color red that Mary sees for the first 
time. Whatever Mary’s probable startled reaction at seeing color for the first 
time, in the case of the now we wake up to, one would expect a similar reaction. 
Yet in fact it is not so; instead, no surprise. Strangely, as it would seem from this 
angle of approach, the awakened immediacy of our surroundings comes off as 
ordinary and familiar. And so how does one go about accounting for our per-
functory response to the now? 
Necessarily from what we have just said, the only place to look for an an-
swer lies in the present, not in the past. Habit, repeated exposure, getting accus-
tomed to what it’s like – all such manner of explanation relies on the assump-
tion of the now’s having a past. On the other hand, taking this familiarity as an 
automatic response or as a conscious reflection about something in the present 
scene mistakes the now for a configurative stimulus of some kind, light from a 
visible object, or confuses something in the scene for the scene being present in 
the first place. If we are to find the explanation for this familiarity – if we are to 
find it at all – it is in the direct acquaintance we have with it, a knowing in the 
form of an already (i.e. familiar) knowing, rather than as a type or property as-
pect that our mental conceptualizations come up with.32 We are simply there for 
  
32 This knowing contrasts from a dream experience in that in the former case there is an 
active self and experiential contact with the now’s familiarity that can’t be explained by past-
to-present means. The starting point is the now’s familiarity. In the latter case the dreamer’s 
responses are reactive. Being asleep, there is nothing one comes to know by being awake to 
the world. The knowing, at most, is part of the illusion of the dream. What we mean by a 
knowing that’s based on a familiarity given to our now acquaintance is that its source is 
external and not cognitively derived. As an analogy, we can adopt Strawson’s expression 
The Now in its Immediacy 89
it – this familiarity with the now. Hence, nothing from our mental faculties can 
be said to be doing this familiarizing. The now given to our acquaintance does it 
for us. It communicates itself as a perfunctory ordinary morning we waken up 
to. 
When I first broached this conundrum of the now’s familiarity, this idea 
suggestive of a revelatory temporality, to a scholar in the specialized fields of 
consciousness and knowledge by acquaintance, his reaction was in the dis-
missive vein of a rational appraisal along the lines of “The notion of unmediated 
experience seems, if not self-contradictory, at best empty.”33 But it was simpler 
in its irony: “You mean, from God?” And yet, if one mulls on that response seri-
ously and compares the now acquaintance with experiences that are purportedly 
revelatory, expressive of either a transcendent or ineffable character, it becomes 
clear that the now’s familiarity, being so very commonplace and unextraordi-
nary, belongs in a totally different venue than experiences of a revelatory nature. 
Their one common ground may be said to be this: In both cases the knowing, 
what the experience acquaints one with, comes not from within but from a 
source outside.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
“the having is the knowing” when he writes: “When we claim (with Russell) that to have an 
experience is eo ipso to be acquainted with certain intrinsic features of reality, we do not 
have to suppose that this acquaintance involves standing back from the experience reflec-
tively and examining it by means of a further, distinct experience. It doesn’t. This picture is 
too cognitivist . . . The having is the knowing.” Galen Strawson, Panpsychism? Reply to…, 
251 (n. 147). Given the knowing that comes by one’s experiential 1st person access to the 
now, it can be contended a blatant contradiction exists in my using cognitive resources – 
and necessarily the before and after of time – in writing this book about the now. But while 
cognitive resources are obviously needed, it seems accurate to say that the challenge is in 
moving into the now’s immediacy and having that acquaintance as source, and writing 
about it on that basis, and of course comparing what others have to say on the subject, and 
from out of that distillation using the representational means of language to penetrate as 
best one can the enigma of this phenomenon, such as the aspect of the now’s familiarity. 
That may be a contradictory task. I hope not.  
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 As the now is temporal and not a spatial concept, it follows that to speak of it as 
locatable in any spatial sense is misleading, although we have described it as 
originating externally and derived from an external source. We have done this 
simply as a way of indicating its domain status, being a now from abroad – call it 
from “nature” – rather than an output of our own minds. Even to speak of it as 
mentally representable or physically representable is misleading, as discussed 
earlier. Of course I am writing this book with words that represent, employing 
concepts and thoughts that represent, but I do this knowing that the present 
only manifests as present, not as a copy of itself in memory or any other place, 
nor as part of my representational tool kit. 
Metzinger poses the question: “How precisely is it possible for the con-
tent of phenomenal representation – as opposed to the content of phenomenal 
simulata – to be depicted as present?”1 The sole answer that follows from what 
we’ve already said is: It can’t, at least not by the representation itself nor by a 
source within ourselves. Representation does not equal presentness. 
And so let us try a different approach.  
Please take a seat at this taverna on the island of Naxos, Greece, and 
gaze out at the view. You’re sitting on a hillcrest, admiring the mountain out-
stretched at one side, the late afternoon Mediterranean sunlight casting brilliant 
light on the mountain at an angle. Where the sun is too low to hit, there appears 
this stark line of shadow, its edge like a deep dark fissure, running down and 
slowly across the mountain’s craggy slopes, your eyes meanwhile fixed on the 
desert red texture of the sloping landscape. But here’s the thing. It’s there. You 
don’t see it moving. You don’t think it’s moving. But then you look again. The 
shadow’s spread, its streak of encroachment suddenly more pervasive. The fis-
sure of shadow etching the boundary between shadow and light now more ad-
vanced. Did it actually spread in a moving way or simply advance in impercepti-
ble steps of momentary time? 
  
1 Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 2003), 62.  
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1. Changed or changing? 
 Let’s take me. I’m “going” to the store. That could mean, I will be going to the 
store, or it could mean I’m in the midst of going to the store. Either way, there’s 
a part of the plan that hasn’t been achieved (actually getting there), and – in the 
second meaning – a part achieved as well (having advanced to the midst of go-
ing). Or again, staying with the second meaning, there’s the change yet to be 
completed (actual arrival) and the extent of completed change marked by my 
progress in getting to the store. The question we’re getting at is this: Where is 
the actual changing part – the progressing and advancing on the horizontal axis 
of my walk to the store – once we remove from consideration the completed and 
uncompleted segments of the walk? It seems there is no other part left, no actual 
changing at all. Of course, as I proceed on my way, I am aware of a portion com-
pleted and the distance yet to be covered, just as you are in witnessing, observ-
ing my walk. Furthermore, at any moment of consideration along the way, at 
any now on that horizontal axis, I am aware of a changed in how far my walk has 
progressed, and I’m aware as well of the not yet of change to come, but in all of 
this there remains the enigma of an actual changing in this immediacy of the 
now. Where is that? And that’s just it. Motion is another way of speaking about 
the before and after of extended time, a different notion of time altogether. The 
now, on the other hand – being immediate, holistic, boundary-less – it stays 
anchored. It neither precedes nor follows itself, neither moving from a no longer 
now to a not yet now. And so there we are observing that shadow on the moun-
tainside. We note its changed character at that moment of observation. What 
about the changing? Of course we have the impression of changing in every mo-
tion we make and in everything that moves in a perceptibly noticeable way.2 But 
invariably in such cases there creeps in the before and after of extended time, 
and the changed of immediate time ceases to become pertinent.  
 One might compare the impression of changing that the syntax of the 
present progressive tense in English provides for, compare that with its apparent 
absence in the future/past tense structure of Hopi, an indigenous language in 
the American southwest studied in previous decades by the linguistics scholar 
Benjamin Whorf. The Hopi verbs refer to two realms, that of the manifested 
(completed) and the unmanfested (future). What happens to now time is that it 
gets conveyed in the form of an elapsing in stages of getting manifested or com-
pleted. The Hopi notion of future comes across as incremental steps in transi-
tion from the unmanifested to the manifested, similar to an observer noticing 
  
2 For recent discussion on that “impression” issue, see (1) Christopher Hoerl, “On the 
View that We Cannot Perceive Movement and Change: Lessons from Locke and Reid,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 24/3-4 (2017): 88-102.; and (2) Hoerl, “Seeing Motion 
and Apparent Motion,” European Journal of Philosophy 23/3 (2015): 676-702.  
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increments of shadow advancing over the mountainside as the sun sets. As for 
the actual changing or progressing of time, the actual passing of time between 
increments, according to Whorf it’s not in the Hopi tense structure and notion of 
time.3 An analogy in English can be gleaned from verbs that intimate an aorist 
sense of the immediately achieved, transition at once, conveyed by such verbs as 
“see”, “discover”, “know”, “pregnant”. You can begin to know, but then you are 
already in the changed position of knowing to some degree. A woman’s pregnan-
cy is for a period of months, but that doesn’t mean she can be half pregnant. She 
either is or isn’t. 
 It comes down to three reasons for considering the now’s immediacy as 
a completed stage – that is, a now that stays where it is rather than as a chang-
ing or passing phenomenon, and those reasons stem from, first, its holistic char-
acter, being a whole and not a part of something segmented into discrete units 
of time; second, its having the attribute of a one-time token or quality instance, 
a condition that fixes “moment” in the singular, prior to any post-appraisal in 
sequential terms as “moments”. And third, there is no memory of the now, no 
re-presented now, as has been emphasized earlier. What follows, there cannot 
be a before and after in the form of past and future moments to sustain a per-
son’s experiential contact with present time. It goes without saying that the im-
mediate present, its temporality, is something different from one’s memory of 
the past or expectation of the future, although both play a crucial role in our 
ability to configure and recognize what we presently experience. The “you” I 
recognize is the “you” I remember; nevertheless, it is not an earlier remembered 
you or a later you that I am presently seeing. The “you” now is changed for the 
very reason that “present” is necessarily a changed present. 
 On the other hand, what brings about our configurative recognition of 
change is greatly due to our faculty of memory. Mellor describes that source in the 
format of extended time when he writes: “We perceive an event e which then 
leaves a memory trace in us. When we perceive another event f later than e, we 
perceive that e is earlier than f because at the time of perceiving f, we also remem-
ber e.”4 Notice how “earlier” is described in terms of memory, and how what 
comes about as the changed present is described in Mellor’s terms as an event e 
already in place at the time of perceiving event f. In other words, bracket out the 
already completed and the yet-to-be completed part of my walk, the residue that’s 
left is this present perceiving at the time of event f, or at any point along the walk, 
which is a perceiving of what has changed, the difference between the before and 
later. As to the impression of changing, the physicist David Deutsch keeps to this 
  
3 Benjamin Whorf’s chapter “An American Indian Model of the Universe,” Language, 
Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John B. Carroll (Cam-
bridge, MA., M.I.T. Press, 1956), 59.  
4 cited in Craig Bourne, A Future for Presentism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), 16. 
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distinction of changed present or “differences” as he puts it, rather than the im-
pression of literal changing (“passing”), when he writes, 
We do not experience time flowing, or passing. What we experience are differences 
between our present perceptions and our present memories of past perceptions. We 
interpret those differences, correctly, as evidence that the universe changes with 
time. We also interpret them, incorrectly, as evidence that our consciousness, or the 
present, or something, moves through time.5 
His description points out the comparison between what amounts to the close-
up experiential differentiation of time (direct acquaintance) that is correctly 
assessed as such, and on the other hand how that differentiation of changes gets 
misinterpreted as movement or passage or flowing. The experiential, as he gives 
it, is staked out by differences (i.e., changed differences). Such differences are 
the pinpoints of the now’s immediacy, as we have proposed it.  
 Returning to Metzinger cited earlier, and another of his relevant passages, 
we detect a parallel description of the now’s immediacy, its anchored foothold in 
experience, although Metzinger implants a “subjective” reading in his portrayal.  
There is no temporal texture. There is no internal structure. There is just this, now. I 
believe that it is precisely for this reason that we experience low-level subjective 
qualities as immediately given. They never become what they are, they always al-
ready are what they are. The structureless character of presentational content en-
dows it with an ahistorical character.6 
On the one hand, it can be noted how concisely this passage makes note of as-
pects we have discussed of the now’s non-measurable and non-segmentable 
features: (1) lack of “temporal texture” and “internal structure”, which concur 
with the “unconfigured” description we have given of the now; (2) “immediately 
given”, which chimes in with the now’s immediacy; (3) “they always already are 
what they are”, which translates, in our version, as the preconditional now, the 
now that precludes any attempt at measuring it; and finally (4) “ahistorical 
character” – i.e., the traceless now, a now that memory or the past cannot re-
trieve. But on the other hand, the author’s difference in appraisal from the “this, 
now” we’ve been advancing comes out in his word “subjective” and the premise 
that qualities pertaining to “this, now” described as “immediately given” proper-
ly fall into the category of subjectivity. We have argued for the now’s objectivity, 
a now that comes to us, not from us.  
 This leads us to a closer look at the question of how distinct the primal 
reality of the now can be from one’s subjective input, and in particular distinct 
from memory. In short, can there be a now without it? 
  
5 David Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 263.  
6 [italics his] Thomas Metzinger, Being No One, 191.  
Completed Time: the Time that Stays Where It is 95
2. The changed and the mediated  
 And so, to put the question conversely: To what extent might the now’s imme-
diacy, which we have been describing here in terms of difference – the 
changed element that highlights what we’re presently awake to – necessarily 
implicate a changed from and a changed to. The changed from is often taken 
to be, as Mellor put it, a “memory trace”, or as Deutsch phrased it, “our pre-
sent memories of past perceptions”.7 Hence comes that apparent mediation, 
the changed from being that memory trace of what was previously a present, 
and the immediate present thereby made distinguishable by comparison. The 
changed to, on the other hand, applies to the new, the different, the changed 
in a modified way. But then this question: How can we possibly label the now 
– the changed to – an “immediacy”, as we’ve labeled it all along, if the puta-
tive recollection we bring to it – that mediation from us – is an intrinsic part 
of the experiential contact? The psychologist William James gives us some-
thing of an analogous comparison when he referred to the present as “imme-
diately and incessantly sensible” and described the “just now” or “changed 
from” in our designations as the “immediate consciousness of pastness”, dis-
tinguishing in that way the recent past from the past further down the road. 
We must keep in mind, however, that by his analysis of the specious present 
(based on his sense datum – i.e., cause/effect, before/after – notion of time), 
the problem of reconciling a now in nature with memory’s mediation was not 
so urgently spelled out.8 The specious present was, for him, not a now intrin-
sic to nature. Closer to the mark on this immediacy/memory question we are 
addressing is Edmund Husserl’s notion of the “epoche”, a primal experience 
he described as phenomenological and which presupposed the bracketing out 
of (linear) space and time, equivalent to our bracketing out of the before and 
after, the completed and yet to be completed parts of my walk to the store. The 
issue in Husserl’s case was how this bracketing out could be achieved without 
memory, and conversely how it could be achieved with memory intact. Hus-
serl’s statement “the now-apprehension is, as it were, the nucleus of a comet’s 
tail of retensions” drew this criticism from the French philosopher Derrida: 
As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and non-
perception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and pri-
mordial retension, we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; non-
  
7 Note by comparison Barbour’s notion of the now as changed, but not in the sense of an 
experientially grasped happening, but instead as a structure or configuration. Barbour, 2, 
28, 34, 44, 50, 53. 
8 Discussed in J. Bricklin, “Consciousness Already There…”, 65-67. See also James 
(1890), 609.  
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presence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the instant. There is a dura-
tion to the blink, and it closes the eye.9 
So now let’s apply this critique to the paradigm we’re advancing. We admit into 
this immediacy of the blink the changed to and changed from we’ve described 
the now as consisting of. And yet, how can we do that without thereby imposing 
into the now’s immediacy a mediating process, a not-now, namely our memory? 
And would not that memory invoke a past that would reduce immediate experi-
ence to a consequence of that past, an effect or product of prior causes, making 
the now thereby specious after all, lacking any intrinsic – or rather extrinsic – 
quality of its own? Doing that would seem to sound the death knell of the now, 
at least as we’ve been advancing it. Instead of making the now, and present-to-
past, the priority condition by which to paradigm immediate experience, we fall 
back on a past-to-present scenario, and its drawbacks, to explain why we’re 
awake to the world in the first place and on what basis an objective reality could 
be ascertainable. Capek’s phraseology would seem to fall in line with the latter, 
i.e. the “[n]ovelty of the present is possible only on the background of the imme-
diate memory of its antecedent past”.10 Alternatively, if we follow a different 
course and withdraw the changed from from memory and insert it in the very 
nowness of immediate experience, we introduce the seeming ambivalence of two 
nows at once, a just now (or changed from) and a now (or changed to), contrary 
to how we’ve been describing the now as uncountable and unmultiple, only this 
now and no others, past or future. Even were we to do this, and posit the just 
now and now as part of one and the same perceptual unit, one would be hard 
pressed to find an experiential or empirical basis for such a distinction, both 
being immediate and present.11  
  
9 quoted from Rosalind E. Krauss, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. 
Press, 1993), 215. 
10 Milic Capek, “Immediate and Mediate Memory”: 90-96. [http://www.religion-
online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2419], 6 (d). Note also his comment about the fading of the 
past’s continuity as indicative that “there cannot be any radical difference between immedi-
ate and mediate memory.” [italics his] (p. 2). Bergson, on the other hand, points out the 
mistake in failing to recognize the difference between perception and memory, or in other 
words the “radical distinction” between the present – “that which is acting” – which one’s 
present perception takes in, and the past – “that which acts no longer” – which memory 
recalls. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (New York: 
Zone Books, 1991): 68-69.  
11 Gibson points to the difficulty of distinguishing the memory element one brings to the 
scene, distinguishing that from the external field of the present one is lucidly aware of when 
he writes:  
 
The seemingly innocent hypothesis that events are perceived has radical 
implications that are upsetting to orthodox psychology. Assuming that 
shorter events are nested within longer events, that nothing is instantane-
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 How then do we avoid either quagmire and keep the now’s immediacy in-
tact and sufficiently autonomous from memory’s mediation in such a way that the 
present becomes not simply a product of the past, a result of causal mechanisms? 
Bergson’s way to do this is to conceptualize the meaning of memory as itself out-
side the bounds of individual minds and causal forces. He puts it this way: 
[T]he thing and the state are only artificially taken snapshots of the transition; and 
this transition, and all that is naturally experienced, is duration itself. It is memory, 
but not personal memory, external to what it retains, distinct from a past whose 
preservation it assures; it is a memory within change itself, a memory that prolongs 
the before into the after, keeping them from being mere snapshots and appearing 
and disappearing in a present ceaseless reborn. . . . Thus, our duration and a certain 
felt, lived participation of our physical surroundings in this inner duration are facts 
of experience. But in the first place the nature of this participation is unknown, . . .12 
“Lived participation” brings to mind Gibson’s notion of an affordance that “cuts 
across the dichotomy of subjective-objective” and “points both ways, to the envi-
ronment and to the observer.”13  
 The way, on the other hand, we propose to avoid the impasses delineated 
above is one that – while likewise pointing to a participation, being in this case a 
self/other temporal fusion – is nonetheless a participation based not on memory 
or duration but on the 1st person perspective. Francisco Varela gives us the clue 
when he writes about the just-past, “In the ‘present’ I see what has just past; in 
memory I can only hold it in a representation as if through a veil. Thus memory 
and evocation have a mode of appearance that is qualitatively different from 
nowness.”14 The insight this perspective gives us about that transition, the tran-
                                                                                                                                       
ous, and that sequences are apprehended, the usual distinction between 
perception and memory comes into question. For where is the borderline 
between perceiving and remembering? Does perceiving go backward in 
time? For seconds? For minutes? For hours? When do percepts stop and 
begin to be memories or, in another way of putting it, go into storage? . . . 
Equally embarrassing questions can be asked about expectation.11 
 
James J. Gibson, “Events are Perceivable but Time Is Not,” The Study of Time II: Proceed-
ings of the Second Conference of the International Society for the Study of Time, ed. J. T. 
Fraser and N. Lawrence (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1975), 299. 
12 [italics his] Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 30-31. 
13 J. J. Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, (Boston: Houghton Mif-
flin, 1989/1986), 129.  
14 Francisco Varela, “Francisco Varela’s home page: articles on neurophenomenology 
and first person methods” [http://www.franzreichle.ch/images/Francisco_Varela/Human 
_Consciousness_Article02.htm] (2009), p. 10. Note also William James: “The reproduction 
of an event, after it has once completely dropped out of the rearward end of the specious 
present, is an entirely different psychic fact from its direct perception in the specious pre-
sent as a thing immediately past.” (James, 1890, 630) 
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sition marked by this now, is how it becomes knowable in its immediacy accord-
ing to the groundwork already laid out in this book. In other words, what we 
experientially get to know by means of the 1st person perspective is that the now, 
or immediate present time, is that which starts the ball rolling, the starting point 
by which questions of a 3rd person nature, such as those that concern cause and 
effect or the before and after of extended time, arise as a consequence of there 
being a now in the first place, a now accessible only by 1st person means. Addi-
tional to that starting point, what the 1st person perspective gives us, instead of a 
before and after, is a just now/now, or changed from/changed to, combined in a 
holistic way, as pointed out by James. No “just now” before and a “now” in se-
quence. That holistic cameo of experience gets conveyed in the form of a tem-
poral constraint. Hence, no this then that in one’s field of sensory experience. 
There is only the this which is now. 
 From the above, we can proceed in a way that leaves our rendering un-
fettered by the cul-de-sac of nowness being treated either as a memory-
contingent phenomenon of the mind or of a kind of perceptual double. The an-
swer we have proposed is that the now’s autonomy is to be found, not as a result 
of memory or, as an alternative, an actual bifurcated seeing of what is present 
and just past, but as a result of its changed character and the indivisibility of its 
temporal exposure. And as discussed earlier, what the now entails is an align-
ment or attunement between present self and present other, on the basis of 
which are made possible 3rd person strategies of explanation and distinctions 
between before and after, past and present. A lapse in memory is one thing. A 
failure of alignment is quite another. I might forget a person’s name, not recog-
nize a street I once lived at, or be confused about the present time of day. But 
confusion over the present itself – i.e., its 1st person knowability – amounts to a 
question of lucidity and whether one can be said to be awake at all. 
3. The changed and the timeless 
 Having put forth here what appears as a blurred dynamics of time – on the one 
hand, “motioned” rather than “in motion” and on the other hand, “changed” 
rather than “changing” – one may question what this implies about the very 
meanings of “before” and “after”. As for the “before” that refers to the yet to be, 
i.e. future, its definitive existence from the perspective of present experience can 
be denied in that one detects no trace of it, given the temporal constraint and 
one’s lucidity in nowness.  But to deny the before and after as a primal infra-
structure of reality, or at least to relegate to mere memory (with all its lapses 
and subjective preferences) the primal status of the past – i.e. the once pre-
sent --, such a dismissal is tantamount to rejecting, as a substructure of na-
ture, the full sweep of extended time’s passing, along with its measurable and 
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immeasurable past. And yet this is what the now in its immediacy would leave 
us to believe, or so it seems. How then can this notion of changed time – time in 
its immediacy – be plausibly upheld that dispenses with extension altogether – 
namely, time in its passing and extending into the past? 
 Let us contemplate this question by taking as our modus operandi some 
footage from a Nazi 1942 film clip contained in a production from recent times, A 
Film Unfinished. In this film within a film, the footage begins with a few moments 
of grey opacity, blurs, streaks, squiggles, and watermarks, and then suddenly dis-
cernable scenes of a past can be made out. Trolleys move jerkily along tenement-
lined streets, throngs of pedestrians, some looking back at the camera, food 
stands, and on occasional doorways a corpse, outcome of probable disease or hun-
ger. The footage is of the Warsaw Ghetto, shot by Nazi photographers in 1942 and 
itself the subject of A Film Unfinished. While some of the scenes were staged for 
Nazi purposes, as the commentator from the later documentary points out, the 
raw graphics tell of a stark reality attested to not only by surviving witnesses seen 
watching the footage and commenting on it in the later film, but also by the ap-
pearance in A Film Unfinished of a cameraman of that 1942 footage in a post-war 
interview. Even beyond that, there are voiceover readings from the diary of the 
Ghetto’s Jewish Council leader seen depicted in the Nazi film. 
The past is there. And in an obvious sense no one can doubt it. A broad 
conclusion seems to follow: The facts of any past are there, irrespective of who 
knows about it today or to what extent. Irrespective, we might add, of the record 
keepers, record viewers living in the present, irrespective as well of what or how 
they prioritize and disregard, how they interpret, construct and reconstruct, how 
they shape, and are shaped by, new concepts for old, new words for old, and 
generally move about in a world so different in some ways from 1942. 
On the other hand, perhaps a better word than “the past is there” would 
be “the past happened”. When one speaks of an absent present – i.e. the past – 
what does it mean to be “there”? Does the “there” exist? How so if not in any 
locality? Is there a tangible “there” beyond the projection of light through film? 
Still, there is likewise some difficulty with the word “happened”, assum-
ing we treat it as signifying a temporal severance from present time and from the 
contemporaneous world. The problem here is not so much epistemological, not 
so much that of knowing the past, but rather of allowing the use of tense to im-
pute an ontological wedge between a supposed then-in-itself and a lived imme-
diate NOW. Again our question similar to above: What does it mean to speak of 
a then-in-itself or a then by itself? Here we meet up with a comment from histo-
rian Paul Ricoeur, commenting on what he terms “the methodological illusion 
that the historical fact exists in some latent state in the documents and that the 
historian is a parasite on the historical equation.”15 Is there, in short, an un-
  
15 Ricoeur, Vol. 1, p. 99. 
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present past, a past split off, floating around some place? Another way to put it 
is: Can the present that is no longer nonetheless still be around in some sense 
and exist? A now that is not now, essentially speaking. And of course one detects 
the oxymoron in such inquiries. Can something be what it is not? 
 But on the other hand, why not a now that is changed, a now that by its 
very manner of disclosure testifies to a present that is no longer, but nonetheless a 
present that is, or at least is demonstrably shown to be so? We have only to 
consider that it is our present perceptions that reveal the past as a completed fact 
– the records, the monuments, the artifacts of history, the very buildings built or 
constructed at whatever stage of completion.  That evidence derives not just 
from memory – a general consensus based for the most part on people’s 
memory of what preceded – but obviously as well from a source outside of 
people’s memory, the changed that distinguishes the now from the not-now.  
It would seem then that in this way we have overcome to some degree the on-
tological wedge or split between the past and present, between in other words 
unquantifiable time and spread sheet or “umbrella” time, the latter two un-
derstood in the sense that quantum physicist Wheeler gives to such terms: 
“‘Time’ we too easily view as a pre-established umbrella stretching over the scene 
of physics from big bang to gravitational collapse and beyond, extending from 
everlasting to everlasting.”16  The problem that stubbornly persists, however, is 
precisely that such consensus about what is configurative and recognizably in 
evidence around us, such consensus can’t escape inferential judgments and 3rd 
person construals derived from our own cognitive resources and memory, 
rather than from an outside face-to-face past.  This throws us back to the di-
lemma of an ontological split between a face-to-face confrontation with the 
present and a past that is undisclosable except by representation.             
The hazard lurking in such a split is the diminishing of the reality sta-
tus of the past relative to the present, or simply the implied denial of time 
itself in an extended sense.  To quote Wheeler again: 
 We see here, more dramatically than in any example one can easily give, the difficul-
ties of speaking of what goes on in the old-fashioned language of determinism.  What 
a difficulty for Einstein!  What a difficulty for the view that all that is and was exists 
“out there,” independent of the choices made by the community of the observers in 
the here and now!17 
We might add to that how philosopher Galen Strawson once put the prospects of 
this diminishing status:  
  
16 J.A. Wheeler, “Bohr, Einstein, and the strange lesson of the quantum,” Mind in Na-
ture, ed. Richard Q. Elvee, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 22. 
17 Wheeler, “Bohr, Einstein…”: 16-17.  
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Note that if temporality goes, i.e. not just spacetime tm but temporality in any form, 
then experience also goes, given that experience requires time.  One of the fine 
consequences of this is that there has never been any suffering.  But no theory of 
reality can be right that has the consequence that there has never been any 
suffering.18 
And yet, that is precisely the one thing our thesis about time is not denying – 
experience.  What is being denied is that the primacy of immediate experience 
over notions of extended time necessarily excludes or diminishes the reality 
status of past experiences, the experiences our memory recalls.  When one cries 
out in pain, the temporality of that “It hurts!” is not, as Hestervold has pointed 
out, about the time of day but about a present experience.  Likewise, when one 
flinches in pain when recalling a past suffering, okay it is a memory but that 
does not diminish the veridicality of source of the memory, the experience as 
remembered.  In other words, the distinction that is intended to be brought out 
here is not that of an ontological wedge between present and past, but rather 
that between an ontological bedrock of time, regardless of when, and on the 
other hand its chronological attribution or any given notion of extended (linear) 
time. 
                   Let’s try to make this distinction clearer by means of two illustrations.  
Author of Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor gives reason to blur the distinction 
between the immediate present of experience and past experience when he 
takes, for example, the experience of sudden rapture:  
Of course, the immediate experience could be strong and convincing on its own. . . . 
But even here, your past striving and moral experience would alone enable you to 
understand and identify this rapturous state. You would recognize it only through 
having striven in a certain direction, and that means again that you know what you 
are through what you have become.19 
Taylor points to this knowing – and by implication a knowing now – as a 
past/present present mingling.  How then does the temporal bedrock of 
experience enter in here?  It does so precisely in the mingling. Knowing what 
you are is one thing. Knowing that you are now is another. The latter consists of 
being awake in and to the present, and that entails recognizing one’s sur-
roundings as present surroundings and not those from a memory or a dream. 
Keeping in mind these two senses of knowing (the what and the that), we can on 
the one hand agree that knowing the rapturous experience necessarily draws on 
former experiences, sources of the self that the present rapture is built on. It is 
  
 18 Galen Strawson, “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 13/10-11 (2006): 9, n. 16.  
19 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 48.  
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to this sense of experience that linear notions of time get applied, past strivings 
and moral experience being amenable to the schematization of sequential time. 
On the other side, however, there is this “knowing that”, this familiar knowing of 
the present, the kind of knowing that gives us this taken-for-granted sense that 
our present rapture is different from a recalled rapture. And that familiarity 
comes not from sources of past experience filtered through memory, but from 
prersent contact with the outside, a strictly now world.  If it were not so, one’s 
present rapturous experience would not be a happening one would be awake to 
and in contact with, but an illusion of some kind generated by one’s own 
internal mediation. 
                Another way to show how the ontological split between present and 
past is challenged by our notion of experiential time is to take the example of 
where the experiential sense of time is put to the sidelines, denied ontological 
status and treated as merely subjective or phenomenological, as in temporal 
frameworks that give preponderance to what are referred to as tenseless B 
theories of time and time-reversal invariance.   The quandary, in so doing, is 
epitomized by Glasersfeld – that of trying to get access “to that outside reality 
before we get to know it”.  In other words, the means by which this is attempted 
inevitably involves a split in the ontological base, a split between the 1st person 
experiential evidence and a 3rd person schema of time.  We see this happening in 
the case of physicist Weyl’s classic statement:  
The objective world simply is; it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my 
consciousness, crawling along the lifeline of my body, does a section of this world 
come to life as a fleeting image in space which continually changes in time.20  
The question is how can he know about this non-happening? From outside the 
now?  Weyl’s way out is to adopt a 3rd person schema of time detected in the 
phrase “changes in time”, thereby entailing a splitting off from the 1st person now 
to changes in time, which – as the “in” suggests – is all about umbrella time, the 
time that takes time, not the experiential now it is predicated on. In short, the 
question of starting point is presupposed rather than addressed. 
  
20 [italics his] Herman Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics, 116. 
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So far, we’ve probed a number of facets of the now and its experiential immedia-
cy that suggest some leads into the nature of this enigma – facets of this phe-
nomenon like its resistance to our ways of conceptualizing by means of number 
and sequence, its originating from the external world, its precluding scientific 
ways of being comprehended as an object – this in spite of its thinglike attribute 
of being an intrinsic part of the very concreteness of objects, their being exposed 
that way, and only that way empirically and observationally, rather than as ren-
dered to our awakened experience in abstract terms or as mere thoughts or 
speculations. Our journey, however, is as yet midstream, and there is much 
about this enigma of the now’s immediacy that remains – and undoubtedly will 
always remain.  
The question we probe in this chapter is a formidable one. It has to do 
with the now’s connection to our 1st person perspective. This connection, as 
brought out earlier, is not of a kind that would make the now indexical or a mir-
ror feature of awareness, but of a kind that would seem to deprive the now of 
any conceptual relation to the non-immediate. To reiterate questions previously 
asked, if present time is all about what is now – the present world one is awake 
to –, what happens to the rest of the world, the world one isn’t awake to or 
aware of? And by implication, why are there not invariably multiple nows from 
multiple perspectives, and so a countable aspect to the now, after all? And to 
take this yet further, given this connection between one’s 1st person perspective 
and the now, what effect might this have on the 3rd person perspective, or when 
the last person on Earth dies, and, along with that person, the 1st person per-
spective of that person?  
In essence the problem can be framed as belonging to a branch of what 
can be termed “ontological relativism” – namely, how the evidence that is rela-
tive to a 1st person perspective can hold its own, claim a bearing or significance 
beyond one’s mere narrow point of view, in the face of a broadened 3rd person 
outlook. It is not unlike the type of problem Thomas Nagel posed at the begin-
ning of his book, The View from Nowhere:  
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This book is about a single problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular per-
son inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his 
viewpoint included. It is a problem that faces every creature with the impulse and the 
capacity to transcend its particular point of view and to conceive of the world as a 
whole.1 
The challenge before us, and has been from the beginning, is to assess how much 
of “the world as a whole”– and an objective view of that same world that the now 
provides us with – can be encompassed by the (present) perspective of a particu-
lar person, and without thereby evading the now (i.e., by “transcending” from 
the concrete to the abstract). In particular, how much can the 1st person wit-
nessed perspective tell us about time without the 3rd person measuring tools 
thrown in that bring us information not immediately in view?  
It will be the aim of this chapter to proceed with this challenge and take 
up the questions just posed. The notion we introduce here of con-temporaneity 
will be the means by which we do this. 
1. Con-temporaneity 
“Con-temporaneity” is spelled with a hyphen to underscore that by that word we 
mean the interlocking of present time, this spread feature of the now, despite 
variations in clock time depending on what time zone or country we live in. Ad-
ditionally, it signifies the immediacy of temporal union between self and other, a 
temporal monism in essence, which prioritizes that lucidity we are endowed 
with that enables our distinguishing between present and past, that clarity of 
mind alert to what is now that other kinds of time – measured time, before-and-
after time – are predicated on. The effect of this temporal union in self/other 
terms is to make the two into one in time by their having the same temporal 
now. Our frequent characterization of the now as “outside” is not intended to 
signify its being unplugged from one’s self/other con-temporaneity, but only to 
earmark the source of the now – i.e., in the external field, an external ambiance 
we’ve so far ascribed as “nature”, and originating not from us, not from our 
mental constructs, subjective states, or however “now” might be construed as an 
indexical self-marker.  
 How then does this notion of con-temporaneity help us bridge the gap 
between one’s present perspective on the one hand and on the other the world 
and nature construed as extending in time, in evolutionary and cosmic propor-
tions, from the standpoint of information and calculations obtained by 3rd per-
  
1 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1985), 3.  
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son approaches? How can the former possibly compare to the latter? Let us try 
several paths in seeking an answer to this question.  
 I make a phone call to a friend overseas. During the conversation there’s 
a detectable pause each time before my friend responds to whatever I say. Or it 
may be that on the TV there’s an interview going on with someone in Afghani-
stan. A similar slight pause is detected before the person interviewed responds 
to each of the reporter’s questions. The delays in each case can be accounted for 
by the time it takes sound waves to travel the overseas distance. Such indica-
tions suggest that in cases of long distances not only are there time zone differ-
ences but differences, however slight, in what constitutes the now at each end of 
the conversation. It seems, in other words, that in these instances linear time – 
the time that takes time – predominates over the now’s 1st person immediacy.  
But let’s look closer. The person at either end of the phone call or at ei-
ther end of the TV interview is awake to the world and experiencing the now’s 
immediacy. At no time do any of these participants drift from the now or lose 
their sense of now time. Nor do they suddenly find themselves in direct experi-
ential contact with a 3-minute-ago – or 3-second-ago – friend, or a 3-second-
yet-to-be interviewer. I may watch on the TV someone whose image or voice is 3 
seconds ago or 3 years ago, but experientially I myself cannot exchange the pre-
sent I’m awake to for a present yet to be or already past.2 Nothing in my experi-
ential field, or in the experiential field of any of the listeners or viewers, is past – 
not even the delayed response! And not even that star in the sky that scientific 
analysis tells me is extinct. That star as well is part of the immediacy of nowness 
I’m awake to, that temporal constraint which we discussed earlier. And so, in 
these instances of long distant exchanges given above, the self/other temporal 
alignment stays fixed regardless of perceptible delays at either end. It stays fixed 
thanks to the lucidity that each of these persons brings to the exchange.3 In fact, 
it is thanks to that lucidity, thanks to that experiential contact with our sur-
roundings now and with the world now, that one can move at all from the expe-
riential to questions of differences in linear time. The implication we are getting 
at is close to a contradiction. It is this: There is this conjoining of time at base 
  
2 Even in “back to the future” speculative scenarios, the time that diverges from ordi-
nary experience is not now time but linear time, the time that takes time, its distortion 
coming about by such things as near light speed space travel or speculated feats of time 
warping, which again implicate linear time distortions. Were the now itself capable of 
being warped or escaped from in such scenarios, the implications would be closer to 
anecdotes from religious and supernatural literature rather than from futuristic science.  
3 We can extend this thesis to the twin paradox, discussed earlier, arising out of Ein-
stein’s relativity theory, and to Whitehead’s notion of co-presence in which space voyag-
ers at near light speed approach each other’s close proximity, although their linear time 
discrepancy is great. In either case, however great that discrepancy, the observing of each 
other is defined by a now awareness that pervades their field of view. On Capek appropo 
Whitehead’s notion of co-presence, see chapter 4, n. 18. 
Chapter 6 106
level between my phone call and the person overseas at the other end, or be-
tween the domestic interviewer and the person interviewed in Afghanistan, a 
conjoining of self and other that underlies, and seemingly contradicts, the dis-
juncture in linear time between self and other, extracted by calculating speed of 
sound, interpreting delayed response, and so forth. 
Which to trust? Can they both be right? Is that star there or not there? 
Am I seeing what’s now or seeing into the past? If we go by way of the data that 
3rd person approaches come up with, evidence of temporal conjoining doesn’t 
exist. In fact, the now isn’t even pertinent. Perhaps it could be just as well elimi-
nated. But if we do so, and replace the present world one is awake to with a per-
spective that doesn’t rely on one’s being awake in the first place, instead of a 
present world we end up with a nowless state of the world – what one might 
posit a vacuous notion – and the edifice of knowledge itself resting on this pre-
sumption of a nowless state.  
And so we see in this how con-temporaneity – this temporal conjoining 
of experiential time – is shown as something fundamental and how 3rd person 
notions of time – the time that takes time – are a derivative outcome. By means 
of this interlocking of present time, what con-temporaneity does is make possi-
ble our constructing a time that isn’t experiential out of one that is. The rings of 
a tree tell us how old that tree is. Its age, however, isn’t experiential. It’s counted 
and computed. The experiential part, by contrast, is that present tree and those 
present rings, the fact that they are observed and that consensus about them can 
be had not only on the basis of what is observed – the tree and the rings – but 
most fundamentally on the basis of a common core lucidity among 1st person 
reporters that makes possible the distinction in the first place between what is 
present and what is past, i.e. the changed to and the changed from. Absent that, 
the rings and the tree’s age would have no meaning. In short, given how central 
the now and con- temporaneity are in experiential contact and how central ex-
periential contact is in 1st person reports, it recalls the remark of Bitbol and Pet-
itmengin suggestive of the significance of both the now and con-temporaneity 
when they write, “First person reports remain the de facto starting point and 
ultimate warrant of the whole system of knowledge.”4 
Still, one might return to the Weyl challenge spoken of earlier and support 
with a different argument the resistance he would be expected to have had to our 
labeling as “fundamental” one’s 1st person awareness of time and our applying 
“derivative” to the informational output thereby enabled, namely our 3rd person 
linear extrapolations about extended time. One might contend, as an alternate 
route in support of Weyl, that the time we’re awake to is constructed, a derivative 
product of our senses, and that the label “fundamental” rightfully belongs to an 
unseen world of internal processes that only 3rd person methodologies and deduc-
  
4 [italics theirs] Michel Bitbol and Claire Petitmengin, “On the Possibility…,” 53. 
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tive analysis can attain information about. Accordingly, the labels reverse. Access 
to time’s real nature must all depend on 3rd person, not 1st person, approaches. 
Such would be the relevant part of Donald Hoffman’s thesis in his book Visual 
Intelligence: How We Create What We See. As for that table now that we’re all 
sitting around, for Hoffman that consensus we have about this table we see and its 
presence in time would be part of “an intelligent process of active construction. . . . 
We construct the same things because we use the same rules of construction”.5 
And so the starting point for time and everything we experience becomes 3rd per-
son – deciphering the rules of construction. But now the problem becomes one of 
untangling ourselves from our constructing. If I’m constructing this world I’m 
awake to, including the table that we agree is there and present in time, how do I 
know I’m not constructing other things that consensus might show to be true – 
namely my thinking and drawing conclusions about the rules of construction? And 
how do I know I’m even awake to do that or any other constructing and not con-
structing the fact that I’m awake? What happens, in essence, is we end of with the 
same skeptical morass we discussed earlier, the outcome of taking the 3rd person 
perspective as our starting point. 
And so with that said, let us now venture down a second path in search of 
how far this notion of con-temporaneity can take us in filling the gap between a 
present perspective that confronts time one way and the appraisal approach that 
takes time another way, namely as time extending and amenable to calculation. 
Specifically, the problem posed here concerns the 1st person accounting of things 
and what happens when my (or your) experiential contact with the now’s immedi-
acy connects with – or disconnects from – that of another person or thing. Con-
temporaneity is all about presence, and according to its accounting of things there 
cannot be an absent person now that one is not in contact with, an absent world 
now that one is not awake to, or a present view that one is not in fact viewing. In a 
nutshell, and most significant of all, there cannot be countable nows, such as the 
presentness of my awakened perceptions and the presentness of yours back where 
you live in another city. Would not that blatant experiential exclusion of “nows” in 
the plural be reason alone to give the 3rd person perspective, based on reasoning 
and inference, a far superior accounting of time?  
 Let’s turn to a less sophisticated accounting for possible insight. 
2. Presence in and out 
 In his study of the Piraha native Americans, an indigenous group living in the 
Amazon region, Daniel Everett describes a culture that is without the concept of 
  
5 On how he explains it, see Donald D. Hoffman, Visual Intelligence: How We Create 
What We See (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1998): xii, 33-34, 73-74, 198. 
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number and without the everyday abstractions of time and space that speakers 
of developed cultures in today’s world take for granted. For the Piraha, by con-
trast, their world is the world of direct experience and, for example, for them 
there is a cultural significance and hard to define meaning – Everett uses the 
term “experiential liminality” – that attaches to crossing the border between 
entering and leaving experiential contact, what lies on the boundaries of one’s 
perceptual experience. He gives the example of a canoe of paddlers appearing or 
disappearing around a river bend and describes the distant onlookers’ excite-
ment as hard to describe – almost as traveling into another dimension. Likewise 
he notes the same absorption, even fascination, at the sudden appearance of an 
expected plane or its disappearance, or a comrade’s arrival after a journey in the 
jungle, or a suddenly audible or inaudible voice, or the flickering light of a match 
or smoldering campfire about to go out.6 To describe these in and out transi-
tions of experiential contact, the Piraha would exclaim a thematic word – “xibi-
piio”, which Everett at first thought meant “just now”, or that designated per-
sons just caught sight of or just out of sight. Later he realized the word applied 
narrowly to that moment of experiential contact, the verging in or out of it – a 
changed happening. 
 To see how this “xibipiio” – this in and out of experiential contact – re-
lates to the issue of absence before us, we have first of all to understand what it 
means to speak of a present perception. A present perception does not come 
from us or our cognitive mechanisms. I may open my eyes when I want, look the 
other way, move to another field of view, and choose in that way the aspect of 
my surroundings I wish to see, but the temporal constraint we have talked about 
determines that the time frame of whatever is in my view be con-temporaneous, 
that it falls in line with a fixed and socially interlocking self/other alignment in 
time.7 I may wake up to whatever clock time I want, but I cannot wake up to a 
minute before or a minute after the immediate present, the time that defines my 
self/other temporal alignment. Such limitations reflect the now’s foreign owner-
ship, a now in nature, an externally derived present in a present perception. 
  
6 Daniel L. Everett, Don’t Sleep. There Are Snakes: Life and Language in the Amazoni-
an Jungle (New York: Pantheon Books, 2008): 129-132; see also: “Cultural Constraints on 
Grammar and Cognition in Piraha”, 631-632; Current Anthropology 46/4 (August-October 
2005): 621-634. [http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~kay/Everett. CA.Piraha.pdf] Controver-
sies concerning aspects of his linguistic conclusions we need not address.  
7 Compare what John Smythies describes as a problem that has never been solved, 
the conflicting stands of two theories of perception, the one – the direct realist – taking 
literal transparency as the essential feature, the “literally direct views of external physical 
objects”, and the other – the representative theory – addressing the optics of seeing and 
basing its conclusions on the premise that “our sensations are representative construc-
tions of the nervous system, and not direct view of external objects”. Smythies, 225. 
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 Consonant with this setting of an externally derived present is the 
changed happening, which is only another way of speaking of the present – 
the immediately changed to of the present, a present that happens. Returning 
to the Piraha, when that canoe vanishes from sight, or the flame flickers and 
the smoldering fire goes out, or a voice suddenly becomes inaudible, we en-
counter as well the changed happening that defines the present, but in these 
cases the Piraha spectator is emotionally riveted to the scene, such as Everett 
describes, due to the absencing of something in the present perception which 
opens its door to self/other temporal alignment. Existence becomes a form of 
non-existence from the Piraha’s 1st person perspective, although from our 
rational means of explanation we know that the canoe or that voice haven’t 
ceased existence and that the flame has merely changed chemistry. Still, even 
in modern cultures, absence – or experiential non-existence – is not neces-
sarily better explained by rational explanation, as when one confronts the 
baffling end of a loved person’s life or when the light merely goes “out” or 
when one simply asks, “Whatever happened to a moment ago – that moment 
ago, let’s say, of that flickering light?” What rational explanation can one give 
for that verging out of view of the moment, one’s experiential contact, that 
xibipiio? Whole religions have been built in quest of an explanation. 
 It is, however, clear that the thorn in the side of con-temporaneity has as 
yet not been removed by this exegesis on the Piraha system of perception, what 
Everett calls “the cultural immediacy of experience principle”. The reality of 
absence – meaning in the Piraha case the absenting of that canoe, for example, 
from the immediacy of the viewer’s experience – has so far not been satisfactori-
ly accounted for, given con-temporaneity’s credo as to the interlocking of pre-
sent time. After all, what is it that becomes of 1st person phenomena absent their 
interlocking? No nows? Only one now, mine or yours? Can one plausibly deny 
that Freddy Winters in Texas has a now he’s awake to, even though his can be 
presumed not to have any interlocking with mine? It seems, then, that con-
temporaneity cannot bridge the gap between a 1st person perspective and an 
appraisal of time receptive to multiple nows – unless it can get around this issue 
of quantifiability and countability. 
3. The absent present 
 So let’s try yet one more path toward filling that gap by adopting what’s called a 
relational approach that steers more or less within the parameters of con-
temporaneity. We’ll use, as our proposed model to serve this aim, a passage 
from Paul Baird: 
How does one state of my brain relate to the state of another brain widely separated 
from mine? Quite simply it doesn’t unless correlation between the two systems takes 
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place. Does a hypothetical Freddy Winters in Tucson Arizona have the same now as 
me, as I write these words in Brest France? The question has no meaning in a rela-
tional universe. I simply cannot say whether Freddy has the same now as myself un-
less I get on the phone and make a call to him. Then our systems correlate and, in-
deed, we will be sharing the same now as the state of a system which incorporates 
both of our brains.8 
The relevant question applicable to our discussion is what happens when the 
two systems – we’ll describe them as two self/other temporal alignments, to 
adopt our phraseology – do not correlate? Two clues to an answer are suggested 
above, according to this relational approach. First clue, “I simply cannot say”. 
The second, “the state of a system” has yet to incorporate “both of our brains”. 
Let’s consider here how well this accounting accords with con-temporaneity, 
and what alternate path it might offer that avoids the quandary of an absent 
present time? 
 As to “I simply cannot say”, how we can translate that in con-
temporaneity terms is the equivalent – “I don’t know” –, and more precisely – 
“I don’t know by direct acquaintance”– or in other words by personally expe-
riencing that shared now. The question then becomes: Is there any other mode 
of knowing that would inform Paul whether Freddy has the same now, or dif-
ferent for that matter, from that of the author? “The having is the knowing” – 
to quote Galen Strawson’s axiom about the kind of exclusive knowing that 
comes from experiencing. The point is here, in the case of the now or present 
time, the knowing is exclusively in the currently having. No other knowing 
about the now that Freddy is awake to is accessible other than by the sharing 
of present time, and obviously with Freddy present, at least by phone contact. 
The notion of an “absent present” would amount to an oxymoron, the incon-
gruity of supposing Paul’s sharing in Brest, France, the experiential evidence 
of what it’s like for Freddy in Tucson to be awake at present, doing so by in 
effect getting inside the latter’s physical and mental state. Sure, Paul can re-
ceive information indirectly that Freddy is alive and well, and so presume that 
Freddy must be presently awake if it’s daytime in Arizona. But that’s not our 
concern, nor is it Baird’s. The question is fixedly about another now – what it 
means to speak of another now, an absent now. Baird’s answer – “I simply 
cannot say” – accords with how con-temporaneity would evaluate the situa-
tion. In fact, taking “I simply cannot say” to mean “I lack the kind of exclusive 
knowing that comes from currently experiencing”, it turns out con-
temporanity moves part way in filling the gap between time present and the 
absent present by effectively nullifying the conceivability of the latter. The 
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now can only be present to someone. However engrained in society this notion 
of things being quantifiable, however starkly apparent an absent present 
might seem – given all that lies outside one’s limited 1st person purview –, the 
failure lies not in the 1st person perspective, nor in con-temporaneity, but in 
the failure of the appraisal habit of mind to account for a phenomenon that 
cannot be absent, but only immediately acquainted with.9 
 Explanation is easy to come by if, from a 3rd person perspective, one can 
deem as illusory the notion of an external or extrinsic now. After all, where is the 
“information” that such a now exists other than as an indexical reflection of 
ourselves or a subjective impression brought about by consciousness? Hence, 
that way the problem is swept under the table. There is no now to begin with 
such as to cause a fuss over speculations like an absent present. But here is 
where Baird’s second clue about the absent now comes in, and it comes in the 
form of an absent correlation – i.e., “the state of a system” that has yet to incor-
porate “both of our brains”. The phone call between Paul and Freddy has yet to 
be made. Paul is not in a position to say anything about Freddy’s now. But then 
comes the phone call. It triggers a new state of a system that incorporates both 
of them: Translated, a changed happening occurs in the form of a new alignment 
that connects the two parties to a common circuit of nowness. What we can con-
clude from this? That now of the new state of a system, prior to the phone call, 
never even existed! We can go further: There is no history of that now, no histo-
ry of whereabouts of any now prior to any experiential contact, because the now 
is precisely that experiential contact and nothing extending in time from out of 
it. What follows: No prior existence of Freddy’s now – no absent present – can 
be inferred (by 3rd person means) from the current contact (by 1st person means) 
between Paul and Freddy. The 3rd person perspective falls helpless by the way-
side, unable to penetrate into a self/other alignment that can only be known by 
1st person means. 
 This would seem to lend sufficient weight to the claim that the deficiency 
that is deemed to apply to immediate time and its access by experiential means, 
a deficiency in failing to take account of other times, reflects as well an inade-
quacy of 3rd person strategies, geared to the appraisal of an amount of time. The 
3rd person perspective cannot find the now.  
4. The Seager paradox  
 What has just be said about the relational approach to experiential contact and 
how it helps us unravel the paradox of now time can also be applied to another 
  
9 One might adopt Stapp’s phraseology to describe that failure – “the dodge of char-
acterizing as illusory that which it is constitutionally unable to explain”. Henry P. Stapp, 
“The Mind…,” 201.  
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paradox, this one proposed by William Seager, a philosopher whose field ex-
tends to quantum theory. Seager hypothesizes a mind experiment that would 
extrapolate in macroscopic terms the effect of observation and measurement on 
a particle’s existence in the quantum world. The Seager paradox begins as fol-
lows: Supposing an experimenter could choose which part of potentiality to 
make real in present time by performing a measurement that would change 
potentiality to actuality, or non-locality to locality, what then? 
Paradox looms! The experimenter him or herself is presumably only a part of nature 
rather than the entirety of the world, and so has no reality until and unless brought 
into being by some operation of another observer.10 
Is there a way out of this paradox? The way we suggest is to approach the para-
dox as an artifact of 3rd person reasoning, as an illustration in other words of the 
human tendency to explain observation in an immediate situation according to a 
methodology that distances from the immediate rather than taking the immedi-
ate as a 1st person starting point that can’t be distanced from. Let us see why.  
 Drawing on our Baird discussion, we can follow that path in interpreting 
the analogy implicitly made in the Seager passage between a quantum particle, 
such as a photon, and an observer being observed, and forge a way to unravel 
the paradox. 
 The particle’s character, prior to what one’s measurement determines 
about it, remains ambiguous until actual measurement is carried out by the 
observer doing the quantum measurement. For example, there is the familiar 
wave/particle uncertainty and ambiguity that applies to a photon prior to meas-
urement. The now presence of the observer is what does the trick, at least ac-
cording to one prominent school in quantum physics, proponents of the Copen-
hagen interpretation. The now observation is what concretizes the quantum 
object, brings about the wave function collapse, and gives definable existence to 
the particle. In Seager’s scenario, the quantum observation is extrapolated to the 
macroscopic world we wake up to. Borrowing from the behavior of particles, he 
applies it to that of an observed observer who, by analogy, is postulated in this 
thought experiment to become a concrete entity, an actualized observed person, 
as a consequence of the second observer observing that person. His reasoning 
here alludes to the mainstream scientific view that would adjudge consciousness 
an “emergent feature” that “stands as epiphenomenal and a mere epistemic re-
source which appears only to . . . consciousness.” [spacing periods his] In other 
words, one person’s consciousness becomes but an emanation of another per-
son’s consciousness. A quandary here, which Seager appraises as “a worrying 
whiff of circularity” that betrays “the fundamental and irresolvable problem with 
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the treatment of consciousness in the scientific picture of the world”.11 So how 
does our set up of the self/other alignment do any better? 
 We recall the phone call from Paul to Freddy in the Baird scenario, and 
the now alignment instantiated by their experiential contact. In the Seager para-
dox, however, what occurs is not only the instantiation of a now alignment but 
of an actual human being – the experimenter coming into existence by being 
observed! The implication: Not only no past now, but as well no previously ob-
servable experimenter prior to the conscious awareness of the second observer 
entering the picture.  
 Of course, in the case of both observed experimenter and Freddy on the 
cell phone, one can portray their existences from a 3rd person perspective and 
not on the basis of shared experiential con-temporaneity or shared 1st person 
alignment in present time. Proceeding thus, one has at hand the obvious infer-
ential and informational ways of determining prior existence, among others. But 
then the analogy with the quantum particle ceases, as the concretized photon 
has no 3rd person access route that way. “No reality” and “brought into being” – 
such phraseology is being applied according to a 1st person criterion, not accord-
ing to 3rd person methodologies of time – time as extending and amenable to 
calculation. The presumption that sustains the photon/observer paradox is that 
“no reality” and “brought into being” are construed in ways that pertain to the 
now – namely as outcomes of an experiential contact that brings about a new 
state of affairs, an actuality with nothing but potentiality preceding. Then the 
paradox is solved. In fact, then there is no paradox to begin with, barring the 3rd 
person perspective. Like a particle’s contingency, the nowness of one’s self/other 
alignment doesn’t exist without a sensory knowing – a consciousness – that 
comes about in that now alignment. This doesn’t make nowness (or conscious-
ness, given this analogy) an epiphenomenon. Rather, it makes linear time – the 
before and after – an epiphenomenon or consequence of nowness (or con-
sciousness, in the sense of a fundamental reality, a starting point). 
 What the Seager scenario gives us, insofar as a parallel can be brought 
out between the behavior of a quantum particle and one’s 1st person alignment 
in present time, is yet another striking example of how the latter notion of time 
– the now in nature – fills a gap that 3rd person methodologies of time – time as 
extending and amenable to calculation – cannot do and, in this case, leave as a 
paradox: Consciousness, when translated temporally as an exclusively 1st person 
experiential immediacy, entails no prior now immediacy in (linear) time. That is 
to say, there is no now preceding the starting point of the now, just as there is no 
actual particle preceding experiential contact. Of course, it can be pointed out 
there is the existence of that observer before the second experimenter’s observa-
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tion, but then again can there be that observer before the now or before experi-
ential contact of any kind in the form of self/other alignment? In any case, the 
paradox is resolved if what is deemed consciousness, or more appropriately the 
now’s self/other alignment, is considered not as an emergent property or epi-
phenomenon – i.e., an outcome emerging out of a cause – but as a fundamental, 
a starting point. Introducing this nonlinear perspective here avoids such quan-
daries as shown above and as illustrated earlier in the contradictions of causal 
closure in chapter 4.  
 What we can conclude about the meaning of this topic of “con-
temporaneity”, the title of this chapter, is that it is integral to various aspects of 
immediate time. To begin with, con-temporaneity is another way of speaking 
about temporal uniformity, the dyadic self/other alignment in the immediacy of 
present time, no matter how far apart and far reaching this otherness may be. 
This follows from the fact that con-temporaneity functions, not “in” space, but 
as a temporal template on the basis of which calculations can be made about 
measured distances in space and spacetime. Past and future are as well, it would 
seem, founded on this con-temporaneity, for where else “in” space and time 
could they function or happen or exist except in relation to present time? Fur-
thermore, there is the con-temporaneity that as well undergirds and makes pos-
sible such primordial needs as face-to-face communication, self/other interac-
tion, social behavior, including basic agreement simply about what is present 
and past. That fallen tree, this built building, my arrived message, the records of 
previous experiments – the fact that there is con-temporaneous agreement 
about what these are all about suggests the past, as exhibited in this concrete 
way, is con-temporaneous as well in its present condition. But being con-
temporaneous, how could one speak of it as experientially “in” the past to begin 
with except as a kind of metaphor that adopts a different notion of time – 
countable or extended time, for example? After all, how is it possible to measure 
past con-temporaneity – i.e., the past immediacy of experiential contact? More-
over, might there be a connection between the non-existence (in a measured 
time sense) of a past con-temporaneity, the non-existence of a particle’s potenti-
ality, and furthermore such a notion as the non-existence of experience itself, or 
even the non-existence of death? Let us see what we can do with these questions 
in the chapters which follow.  
 
“The length of time of a human life, compared   to the range of 
cosmic time spans, appears in-   significant, whereas it is the 
very place from   which every question of significance arises.” 
    Paul Ricoeur Time and Narrative, 3. 
Chapter 7 
The Notion of a Beginning 
Bertrand Russell once wrote: “What is to say that the world has not just come 
into existence complete with fossil records, memories, and other such causal 
traces?”1 In other words, who’s to say it all just doesn’t begin right now? 
 This chapter will propose that when one’s route to time is experiential it 
all does begin right now. Such would be the answer given here to the question 
“Which comes first, the chicken or the egg?” That is to say, however much the 
present depends on a past accounting, the fact that there is a needed present in 
order to make that past accounting, or any past-to-present assessment, implies 
an order of time where the present comes before the past. Such encapsulates the 
theme of “beginning” in this chapter’s discussion of experiential contact.  
 The problem begins here: “In the beginning God created heaven and 
earth.” How does one reconcile a timeless beginning with a creation that con-
tinues in time? Or for that matter, a spontaneous Big Bang with a subsequent 
universe obedient to natural laws extending in time? The quest for a logical 
“before” in either case reflects our natural inclination to think in terms of lin-
ear time, the time that takes time and that doesn’t just suddenly dart out of 
nowhere or start from scratch. “Spontaneous beginning” reflects another of 
those paradoxical notions that strains consistency and boggles the 3rd person 
perspective, as does such contra-sequential asssertions as for example: “Since 
the Big Bang initiates the very laws of physics, one cannot expect any physical 
explanation of this singularity; physical laws used to explain the expansion of 
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the universe no longer hold at any time before.”2 Nonetheless, some in the 
scientific community might claim a loophole out by insisting there is a before 
the Big Bang – though not a “before” in sequential, measurable time, but ra-
ther a kind of “vertical” time, as suggested in Stephen Hawking’s no boundary 
proposal. As he puts it, “Events before the Big Bang, are simply not defined, 
because there’s no way one could measure what happened at them. . . . Since 
events before the Big Bang have no observational consequences, one may as 
well cut them out of the theory and say that time began at the Big Bang.” Nev-
ertheless, as he proposes it, “The no boundary condition is the statement that 
the laws of physics hold everywhere.”3 But then the enigma of a “before” that 
is not locatable in extended time, a “before” furthermore that would seem to 
extrapolate from what can be measured and calculated based on the observa-
ble universe as we have it today, leaving us with a question mark about how 
this “before” in a non-measured and non-calculated temporal sense can trans-
late as a “before”. In other words, it seems there is still the mystery in this 
notion of a beginning, how it can pop out of nowhere. And so let’s try another 
approach, utilizing some of the things we’ve already pointed out about the 1st 
person perspective to help us along our way.  
 Temporal starting point. Is there such a thing? How does one legitimize 
the notion of a beginning with nothing in extended time before it? Let’s take 
examples of such attempts.  
 The American quantum scientist J. Wheeler was an adherent of the Co-
penhagen interpretation of quantum theory, which laid particular stress on the 
observer’s role in bringing about particle actualization, or wave function collapse, 
in performing a quantum measurement. Wheeler went to extreme in putting par-
ticular emphasis on the experimental set up “here and now”, noting for example 
the effect a last-minute decision in the present would have on “what we have the 
right to say about a photon that was given out long before there was any life in the 
universe”, and, from this apparent effect of present circumstances on a photon’s 
past, concluding that, in this discipline at least, “the past has no existence except as 
recorded in the present”.4 And when asked by an interviewer: 
ELVEE: Dr. Wheeler, who was there to observe the universe when it started? Were 
we there? Or does it only start with our observation? Is the big bang here? 
  
2 Bruce Reichenbach, The Cosmological Argument: a Reassessment (Springfield: 
Charles Thomas, 1972); see also: [https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-
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3 S.W. Hawking, “The Beginning of Time” [2018] [www.hawking.org.uk/the-
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WHEELER: A lovely way to put it – “Is the big bang here?” I can imagine that we will 
someday have to answer your question with a “yes.” If there is any conclusion that 
follows more strongly than another about the nature of time from the study of the 
quantum nature of space and time, it is the circumstance that the very idea of “be-
fore” and “after” is in some sense transcended.5 
Removed from the context of quantum physics, such comments become quite 
controversial. I need only mention, as an example, a history professor in a forum 
discussion rebuking me for giving attention in an academic lecture to Wheeler’s 
suggestion of a non-existent past except as recorded in the present. Would not 
the Battle of Verdun in World War I, with over 700,000 casualties, have existed 
just as much in the past, he expostulated, regardless of recording in the present? 
In any case, Wheeler was not denying the very idea of “before”, as we see above, 
but rather suggesting, given evidence limited to quantum experiments, that it is 
in some sense transcended. And so that becomes the question, the question of 
applicability. Once we take it out of a quantum context, the uncertainty would 
seem all the greater about how there can be this beginning, this now or present 
time that transcends linear time and subordinates the latter to a kind of contin-
gency. 
 Even in the context of quantum physics, the uncertainty arises once we 
move from Wheeler’s model that gives priority to present time and turn to a model 
that interprets differently the observer’s role in the wave function collapse by 
which the quantum particle concretizes from potential to actual state. Craig 
Callender, for example, debunks the observer’s role as having such present time 
priority, pointing to anti-Copenhagen interpretations, such as that of Broglie-
Bohm. He cites physicist J.S. Bell’s “Against ‘Measurement’”: “What exactly quali-
fies some physical systems to play the role of measurer?” he quotes Bell as asking. 
“Was the wavefunction of the world waiting to jump for thousands of millions of 
years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little 
longer, for some better qualified system . . . with a Ph.D?”6 Bell’s answer, as 
Callender quotes it, is “that more or less ‘measurement-like’ processes are going on 
more or less all the time, more or less everywhere.” No need, in other words, for 
experiential contact from an observational set up to do it. 
 Likewise, one finds on another subject – reverse causality – a similar 
disparity of opinion on the role of experiential contact as a starting point. One 
school of thought has it that in areas of the past we know nothing about, in such 
cases it is possible for a present decision, as for example when and in what way 
to perform a quantum measurement, to retro-causally bring about a determined 
course of history of a quantum particle. Broadening the scope of that retro-
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causality, it has been argued that where knowledge of the past is lacking, a pre-
sent decision can bring about a past event’s actualization in a way that otherwise 
would not have happened. Opposing that view, those in the “hold the past fixed” 
camp would argue that just because people at present don’t know about certain 
events in the past, it stands to reason those facts are nonetheless immutable, 
having in fact happened, regardless of whether we know about them or not. Fur-
ther support on this side of the fence derives from the problem of verification. I 
might, by ceremonial magic, try to change the winner of that race last week, but 
that possibility could gain credence only if I was incapable of knowing of that 
changed outcome in advance. An informing, however, could conceivably come 
by way of a light signal, allowing my capability to know in advance. Were the 
race results so recent as to make the signal not conceivably possible, on the oth-
er hand, it would imply the change of winner did not happen prior to my cere-
monial magic, and so no retro-causation.7 
 Much of this debate stems from the semantics of “informing” and 
“knowing”, whether we mean by these words 1st person experiential contact – a 
now acquaintance – or 3rd person acquisition of knowledge, by information and 
other indirect means. If the former, retro-causation may be a consequence of 
quantum observation, at least according to Wheeler and others in the Copenha-
gen school. Such a consequence would depend on a particle’s history being un-
determined by previous knowing, the now situation that a previous quantum 
observation had already set in place. Apart, though, from this avenue of unpre-
ceded knowing by experimental observation, it would seem problematic how, 
informationally by 3rd person means, it could be determined whether magic or 
techno-wizardry presently engaged in could have some retroactive bearing in 
establishing what, in fact, is an aspect of the past we don’t know about.  
 From what has been shown above, the evidence from quantum physics 
and retro-causality provides a mixed verdict about this notion of a temporal 
beginning from scratch, a temporal beginning with nothing in extended time 
before it. Given that, how else might one find a basis for sustaining such a no-
tion? The introductory caption from the historian Paul Ricoeur, above this chap-
ter’s title, offers a clue. 
 In a nutshell, what Ricoeur is saying is that questions of significance – 
and in particular the significance of enormous time scales as compared to what 
might seem the insignificance of a human lifetime – begin with us, the perspec-
tive we give to the past. This is not to extinguish the fact that there is a past and 
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its extended time frames, but rather that when it comes to questions of signifi-
cance and choices, there is an implicitly understood beginning point, the here 
and now of a present perspective, transient though it be by standards of meas-
ured time. The motif of present time’s significance is returned to by Ricoeur 
when he speaks of history as molded by a present perspective. He quotes in part 
the French historiographer Henri Marrou: “In any case, ‘there is no historical 
reality, ready-made, prior to knowledge, which need only be reproduced with 
fidelity.’ History is the result of the creative effort, by which the historian, as the 
conscious subject, establishes a relationship between the past which he evokes, 
and the present which is his own.”8 The ambiguity in that phrase “no historical 
reality” is precisely what we need to address next in order to determine how far 
this present-to-past restructuring of significance can lead us to the notion of a 
beginning with nothing in extended time before it. 
 Insofar as the phrase “no historical reality” intimates the temporal sta-
tus of the past, its meaning could go in a number of directions. One could argue 
a literal understanding, that there is no reality of the past, no separate ontologi-
cal ground, according to this phrase; the only past then would be the one we 
construct in the present and date according to various chronologies. The Battle 
of Verdun, the Holocaust, consequently would lack a reality in the past, having 
vanished from the present. On the other hand, given a second reading, one could 
take “no historical reality” to mean that the reality of the past, the fact of its 
having happened, is not ontologically in question, only what significance histori-
ans in the present world choose to give to any aspects of it or how they decide to 
interpret it. As with nature, the final answer as to what history is all about may 
then remain out of reach – perhaps forever – but that reflects our epistemic 
limitations, not the truth of what it is we seek to know. And then one finds a 
third way of construing “no historical existence” – namely, as a past that is in 
some sense present. The denial here is only about its misplaced temporal situat-
ing – a past deemed situated in an order according to notions of chronology and 
extended time. 
 Despite the seeming ambiguity in the phrase above, it is clear – taking 
in more of his context – that what Ricoeur intends by “no historical existence” 
accords with the second interpretation we have given. Not that the past has no 
reality, but that the work of the historian – the facts as set in order and their 
priority – is not preordained, readymade, before his or her research has even 
begun. As for that past that historians seek after, “In an ontological sense, we 
mean by historical event what actually happened in the past,” as Ricoeur puts 
it, deeming “past” in this sense “an absolute property, independent of our 
constructions and reconstructions” and as well characterizing it as the “the 
sum of what has actually happened”, something “out of reach of the histori-
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an”.9 Even with this second take on “no historical existence”, what’s important 
for our purposes is that Ricoeur opens the door to that third possible way of 
understanding that phrase, that third construal we have given above, which 
closes in on the notion of “beginning” we are looking for, a beginning with 
nothing in extended time before it. How then does this come about? We find 
Recoeur opening this possibility in that instance of his book, Time and Narra-
tive, where he compares the “lived past”, as he puts it, with the present:  
Further, if this lived past were accessible to us, it would not be so as an object of 
knowledge. For when it was present, this past was like our present, confused, multi-
form, and unintelligible.10 
What Ricoeur opens us to here is a past the manner of accessibility to which (if 
there were any at all) would be by experiential contact – i.e., immediate, so 
much so as yet to be put in order. In other words, this accessibility would have to 
come to us the way the pre-appraisal present comes to us, as that 1st person 
mode of knowing labeled “direct acquaintance”. Contradictorily, or so it seems, 
the lived past, by this hypothetical route of access, would not even manifest as 
the past but only experientially as a now occurrence. Ricoeur acknowledges as 
much by his use of “instead” to distinguish what he has just said above about the 
“lived past” from what the history of historians search for, a quest for a past that 
fits conceptual schemata, and by implication amenable to 3rd person perspec-
tives that neatly divide, order, and arrange the time that takes time:  
Instead, history aims at knowledge, an organized vision, established upon chains of 
causal or teleological relations, on the basis of meanings and values.11 
So, we find ourselves confronting the question of this lived past and its relation 
to the present. If its status as anterior to the present can only be attested to by 
experiential contact – i.e., our 1st person perspective in the present world we’re 
awake to –, the question is, even if such contact were possible, how could that 
effectuate evidence of a lived past?  
 A student of mine once confided that in dreams she would on occasion 
be in experiential contact with an imminent future. Terrified by these oneiric 
episodes, a few days after such an experience she would find herself – as she 
alleged – on a street corner with exactly the arrangement of cars and people as 
occurred in the dream’s presentiment a few nights earlier. More anomalous still, 
a colleague at a recent conference I attended at a Zen retreat in Germany told 
me about a dream he had had witnessing a woman being hit by a car, and then, 
days later, witnessing the situation in real life, except for the fact that his shout 
  
9 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. 1, 98.  
10 Ricoeur, Vol. 1, 99. 
11 Ricoeur, Vol. 1, 99. 
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prevented the woman from being hit by the car. Assuming that such incidents 
were more than coincidences or mistaken impressions, one might suppose there 
might be something in them to suggest cross-temporal direct acquaintance, a 
lived present/future temporal exchange.  
 The problem is one noted earlier, that of the anchor of temporal constraint 
that keeps us from drifting away, at least when awake. When awake, we are pre-
vented by it from drifting cross-temporally to another now that is not now. And as 
we have seen, the now is totally oblivious to linear time differentiations, even when 
someone at the other end of a telephone call or video interview is speaking from a 
different time zone according to linear calculations, or even when those twins con-
versing face-to-face with each other in some locality of our planet are in fact dec-
ades apart based on chronological age, subsequent to one twin’s arrival after a near 
light-speed space voyage. Even in cases such as these, there is no drifting to anoth-
er now, or to another’s con-temporaneity. The self/other alignment holds. This 
explains why that star we both see, though extinct based on linear calculations of 
time, is nonetheless fixed in the present, experientially speaking. It explains why 
any “past” our senses are exposed to when awake can only be present, a sign that 
for doctors certifies we possess a lucid state of mind. What that student and col-
league experienced when asleep is not the issue here. And in any case, the subject 
of prophetic dreams takes us beyond the scope of this book. What concerns us is 
the now they’re awake  to. The now of that immediate situation they’re awake to at 
the street corner or across the street from another pedestrian. Nighttime memo-
ries can’t change that. 
 The reader may remember that old Star Trek movie. It had a complex 
time scenario. A stranger manifests himself into existence in front of the human 
occupants of a space ship in flight. Is he an alien from a different galazy? A dif-
ferent time zone? He conveys a human demeanor except for a darkly brooding 
gaze, suggestive of hidden intentions and powers. Malignant or benevolent? 
Pursued by the others, he vanishes with his cat as easily as his sudden incarna-
tion. Somehow the voyagers have wind of his intended destination, however – it 
being the planet Earth at a time in the past, the 1950s. Nuclear war was on the 
brink. The voyagers thereupon plot the course of their space ship backwards in 
time, to Earth in the 1950s. They land, are now visaged as pedestrians along a 
street in a 1950s’ American city. Here one might wonder what the consequence 
of such time transmogrifications would be? Two nows? Psychotic regression to a 
lived past? Schizophrenia? No such complications, as it turns out. The temporal 
constraint ever imperiously intact. The same old guys, only dressed a little dif-
ferently. The same old now. It could have been they simply visited a foreign 
country, a little strange and less developed. A plight it would seem Hollywood 
can’t escape.   
 Even so, one finds an insightful side to this Star Trek story. The message 
it carries, at least by implication, is this notion of temporal constraint and tem-
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poral beginning in line with our present discussion. For however successfully the 
voyagers could journey into the “past”, as the film depicts it, the lived present, it 
appears, was only as far as they could go, given the fact that the effects of their 
cinematic time regression resulted in no depicted regression of their present 
minds or retrogression to childhood or pre-childhood experience, no impression 
that they weren’t themselves living in an experientially familiar now, the present 
and not the past, no matter how unfamiliar their surroundings. Conclusion: A 
lived past cannot occur in the guise of any sequential distancing from, or before, 
a lived present. It is only our chronological and linear way of sequencing – the 
distanced appraisal of the 3rd person perspective – that makes us think it can. 
Simply speaking, the now is not “in” that kind of time.  
 But still, doesn’t memory tell a different story? The psychologist Wil-
liam James gives us this description of how memory represents the past in an 
orderly way: 
Known symbolically by names, such as “last week”, “1850”; or thought of by events 
which happened in them, as the year in which we attended such a school, or met 
with such a loss. So that if we wish to think of a particular past epoch, we must 
think of a name or other symbol, or else of certain concrete events, associated 
therewithal.12 
But this is not the lived past which he is speaking of, but the represented past. 
By contrast, the question we’re addressing is how a lived past can come back 
into the clutches of a lived present. It has already been pointed out and illustrat-
ed in an earlier chapter how representation is neither the same as presentation 
nor as literal re-presentation, both of which would necessitate a replacing of this 
now with another direct acquaintance with the external world, a substitute wit-
nessing of things we are awake to. And so the problem is that, while memory 
gives us evidence of descriptive details and configurative images we take as con-
tent drawn from past occurrences, memory does not give evidence of an actual 
presenting of what was, an actual immediacy of ourselves living in that now of 
the past, else we would be literally living in that past – perhaps meeting de-
ceased ancestors by some preternatural means, either psychotically or clairvoy-
antly. Even so, in Part 2 of this book coming up – “Whatever Happened to a 
Moment Ago?: Searching the Archives of Not-Now Time for an Answer” –, we 
will attempt just that, to achieve the very feat that we have just asserted can’t be 
done. We will engage in a search – crazy as it may sound – for a specimen of 
that lived past in the past, a specimen of that moment ago, the now in the not-
now of time.  
  
12 William James, The Principles of Psychology, 611 (cited in Bricklin, “Conscious-
ness Already There…”, 67).  
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 Proposing that memory is not conclusive evidence of a lived past, a now 
before the now, there is still a provoking detail that argues for the obvious coun-
terclaim, namely for a preceding lived past. We detect it, for example, in that 
opening quotation from Russell, where he speaks hypothetically of the world 
coming into existence “complete with causal traces”. Prompted by those very 
quoted words, one can easily, it seems, reject such a hypothesis by pointing out 
the stark connections, past-to-present, that appear already built into any sup-
posed temporal beginning, even such as the kind of experiential starting point 
we are advancing, a starting point in the sense of its being experientially unpre-
ceded and unanticipated by a lived past – something that resists schematizing in 
the before and after of extended time, just as with the lived present. The thrust 
of this refutation of such a hypothesized beginning lies in those quoted words 
“causal traces”. It can be summed up in the form of a question: Are not present 
facts the effects of previous causes? And is that not sufficient to dash any such 
notion of a nonlinear beginning, namely that of a lived now that is not preceded 
by a lived then?13 
 One can reasonably ask how causes can produce effects if they are not 
prior to the effects. Take the court’s verdict of innocent or guilty. Is that not 
indicator enough of a lived past, perhaps one violently lived?  
 Approaching such questions will serve to summarize a number of con-
siderations about the now or presentness worked out so far, and by this means 
conclude what we have to say in this Part 1 of this book. 
 We begin our answer with con-temporaneity and the self/other align-
ment. The self/other temporal alignment is the 1st person substructure for all 3rd 
person configurations of time. There are no nowless configurations of time that 
escape the precondition of that 1st person substructure. One can theorize – in a 
non-immediate modality of thought – about the immediacy of time, as I’ve been 
doing, but only because the now sustains me every moment of the way. Nor can 
configurations of time, such as extended time, come before the now, except as 
an artifact of 3rd person ways of breaking time into number and countability. 
  
13 In his chapter on presentism, Tallis gives a detailed discussion of the weaknesses of 
the presentist’s philosophical and cosmological viewpoint that would argue for only the 
present being “real” – meaning in the sense that past and future are treated as devoid of an 
ontological basis, having (in the presentist view) no standing as source other than what 
present societies give to them by way of interpretation. This swallows more easily when 
talking about the yet-to-materialize future than about the past that has already occurred. 
The position we are advancing, by contrast, is that the past has an ontological basis, but it is 
not to be found “in” the past – that is to say, in the chronological past, the before and after of 
extended time. And in that negative respect, this position agrees with Tallis’s, the latter 
taking dates and ordered time as a form of spatialization of time. Raymond Tallis, Of Time 
and Lamentation: Reflections on Transcience, (Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 
2017). As well as his chapter on presentism, see also his pp. 40-41, for example. 
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Rather, it is the temporal precondition of present-to-past that comes first. And 
so our summary conclusion here comes in two parts:  
1. The illusion of a past in the past  
 The drawback in such a paradigm of a past “in” the past results from lack of 
concrete observable evidence of such a phenomenon. While it is useful and vital 
to our survival to construct a chronology of what is no longer, configured as 
encased in a kind of pocket we call the past, it necessarily relies on an ordering 
principle that linear time – the calculated time that takes time – gives us. To 
attest to the past, we necessarily draw on inference from what is present, a pre-
sent that must be presupposed to begin with. We of course observe present ef-
fects, glean the putative causes “in” the past from our memory and such things 
as the records of the past, the memorabilia, the very streets and cities that tell of 
a past. The problem, however, is in our failing to find this “before” directly, ra-
ther than inferentially. Where does one find the substantivity, the palpable ex-
istence of this thing we call the past? Our recourse is to preserve it in memory, 
or give representations of it, arranged chronologically and by extended time, or 
for example to offset lapses of memory by constructing such things as pyramids 
as the ancient Egyptians did, as if they could serve as guarantor.  
 While the sequential mindset, built into our fabric of understanding, has 
been the linchpin of our material success and advancement, this is far from sug-
gesting that the secrets of nature’s temporal behavior have been unlocked by our 
notion of succession or “umbrella time”, as Wheeler refers to it. Our challenge 
then to that causal “before”, and the structure of extended time it’s built on, can 
be stated quite simply. It comes down to three little asides – a, b, and c – about 
this pleasant exchange we’re having, you and I:  
a) You and I, we open our eyes. What do we see? Well, we’re having coffee. I see you 
across the table, not a 3-second-ago you nor a 3-second-yet-to-be you. No past, just 
present, every moment of the way.  
b) Ops! No cheating. Don’t log into your memory. Your memory will only tell you 
about the represented past, not the lived past. The lived past, as we have been con-
tending, cannot come before the lived present, not if the latter is our starting point. 
Nor can the lived present go back to the lived past, such as to bring back about a  
3-second-ago you. So how could the represented past do a feat that the lived present 
and lived past can’t do? 
c) What? You suddenly have contact with the past? You’re in touch with a  
3-second-ago me?? Time to see the doctor. Ops! Correction. It’s not you that needs 
to see a doctor. It’s me that should see the doctor. We’re looking at each other 
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now, right? I’d be crazy if I myself was a 3-second-ago me talking to a you now, 
wouldn’t I? 
 In a nutshell, the same predicament could be applied to Einstein: How could 
Einstein, with his notions of relative time and space, have ever come up with 
such conceptions if his now, his immediate present, hadn’t matched the imme-
diate world he was awake to? 
2. The changed from and the present 
 So what does it mean, this “you now”? The immediate occurrence of this “you 
now” exhibits what we have previously talked about, a changed from and 
changed to that marks this situation of the present time you’re a part of. Every 
moment we’re awake there’s this “just now” that highlights the now, an integral 
coexistence of the two from a 1st person perspective that constitutes present 
time. But, on the other hand, we have found this is not an outcome of sequenti-
ality. The “just now” doesn’t come before the now. No linearity is implicated. 
Instead, both are immediate, present. Both marking a difference that distin-
guishes the now.  
 Okay, so let’s go further back, further back from the “just now”. What 
we come across, first of all, is the completed part of present time. “I’m going to 
the store” implies a completed part and a part yet to be completed. That com-
pleted part – it happens to have been a long walk – is evidenced by my stop-
ping along the way, looking back, and thinking, “Thank God that’s over!” That 
leg of the way is past, but more correctly (from our analysis) it’s of course 
present, the completed present. The visible progress already made, tangibly 
evident now. The same can apply to everything we see around us – people, 
traffic, the appearance of any street or city or far away object in the sky. The 
point is, nothing about this completed scene divulges a present scene before 
the present scene, a 3-second-ago or a 3-year-ago completed scene. It’s 
memory that does that. But memory, as pointed out earlier, only provides 
representation and ways that help us order time and events sequentially. 
What it does not give us is a past happening, the past happening of an event, 
its lived immediacy in the past. That could only be conceivable by endeavoring 
to do the impossible, to be awake to the world then. A futile endeavor but let’s 
suppose the possibility anyway, as we will do in Part 3 coming up. Be awake to 
the world then. Another way of expressing this quest for a past we’re awake to, 
a lived time that was, is to phrase it as a question: “Whatever happened to that 
moment ago – however long ago it was?”  
 And so we end this Part 2 of the book with a statement that few in our 
modern secular world would take seriously:  
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Humans and other living things have existed in their present form since the begin-
ning of time.  
The statement obviously collides with the fossil record, the most fundamental 
facts of evolutionary science and its perspective on time. We have all manner of 
skulls and bones to show the beginnings of pre-human existence on this planet 
from long before human evolution. On the other hand, if we take “humans” to 
mean a species with a present-to-past capacity to initiate and formulate ques-
tions about the past, to understand the past from a human perspective, and in-
stead ask – “When did a present-to-past perspective begin?” Might that not in 
some way mark the beginning of time? Taking things that way, the statement 
about human origins quoted above takes on less absurdity, especially when it 
gets framed in the context we have put it in. After all, can there be a present 
before the present, or a beginning in extended time before a beginning that 
makes that possible?  
And given this terrain of interrogation, should we trust 3rd person strate-
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The Not-Now in Its Various  Designations 
 Whatever happened to that moment ago? That special moment. Shall we call it 
cloud 9, when things clicked? That moment of aura between the two of you, a 
sudden understanding, was it? Or maybe it was a shared experience, a commin-
gled joy, or maybe a sudden loss, the loss of that someone, that moment ago. A 
wistful longing for its return, like the “yesterday” in that old Beatles’ song. And 
so what frequently comes about is the dream of recapturing it, retrieving that 
moment ago we long for when destiny seemed to have culminated in a climax – 
but then passed away. “Whatever happened to it?” one asks. Difficult as it may 
seem, let’s see if we can find it. 
Of course, one can simply deny its existence, treat the past as total noth-
ingness, annihilation, a mere fabrication of one’s mind and memory. But that 
seems hard to maintain. If memory and consciousness were all the past consist-
ed of, if that moment ago were nothing but a pastry of our minds, “the whole 
distinction between the faithful and false memory, between history and myth 
would collapse”, to use Capek’s words.1 
And so something, we suspect, dwells in not-nowness, lingering, and 
that is the basis for our venturing on this search. Let us first be clear, however, 
that it is the immediacy of that moment we are after. The real thing, isn’t that 
what we long for? And even though we are skeptical about finding what we are 
looking for – the actual and authentic – in the memory we have of it or in how 
it is described and registered in words and images we represent it by, we shall 
check out those places nonetheless. This search, then, is a quest for the lived 
experience, necessarily involving a present time at least insofar as we seek it in 
its original form when it originally took place. Even in its immediacy, however, 
it is obviously not happening at the present time we are now awake to as we 
read this sentence, and so we label it – “a moment ago”. But that, as well, is 
not intended to mean that its occurrence was but a breath away into the past. 
The phrase is simply meant to refer to any deeply felt experience that is sorely 
missed and still vivid in our minds. And so the question: Where shall we find 
  
1 Capek, “Immediate and Mediate Memory”, 2. 
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this moment ago and retrieve its immediacy? Admittedly a puzzling question. 
Let us start our search, nevertheless, in the most likely place – the past, and in 
the disciplines that have that as their subject of concern. In doing so, the read-
er will notice that our initial stopover, before proceeding to the various desig-
nated enclaves of not-now time, will be that of a particular notion of time – 
the just now – which as we have seen is both integral with our holistic now but 
also grasped as past, or as not now, from a 3rd person perspective. From there, 
we will move to other not-nows evincing the familar before-and- after pattern, 
and then return to nonlinear (i.e. non-sequential) possibilities in chapters 10 
and 11.  
1. The just now (from a 3rd vs. 1st person perspective) 
 A cursory inspection of the “just now” tells us our moment ago we’re seeking 
cannot be found there, unfortunately. This is because the “just now”, or changed 
from as we’ve described it earlier, evinces only enough of its recognition to make 
distinct the differentiated changed to of the now. It is questionable whether the 
“just now” even pokes its head out to our conscious awareness or whether it 
works subliminally. In any case, regardless of how adequately it can be recog-
nized, the “just now” emerges as not a clearly distinct not-now, as we have noted 
before, but rather as that which throws in relief the external differentiation that 
makes up the present perception, the now that we’re awake to. Hence, although 
experiential and lived, we cannot classify this “just now” even as an “ago”, let 
alone that moment ago we’re trying to recapture. And so our search in the past 
for that moment ago must look elsewhere, at what is genuinely not now.  
The neuroscientist Antonio Damasio once described the case of a pa-
tient he named “David”. David developed encephalitis at age 46, consequent 
to which his memory became limited to a span of less than one minute. As a 
result, the patient had no idea what time it was unless he looked at his watch, 
or what season it was unless he opened the curtain and looked out the win-
dow. His autobiographical memory had been “reduced to a skeleton”, and his 
sense of the future was absence as shown by his inability to plan ahead. Even 
with this deprivation of his patient, Damasio writes, “Everything indicates that 
he has a normal sense of self, in the here and now, . . .”2 – indicating David’s 
capability to go back, experientially, at least to the just now. But it is precisely 
further back in time where we seek to find our moment ago, that moment in 
the past we seek to recapture. And so our inquiry must turn to another out-
post of not-now time.  
  
2 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (London: Vintage Books, 2000): 114, 
118-119. 
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2. The lived past 
 Well, and what about the lived past as the logical repository of that moment ago? 
Keeping in mind that what we’re out to find is this “ago”, it seems obvious we shall 
not find it in the not-now of the future. On the other hand, we must also keep in 
mind that the lived past – being immediate and experiential – is not bound by 
considerations of linear distance or time spans determined by number and meas-
ure. But here is where we see a problem. Both the lived past of that moment ago 
and the lived present of the present moment, both are about experiential contact, 
immediacy, not about the before and after. Plotting a temporal distance between 
the two lived times is therefore impossible as temporal distance invokes linearity, 
which is not the name of the game when we speak of the lived past or lived present. 
In their immediacy they both entail a 1st person involvement, not a 3rd person ap-
praisal of time along a timeline. Considered in this way, we can see that this mo-
ment ago – though expressed as an “ago” – must nonetheless not be understood as 
an “ago” in a linear sense. For to do that would be to arbitrate one notion of time in 
terms of another. Instead, the moment ago, understood as an immediacy of time, 
must be withdrawn from sequential order altogether, throwing into question how 
it can be said the immediacy of that time we are here seeking to retrieve in the 
category of the “lived past” is past in the first place. Such a designation would seem 
to imply a position in linear time before the time we are now living in. But this 
moment ago, this lived moment, cannot be “before” or “ago” in a linear sense, so it 
must be here, a concurrent part of the lived present. But then, where is it? And 
how might a concurrent now ever get discovered, since the possibility of anyone 
with a sound mind countenancing two nows – the present one and a concurrent 
one – can obviously be ruled out. Stymied by such imponderables along this path, 
we had best seek out other options, find another way of tracking down this mo-
ment ago.  
3. The nowless  
The question which this debatable malapropism prompts is whether there can 
be such a time zone as this, concretely accessible, to probe in the first place, a 
realm of nowlessness outside the now? 
In the beginning pages of this book we sketched out a comparison be-
tween two primal counterparts, the now and the not now, the latter being an 
overall designation for the time that extends beyond the constraints of this mo-
ment, beyond the evanescence of sentient existence within the confines of the 
presentness of one’s perceptions. At that initial stage of our discussion we 
weighed the scales heavily in favor of this general category of all that is not now, 
the before and after, the horizontal axis of time that seemed an accurate manner 
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by which to depict material nature’s temporal extent, the enormity of which 
would seem, by comparison, to reduce the temporal constraint of humanity to 
insignificance. One has simply to ask: What species, specimen, or spectacle of 
nature could subsist without a past or future? How could we even know of the 
present if the past – that not now – hadn’t helped us along the way? The ques-
tion of the not-now’s predominance at that early stage seemed so great that one 
might have had good cause to wonder if the very notion of nowness was, in fact, 
nothing other than a misattribution of something explainable from the past, a 
biological or evolutionary adaptive mechanism crucial to survival of the species, 
a not-now of the past masquerading in the guise of a now of the present.  
Despite this backdrop of reasoning, we have proposed weighing the 
scales the other way, a nature oriented to what has been described as a 
self/other alignment – that is to say, the self’s immediate percept or sensory 
awareness, its immediacy of time aligned to the same immediacy, the same ex-
periential time, as that evinced by nature – specifically, by nature-as-other, the 
only nature we know directly. We have proposed that it all starts from this, that 
primal alignment. The question then becomes: Can any of those enormous time 
scales of the not-now universe exist without the now? And by extension, can 
even that “moment ago” we are here seeking to recover the experiential immedi-
acy of, can that exist without nowness linked to it in some way? Perhaps we can 
say this suggests to us at least a clue here about the whereabouts of that moment 
ago. 
But on the other hand, even that clue would seem ruled out if it should 
so happen that what we are seeking here, this moment ago, dwells in a sanctum 
of not-now time which we here refer to as the “nowless”. What we mean by that 
characterization is simply the domain of whatever it is that does not connect, 
one way or the other, to the now. Targeting the moment ago to within the 
bounds of this netherworld of nowlessness would essentially deprive it of any 
awakened, experiential attribution, even as an aspect of the lived past, for a lived 
past implies a nowness, an immediacy, of its own, and nowlessness would extir-
pate those very inclusions. And so, given this category of nowlessness, the mo-
ment ago would no longer become a moment ago, but rather an abstraction of 
sorts, but even so of questionable conceivability. One can conceive of zombies, 
let’s say, but can one imagine a nowless moment that one is not present to, even 
in one’s imagination?3 The now, in other words, seems inescapably implicit by 
the very fact that it is in the medium of human experience by which we direct 
our attention to a nowless domain.  
  
3 Cp. Bergson: “We always come back, then, to the same point: there is a single real 
time, and the others are imaginary. What, indeed, is a real time, if not a time lived or able to 
be lived? What is an unreal, auxiliary, imaginary time if not one that cannot actually be lived 
by anything or anyone?” Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, 56. 
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There is, even so, one putative place to find this nowlessness – and it 
could be that the moment ago is huddled there – and that is in our dreams. A 
dream, given its very privacy from the present world, lacks for that reason the 
present we’re awake to, that outside awareness, and so is nowless in that re-
spect. Admittedly, it shares that experiential attribute of immediacy we’ve de-
scribed the now as having, and arguably, in its narrative layout, it exhibits the 
aspects of changed from and changed to that feature the now. What is missing 
from the dream state is exposure to the present world. It draws on memory to 
construct its narrative, bits and pieces of remembered episodes, but not the lived 
exposure, the direct and immediate contact with the outside world, that we are 
looking for in the lived experience of that moment ago. The invented narrative of 
the dream originates from our minds, not from what we are awake to. And so, 
for that reason, we must necessarily exclude this other avenue of not-now inves-
tigation – the nowlessness of dreams – as a possibility for encountering the 
moment ago we are in search of.  
The indigenous people in Amazonia, the Piraha, draw a close connection 
between dreams and wakeful life. As anthropologist Everett describes it, for 
these people “dreams are a continuation of real and immediate experiences”. 
The Piraha use the word “xaipipal” to designate this dreaming that is in your 
head but that signifies for them a real experience. “You see one way awake and 
another way while asleep, both ways of seeing are real experiences.”4 And so, for 
example, when one speaks of spirit creatures called the bigi, for the Piraha they 
can be evidenced both in sleep and wakefulness. Such a cultural outlook is not 
without some basis. Knowing by acquaintance is the means by which we per-
ceive the immediate present world, and such manner of knowing – direct and 
immediate knowing – is equally applicable in the case of dreams. And even that 
adage of Socrates would appear to chime in on the side of the Pirahas, although 
Socrates implied by it that dreams and wakeful awareness – equally taken to be 
real at the time – were equally to be distrusted:  
[T]here may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as the time is 
equally divided in which we are asleep or awake, in either sphere of existence the 
soul contends that thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and 
during one half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and during the other half 
of the other; and are equally confident of both.5 
 The problem, nonetheless, is simply that we do wake up, and for most of us at 
least, when once awake and in a lucid state, we recall a dream or nightmare we 
just had by thinking, “That was only a dream”. Something about the sharp con-
  
4 Everett, Don’t Sleep..., (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), 131. 
5 “Theaetetus”, The Dialogues of Plato [158d], trans. Benjamin Jowett (Good Time 
Classic Book Collection, 2014), vol. 2: 437. 
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trast from a dream that the present exposes when one has opened one’s eyes 
demolishes the pretence of a dream’s propriety as a lived past or a livid present, 
notwithstanding the immediacy of the dream in its own right. Needless to say, 
there are those who claim a dream’s potential to open a door to another reality, 
more real than our awakened existence, but that takes us outside the confines of 
our discussion here, which is about a lived experience we are awake to and 
where to find it once it is gone.  
Nevertheless, in that very expression “That was only a dream” we may 
have hit upon a promising lead, another category of the not-now prompted by 
the very recalling itself. Might not memory, in other words, and its mode of ex-
periential immediacy provide us with both the whereabouts of that moment ago 
we are looking for and the possibility of its retrieval?  
4. Memory  
 Given the distinction we have emphasized between the source of the past – its 
presentedness – and the past as recorded or represented by memory, there 
would seem little purpose in searching for this moment ago in memory’s reposi-
tory, where we would most likely find nothing more than a fading relic of what 
we are looking for. And yet, memory is inherent in any present awareness, in any 
awakened state, at least to the extent of recognizing what we see. Hence, unlike 
dreaming, memory – as experienced – is inseparable from the lived present, 
although removed from the now’s extrinsic provenance, meaning that alignment 
that connects present self to the otherness of one’s immediate surroundings. The 
otherness it does connect us to is strictly the not-now of the past – but this, 
however, is the represented past, not the past that we are living now in its origi-
nal state. Hence, the reason why we have designated memory as yet another 
branch of not-now time.  
Admittedly, memory includes all that from the beginning of our lives 
has molded our ability to learn and recognize, enabled our adaptation and 
acquired knowledge, enough so to make sense of what is configuratively pre-
sent, the objects we recognize, the names we give to things – even to things 
that are merely thinglike or “something it is like”, such amorphous entities as 
consciousness or the now, which to be known in the concrete can only be ex-
perienced in the 1st person – and necessarily now. This is not necessarily to 
imply the equating of a lived past with a linear or sequentially organized past. 
Despite what suggests an obvious oxymoron in the statement that follows, the 
lived past – precisely because it is lived and original – can only begin now.  
It is precisely for this reason we find ourselves stonewalled again in at-
tempting to salvage that moment ago from a repository of not-now of time – in 
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this case memory. Memory cannot take us back. If it could do that, there would 
be a real question about one’s state of lucidity. 
And yet, in its exposing and filtering of sensory and emotional details 
from a particular past, memory does concretize in an experiential way residues 
of the past that it brings back. A memory, at its most potent, can lock one’s at-
tention to a recalled incident, somewhat in the way dreams do. But even this 
cannot be said to actualized the original, however vivid the details and impres-
sion of impact. It is no doubt that very failure to actualize, along with memory’s 
coloring, blurring, and fading in its very not-nowness, that explains in large part 
the desperate attempts to compensate by means of the monumental – tombs 
and pyramids, testaments and histories that act as surrogates of the past, rescue 
it or a version of it from the threat of oblivion that Ricoeur speaks about:  
With this unsettling idea of the threat of effacement comes that of the threat of for-
getting. . . . Still, there remains the threat of an irremediable, definitive forgetting 
that gives the work of memory its dramatic character. Yes, forgetting is indeed the 
enemy of memory, and memory is a sometimes desperate attempt to pull some flot-
sam from the great shipwreck of forgetting.6 
 So then, are we to rule out memory altogether? But how could any moment ago, 
any experience we seek to bring back, be an experience without memory and still 
be meaningful in some way? Would one even recognize the rapture or sorrow of 
the circumstances if one had no memory of what preceded? It would seem the 
problem we face here is not the memory itself but the roadblock of attempting to 
bring the memory to life, bringing to life its very immediacy and currency. Let us 
therefore make one more perhaps desperate attempt at salvaging from this re-
pository of not-now time the source we are looking for, the source of that 
memory we are so anxious to retrieve. Let us do this by resorting to memory in 
its extreme and unforgettable state – exemplified by a case of trauma. 
In her discussion of trauma, mentioned in the introductory chapter of 
this book, Anne Whitehead cites research by Cathy Caruth that hypothesizes the 
scenario of a traumatic experience wherein the past is actually salvaged. It gets 
retrieved belatedly in the present, but not in a way that one would relish.7 Ex-
  
6 Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), 112. 
7 Anne Whitehead’s Introduction cites Caruth’s scenario of a trauma that exceeds the 
individual’s “capacity for registration and understanding” and so was never fully present 
and occurring in the sense of comprehensibility, but may belated become so, a present sud-
denly registered and grasped at a later time, and thereafter to become past and consigned to 
memory. Michael Rossington and Anne Whitehead, Theories of Memory: a Reader (Edin-
burgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 188. See further, Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: 
Explorations in Memory. (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1995), 151-
153.  
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ceeding the victim’s capacity for mental registration and understanding at the 
time of its original occurrence, the trauma’s immediacy, its realization, comes 
belatedly thereafter. The rationale behind this version of a moment ago’s re-
trieval and reliving arises from the consideration that the trauma, having never 
become fully present, cannot have become past and thereby recollected and 
represented in memory. Instead, the traumatic experience becomes “‘fully evi-
dent only in connection with another place and in another time.’”8 Once that 
occurs the trauma can fall in place and be situated as something in the past, 
something that memory brings back. 
How, then, does this tie into that moment ago we’ve been on the lookout 
for? First of all, it provides us with a lived experience from the past that comes 
back as an actual occurrence. Second, it gets experienced in the lived present. 
The trauma, only partially registered and understood at the first time of its actu-
al occurrence, thereafter becomes, for the victim, a belated though immediate 
occurrence – a first occurrence – at a later time. The question behind all this is 
whether, in fact, the second occurrence counts as a first occurrence. Was the 
trauma really brought back as it originally happened, or do we consign the im-
pression of its reappearance to the victim’s state of mind, delusional or perhaps 
psychotic? But then again, we may be asking the wrong question. A better ques-
tion might be: Considering that our discussion here is about a now immediacy 
that invokes a 1st person experiential accounting of time, how could the traumat-
ic event that first occurred come in fact before the second that the victim was 
immersed in and that was experienced as first occurring. The paradox of that 
“before” arises, given that immediacies cannot be separated except by linear 
notions of time – something a distanced appraisal would implant into the scene? 
From the trauma victim’s perspective, the now is that moment ago. It never was. 
Still, a problem remains. From an outsider’s perspective – necessarily a 1st per-
son perspective in the now – there is no way of determining if, in some ontologi-
cal or primordial fashion, the “was” for that victim had actually become an “is”, 
or only starkly appeared that way in the victim’s state of psychotic recall. Hence, 
no way to substantiate the time warp – except by a 3rd person distanced apprais-
al. Moreover, would not any outside observer who claimed to have witnessed 
what the victim experienced, a regression to a lived past that had become a lived 
present, end in the same dilemma of being disbelieved by others? It stands to 
reason, it would seem. Who could believe that a then had, in actuality, become a 
now?  
It may seem that the time has come to give up this search for that mo-
ment ago, as the evidence so far suggests. Nevertheless, there are still possibili-
ties worth pursuing, even if one’s 3rd person perspective finds the search vain 
with little prospects of success. The direction we shall take now in this quest for 
  
8 Anne Whitehead, citing Caruth, 188. 
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the unforgettable will move in and out of various enclaves of knowledge – “the 
not-now of knowledge” as it’s referred to – opening doors here and there in the 
hope of finding some clue disclosed that will reward our search. And even 
though memory is inextricably a part of knowledge, for our purposes we will 







The Not-Now of Knowledge  
 Prefatory to our search in this vast domain, we had best begin by explaining the 
title. Why the not-now of knowledge? How is such an expression justified? 
 Even at the risk of over generalizing, we can propose a legitimate basis 
for considering knowledge in itself an appropriate category of not-now time. 
Much of this has to do with comments we have quoted from Ricoeur. First off, 
what strikes in the negative in terms of our quest for that moment ago in its 
lived state, knowledge is not about the immediate, or as Ricoeur has put it, 
about “our present”, which he deemed “confused, multiform, and unintelligible”. 
Rather, it is knowledge that gives comprehensibility to such that in its immedi-
ate state lacks that intelligibility – namely the order and structure – that we give 
to the dis-ordered and unpatterned, whatever in its exposure doesn’t follow the 
logical order of before and after. In the current panpsychism debates, one finds 
an assortment of conflicting theories about how consciousness arises from mat-
ter, or how microcosmic particles give rise to macroscopic consciousness and 
consciousnesses, or theories about the combination problem – how minute sen-
tient elements of consciousness emerge into a single consciousness composed of 
them.1 All such issues implicate temporal order – from, to, before and after – or 
in other words a logical ordering of some kind. In the above, we see here speci-
mens of how knowledge goes about its quest for answers in its diversity of path-
ways, speaking in the loosest of terms. We have only to imagine the alternative, 
knowledge as an all-at-once affair, its ordering recomposed into a bursting forth, 
a catalyzt of enlightenment in a non-sequential template of immediacy. Such 
manner of knowledge acquisition would be difficult to conceive of, to say the 
least. Given, then, its essential ordering and sequential framework, we have plot-
ted knowledge, considered in a strictly temporal sense, as appropriately belong-
ing in the repository of the not-now of extended time. Even in the writing of a 
  
1 See for example Part 3, “Panpsychism and the Combination Problem”, in Godehard 
Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla, eds., Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2017): 179-304. 
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proposition, even in the coherency that comes through in the proposition’s read-
ing, the not-now of an extended time frame is invariably presupposed.  
 And so we began with the appropriateness of its not-now classification, 
but how does that make knowledge apply to what we’re looking for, the immedi-
acy of a lived past? 
 Let’s take the other side of the coin. On the one hand, while knowledge 
necessarily entails, or should entail, an objective appraisal – a distancing from 
the immediate –, rather than the “confused, multiform, and unintelligible” that 
Ricoeur speaks about, on the other hand his very analysis of the now in such 
amorphous terms suggests, as an example, that knowledge’s scope is not exclud-
ed from such expressed considerations about immediate time, or for example 
such inquiries as to what extent consciousness and duration play a role in the 
immediacy of lived experience (Bergson), or how lived experience relates to the 
past (the very question of objectivity itself), or what it means to speak of the 
intensity of nowness (Franck), and moreover – specifically in our present case – 
whether a lived experience can be retrieved from the past. And so there appear 
legitimate grounds to explore this branch of not-nowness. Of course, in even 
attempting to probe a hint of the vastness of knowledge’s scope, we can do no 
more than try out a sampling of disciplines and give a cursory look at any leads 
they might suggest.  
1. The not-now of mathematics  
 We have already adjudged mathematics as appropriately not-now in that any 
measurement that takes place, any determination as to extended time or ex-
tended space, any determined location in fact – in linear time and space of 
course –, already presupposes that one’s concern is not the immediacy of time 
that one is awake to but the computing of measured time and measured objects, 
and the calculations that go with it, all posterior to the now of one’s immediate 
existence. But then, where in all this might be found that lived experience we are 
in search of? That moment ago which, although chronologically distanced from 
us perhaps by days or months, is something we seek to recover in its visceral 
form, something we seek to be immediately present to and not detached from 
the way one’s 3rd person perspective detaches itself – at least by an abstracting 
pathway – from the now and the immediate. Even if one should single out math, 
the way the Princeton mathematician Max Tegmark once did, “as the underlying 
structure of the universe” and the human mind emerging “from math, as a self-
aware substructure of an extremely complicated mathematical structure”,2 still 
what that leaves us with is yet another example of a detached appraisal, and it is 
  
2 Hut, Alford, and Tegmark, “On Math, Matter and Mind”: 2, 8. 
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not that which we seek in this Argonaut adventure of ours but something that 
makes itself known before an appraisal of any kind can be made, an exposure at 
once immediate, yet from the past, even if haphazard and confused. Clearly 
mathematics and the not-now of its world of calculation are not the means to a 
present/past visceral meeting ground such as we are proposing. So let’s proceed 
to another avenue of knowledge.  
2. History 
 We need add little of relevance to what we have already said about this branch 
of knowledge. We have seen from Ricoeur its connection to the present, the fact 
that it is interpreters of a present time that give meaning and significance to the 
past. They organize it, arrange it sequentially, and in that way shape its distinc-
tion from the immediate present. For this reason, we can say that it appears as 
self-evident that history, being not about the immediate, appropriately fits as a 
category of the not-now of extended time. But on the other hand, for that very 
reason its resources are not up to providing the experiential immediacy of that 
moment ago we’re endeavoring to extract from it. The problem can be summed 
up by again quoting Capek’s words: “If the past were a mere nothingness, the 
whole distinction between the faithful and false memory, between history and 
myth would collapse.” Exactly. The past is something. The source of history is 
something. But the problem is history is not in the position of providing that 
source. It cannot take us there, but only gives us a distanced appraisal. And so, 
we are forced to move on – this time to a category we can suppose is closer to 
the lived and experiential. 
3. Literature and the arts 
 On the surface, it would seem that literature and the arts face the same obstacle 
that history does in attempting to salvage an experiential moment, a moment of 
the past – namely, its very positioning away from the scene of action, distanced 
from the original source. 
 Literature is in essence a writing about, so right there we spot the re-
moval from whatever it is that is being described, let alone its medium is in 
words, sentences, a narrating of events as they purportedly happened – a prob-
lem that afflicts knowledge as a whole, it being necessarily non-immediate in its 
transcription, its very use of words as a representational medium. Furthermore, 
literature, like history, is necessarily structured by sequentiality in the telling. So 
on the one hand, we can say this sequentiality qualifies the literary piece as be-
ing temporally not-now, but on the other hand it removes as well the possibility 
of its being an immediate retrieval of a moment ago – that is, the retrieval of an 
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experience as it was originally lived at the time of its being imprinted into the 
author’s imagination. 
 In the case of the artwork, the depicted composition on a canvas – at 
least if considered as representational art –, is for that very reason removed 
from the direct source, the presentation in real life, and so abstracted from the 
source of inspiration. Hence, the distancing, as well as the not-now categoriza-
tion that comes about as a result. 
 But on the other hand, there are considerations that sway the other way.  
 For one thing, there is the school of hermeneutics that approaches art as 
a presentational medium. Abstract and non-figurative works obviously cannot 
be classified as representational or image-like in what they portray. Beyond that 
is the contention that the subject matter of art invokes meanings that arise in 
the art work itself, rather than being representational of anything else. And fur-
thermore, the argument runs that we, the spectators, are in the position of being 
directly involved by what the art work depicts. The same could be said to apply 
to the reader of a literary work. In this context one can cite a quotation from 
Gadamer, in a comment he ascribes to Schleiermacher, to the effect that under-
standing is “an immediate ‘re-experience’ of the original experience – a divina-
tion.”3 Whatever the various ways to interpret such a statement, the very phra-
seology of “re-experiencing of the original experience” takes us suspiciously 
close to the nature of our quest – to that original experience of a moment ago. 
Might it be recaptured in a work of art? 
 The problem is two-fold. On the one hand, we are looking for a past that 
authentically happened and yet is retrievable so as to actually happen now. It is 
difficult to see how literature or art could perform such a feat. Whatever the 
immediacy of art or fiction, neither purports to actually bring back the past, but 
only to at most describe it through the medium of words or paint – however 
vividly this is done. And secondly, there is the interpretive element that is con-
sidered to play an integral role in a reader’s understanding of literature or a 
spectator’s appreciation of a work of art. In the case of the now’s immediacy, or 
that moment ago’s immediacy, there is simply our being there, or its being here, 
that is key to the happening of the event – the fact of the temporal immediacy of 
its recovery, regardless of how the content of the experience, its configurative 
makeup, gets interpreted. 
 A former classmate of mine who became a famous artist once stated in 
one of his videos, “Of the interested public, one out of ten get what I’m doing.” 
  
3 Lawrence K. Schmidt, “Alles vorauszusetzende in der hermeneutik nur sprache: 
Revisiting Gadamer’s Schleiermacher interpretation,” Gadamer’s Hermeneutics and the 
Art of Conversation, ed. Andrzej Wiercinski (International Studies in Hermeneutics and 
Phenomenology, Vol. 2) (Berlin: Lit. Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2011; London: Transaction 
Publishers), 278.  
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By contrast, when once I myself was perusing one of his minimalist works, I 
remember simply feeling, without the inclusion of apparent mediation or my 
“getting it” by way of interpretation, the movement of a line in the expression of 
this work. “Feeling the movement of a line” is how one might translate the expe-
riential immediacy of that moment ago. 
4. And science? 
 One might suppose the problem of retrieval of that moment ago would pose the 
same obstacle in science as it does in math. We have only to consider the mate-
rial nature that science studies as a nature defined by its accessibility to mathe-
matical calculation and measure, and from out of that consideration to conclude 
that no where here, in this visage of the material world that science gives us, is 
one going to come upon the concreteness of an experience in its immediacy, 
whether past or present. A comment from Strawson would suggest the same: 
“[P]hysics has no terms with which to characterize the intrinsic experiential-
qualitative nature of concrete reality, . . .”4 On the other hand, we’ve applied 
those two appendages to our conceptualization of material nature in our frame-
work: “here and now” and “as-other”. “As-other” brings about a broadened por-
trayal of nature, a nature that is on the one hand dualistically, though not tem-
porally, distinct from our perspectival selves and the outlook we have of it. And 
on the other hand, it is a here-and-now nature that includes not just objects with 
their measurable and configurable data that our mediated ways of recognizing 
give meaning to, but as well its palpable aspect – the things in their immediacy – 
which makes them and their nowness thinglike to our perceptions. If one ac-
cepts that anything experiential must have, as its temporal equivalent, a here-
and-now immediacy, then it becomes evident that the material nature that sci-
entists wake up to and confront, cannot be without lived experience. To quote 
Strawson again, “[E]xperience is the most certainly known concretely existing 
general natural phenomenon, and is indeed the first thing any scientist encoun-
ters when they try to do science.”5 
 Bearing in mind such considerations, one might deem promising the pro-
spects of finding here in this experiential immediacy of nature – given as well its 
vast dimensionality of the before and after – that moment ago we are looking for, a 
  
4 [italics his] Galen Strawson, “Mind and Being,” 85. 
5 Strawson, “Mind and Being”, 84. Also, Tallis, Of Time and Lamentation: “While 
‘now’ seems to elude physics, it is ubiquitous in the lives of physicists doing experiments. 
It is not (surely!) suggested that physicists are somehow outside of the real universe when 
they are doing physics. If the physicalist world picture does not allow for the existence of 
physicists who are making that world picture, there is something amiss with this pic-
ture.” (Tallis 2017, 281). 
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time paradoxically both experientially immediate and yet removed from the im-
mediate present. And yet even so, relentlessly again, it would seem we face a hur-
dle. Where, one might ask, in this material nature – a material nature here and 
now –, could one possibly cast one’s eyes upon something that is not here and 
now, a moment ago or quite possibly long gone, as we have posited it? A remote 
analogy, nonetheless, might suggest a peak into that possibility – namely the stel-
lar event scenario we mentioned earlier. One theory has it that we do indeed see 
into the past when looking up into the night sky and catching sight of that star. 
According to one school of thought, what one observes is a phenomenon of the 
past manifesting its remoteness, its thenness actually perceived in the night sky – 
even as one presently makes visual contact with it.  
 But on the other hand that star is long ago, so long ago as to be probably 
extinct, given the knowledge that science provides us from the 3rd person per-
spective. That knowledge, among other things, takes cognizance of the speed of 
light, its traveling in the before-and-after of sequential time, the time that takes 
time. Following that way of interpretation, what one sees – or thinks one is see-
ing in the past – is actually the effect of immediate sensations of light on the 
eyes of the observer, out of which the brain constructs images and representa-
tions of things such as stars. In other words, the only thing really happening is a 
present effect, not a seeing into the past. At least, according to this 3rd person 
appraisal.  
 Either way, both interpretations prove unsatisfactory for our purposes. 
The latter focuses on light that immediately strikes the eyes of the observer and, 
consequent to that, the representations constructed by the brain. Nothing here 
about an experience from the past. As for the former theory, even if starlight is 
evidence of seeing into the past, starlight is a far cry from that moment ago 
that’s been on our agenda, with its rapturous or sorrowful intensity we’ve been 
seeking to bring back to life. And in any case, the notion of seeing into the past 
entails a host of unlikely possibilities: that what the star gazer is seeing now is 
not now, thereby defying the temporal constraint we’ve talked about, along with 
infringing on the field of presentness that defines our conscious awareness, the 
nowness of everything we see. Not to mention the paradox, in this alternative 
view, of experiencing two alignments, two nows, the one linked up there with 
that star, the other linked below to one’s surroundings. 
 Stonewalled as we appear to be by the alternative approaches given 
above, there is yet another lead that may turn out more fruitful in our search for 
the past. This lead draws its rationale from the possibility that what we are seek-
ing to find – however long ago that may be – manifests nonetheless, and exposes 
itself, as a presentness, a past experience that is not past at all in that it literally 
comes across as happening now, even though from a 3rd person appraisal it be-
longs somewhere or somehow in the past.  
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  Taking on this line of inquiry requires an entirely different approach. 
The next two chapters will proceed in that way, first by questioning what in fact 
the loss of someone close to us, considered as a temporal and experiential mo-
ment ago, comes to mean from a purely 1st person perspective – from the exclu-
sively 1st person now –, and how a difference here becomes highlighted when 
that perspective is compared to the temporal direction given by a 3rd person 
viewpoint. The second of the two chapters will move in a putatively contra-
lucidity direction, taking up alleged violations of the temporal constraint. Here 
we scan episodes from genres of writing, endeavoring to find wormholes that 
contradict the axiomatic temporality distinction between a past in the past and a 





Do We Die?  
 First of aIl, it is important to make clear the question we are asking, how it per-
tains to a moment ago, and where the 1st person perspective fits into this inquiry. 
The question we are asking here is simply another version of wistful 
meditation about that moment ago that seems irretrievable. Is that moment 
inescapably lost? Only in this case the question focuses on a person, let’s say a 
loved one who has just died and thereby, putting it in terms of nowness, broken 
off the immediacy of contact with the living. The question of irretrievability is 
noted because – obvious as it seems – we seek to verify that that has in fact been 
the case, this death and its irretrievable loss, or whether an alternative analysis 
might indicate no such loss, or a loss due to other factors. 
Let us point out also how the 1st person approach fits into this question. 
One would naturally suppose in this case that the 1st person perspective would 
most obviously pertain to the person lost, the person whose life is wrenched from a 
loved one in this “moment ago” circumstance of death. Obviously, however, dying 
is one thing and death in another, and one does not come back from the latter to 
tell the story, authenticate from the inside – i.e., from that 1st person perspective – 
what has actually happened, or if non-existence be anything at all. One can au-
thenticate death by measurement standards, such as lack of brain functioning, but 
this is to use a knowledged 3rd person appraisal – what amounts to inference – 
rather than the experiential now to not-now as a criterion of death. On the other 
hand, alleged out-of-body experiences as reported in some instances by recovered 
comatose patients or those resuscitated from apparently brain dead states may 
serve as rubric of inside testimony, testimony that counters the common presump-
tion of death as a nonentity, but then the question remains about how reliably they 
tell us about death itself, the entry into its domain and its presumed nowlessness. 
And so what we will do in this chapter is adopt the next best alternative to ascer-
taining, by 1st person means, what is taken to be the perfunctory truism of death 
and its irretrievability in the language of “a moment ago”, doing so by adopting the 
1st person perspective of the witness, the “I” observer who suffers a loss of this kind 
that transforms, for the observer, the moment-to-moment experiencing of the 
living into the moment ago of what once was.  
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The 1st person perspective of the witness is the now perspective. The 
knowing that comes by this means is immediately conveyed to the observer, 
immediately experienced by one’s being awake to the world. What, then, does 
such a perspective tell us about death, and how is it different from the distanced 
appraisal that a 3rd person perspective would give us?  
A child needs only a few years to appreciate that a human life does not 
go on forever. The brevity of life – at least from a 3rd person perspective – has 
been profoundly imbedded in human awareness since probably humanity’s early 
origins, evidenced by the advent of burial mounds and grave sites. In her chap-
ter “On the Conceptual Origin of Death”, Sheets-Johnstone offers this mental 
reconstruction of how a prehistoric human’s first dim presentiments of life’s 
inevitable termination may have come about: 
The concept of death is born when the sense of I too and the sense of distinctive con-
trast are heightened in equal measure. With the sense of I too I ultimately grasp my 
punctuated existence; with the sense of distinctive contrast, I grasp the inevitability 
of my death. The concept of death is thus as grounded in my utter likeness to the 
Other I once knew as it is in my experience of utter contrast to the Other here before 
me. A radical new understanding is born. This temporal stretch of being that I am is 
not just animate: it is a life, my life. And this life which is mine and which I am – this 
more than just animate being – is not a never-ending expanse of being but a punctu-
ated one. In this moment I realize that it is precisely my possibility to be there where 
the Other is now, but in time. It is in this moment that I grasp both my living tempo-
rality and my ultimate end.   (Sheets-Johnstone 1990: 228-229)1 
And so we die. Or do we? What exactly is the aspect of time that makes death 
obvious and the aspect of time that makes it not?  
First of all, as her title itself indicates, Sheets-Johnstone is writing about 
the origin of a conception. That is its focus. The origin of a conception built al-
most entirely on a foundation of the before and after, or what we have referred 
to as the not-now of extended time. As the description unfolds, a scene is 
sketched out in which a presumably primeval human confronts a person who 
has just died, a person we may suppose to be kin or well acquainted to the narra-
tor. In modern usage, our term “corpse” is applied to such as this lifeless figure 
which the narrator designates “the Other” and “the Other I once knew”. And 
rather than merely “the Other I once knew”, our usage might be more like the 
cliché “so and so has passed away”. In any event, regardless of the wording, the 
mental deliberations of the depicted witness belong manifestly in the category of 
the not-now of extended time. The narrator grasps on this occasion the inevita-
ble termination of her own life, a not-now that is not yet but ominous. Underly-
  
1 [italics hers] Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, “On the Conceptual Origin of Death,” The 
Roots of Thinking (Philadelphia: Temple University, 1990): 228-229. 
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ing all of this we detect a conceptual metaphor, not about death itself but about 
time, time as a moving or passing of events, or of ourselves as moving or passing 
by events and heading into a future that is in some sense already there awaiting 
us, a fate we are destined to arrive at sooner or later. “Passage of time” is how we 
commonly refer to this conception of time, a notion long familiar and still in-
stilled in our thinking today.  
Hence it becomes evident that the core of Sheet-Johnstone’s ponderings 
about the conceptual origin of death, as embodied in the narrator’s reflections, 
rides on a certain notion of time, a time that takes time, that changes and pass-
es, and that pertains to what is either no longer or what is not yet, all of which 
exemplify the not-now status commonly attributed to time. But here is where we 
move from that not-now conceptualization and trek a different route, approach-
ing the accounting of death and mortality from a different starting point. In-
stead of resolving the question of “Do we die?” by predefining the answer in 
terms of the before-and-after, the not yet and no longer, of linear time, let us go 
instead to a non-sequential notion of time – namely, this present time that 
comes to our immediate awareness, the time that we are always awake to in an 
immediate sense. This present time is what gives us this present world, the 
world that already is before we take the time to measure anything that takes 
time, for that shift to mediated time necessarily takes us to a perspective of the 
world that is other than what is at this very moment in our immediate aware-
ness. We have spoken of present time as a precondition in that it makes possible 
that deliberated aspect of time, the one with linear extensions. This distinction 
between types of time is brought about by the fact that it is our human position 
anchored in the now that makes possible the plotting of a time that extends ei-
ther into the not-now of the past or the not yet of the future. The plotting pre-
supposes the precondition. 
Given then the primacy of this starting point of time, this immediate now, 
the next step is to ask what it tells us about death and its attributed finality. 
What it does – this now or present time – is turn the question around. In-
stead of addressing the question of death and answering by pointing to all the 
cemeteries, all the others I once knew but have passed away, it addresses the ques-
tion of immediate change and how it exposes itself, this world at any moment that 
is different – however slightly – from the way it was a moment before.  
Many changes go by unnoticed, changes in ourselves, for example. What 
alters consists frequently of absences undetected at first or in some cases not 
until years later – a former acquaintance whose absence is suddenly noticed, a 
message that accidentally comes to light or a scribbled note or impression about 
something discovered in house cleaning. And then as well there are those chang-
es imbedded even in conspicuous everyday regularities – a sickness, a delay, 
unexpected weather conditions. However much our attention focuses on the 
everyday rhythms – waking in the morning, going to work, sleeping at night –, 
Chapter 10 150
the signature of the world at any present time is its difference from yesterday 
and from our memory of yesterday. One does not step in the same river twice, as 
the old adage puts it. 
Our proposal then is that present time recasts the finality of death into 
the broadened category of change, what is changed at any one present time. It 
must be clarified, however, what is meant by this translation into “change” and 
how we are using that word. We mean specifically those changes which, on the 
one hand, are final and irrevocable, and which in addition take on the aspect of 
being already present at hand, a new situation manifested at this or that mo-
ment. Let us examine a little more closely these two significations of “change” as 
they will clarify how and why this recasting comes about when present time 
becomes the medium of our perspective on the question of death. 
On the one hand, we mean by “change” those differences and transi-
tions that are final, like that step into the river at whatever the point in time 
the current sweeps by. It no more flows backward than I am getting younger 
or today goes back to yesterday. That finality then is one part of what’s in-
tended by this word “change” when we propose that the medium of present 
time recasts the question of death into one about change. But there is this 
other signification that comes about when we speak of “change”. It is captured 
in the word we have previously used, the word “differences” – that is to say, 
the differences we see about us in the landscape, the differences that are al-
ready there in this or that moment of present time. And here is where the ex-
ample of death arises.  
The threshold of death is crossed but there’s no process in the crossing 
because, when the aspect of time is restricted to the now, there are no linear 
extensions outside of the present, no processes that take time. What we have 
instead is simply a landscape as it already is, a setting new and different, and 
hence a death the passing of which is a misnomer for what in fact is already past, 
given a present time perspective – the time that doesn’t take time.  
I stop at a railroad crossing. A train speeds by. I catch a glimpse of the 
inside. A moment of windows and faces. And where does it go, that moment? 
Does it go anywhere? The flame of the cigarette lighter goes “out”, but in what 
sense? One’s perfunctory answer to such questions resorts to linear notions of 
time. The train is still in existence, but later. The extinguished flame – a changed 
chemistry subsequent to the capped lighter. Or let’s take a lifeless body – signi-
fying in linear terms the passing away from life to some other state, perhaps an 
afterlife, or an extended time without termination. One discerns this take on 
linearly explained non-existence even in Damasio’s description of patients who 
return to consciousness after being in a coma: 
They can recall the descent into the nothingness of coma – much as we recall the in-
duction of general anesthesia – and the return to knowingness, but nothing at all is 
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recalled of the intervening period, which can span weeks or months. It is legitimate 
to assume, given all the evidence, that little or nothing was in fact going on in the 
mind in such circumstances.2 
We can see how this passage is oriented around linearity. “The descent” is re-
called as being something, rather than nothing, because of the time sense im-
plied by it, time as fading yet continuing, a before-and-after sense of time. Like-
wise, “intervening period”, the spanning of weeks and months, evokes an in-
tended suggestion of linear activity from the outsider perspective, that of the 
doctor, acclimated to the prioritizing of time as order and sequence. But take 
away that linearity, limit the notion of time to mere transition, a state without 
extension, and the presumption is that nothingness is left, meaning the absence 
of 1st person existence except for the moribund body of the comatose patient, 
considered from a 3rd person perspective. “Nothingness” or “absence of exist-
ence”. In any case what might they mean from a 3rd person perspective? Either 
notion would seem to be a conception that reduces to an abstraction, like the 
number zero or a quantum particle’s potential existence prior to observation.3 
Taking the 1st person perspective, on the other hand, one finds at least a hint of 
concrete meaning “nonexistence” might have – namely as an attribute of transi-
tion. 
In linguistics, as noted earlier, there is this form of change that doesn’t 
take time but just is, and which goes by the name “incipient” or “aorist”. It usu-
ally applies to verb constructions that mark a transition where the sense of dura-
tion or process is absent. “He realized”, “She wakes up”, “They discovered”, or 
“at dawn” are some examples. The sense of non-progressing time, transition that 
  
2 Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (London: Vintage Books, 2000), 95. 
3 The intractability of representation (in itself an act of extension in linear time) in the 
case of death and non-existence is illustrated by Dan Mathewson, who cites on this subject 
Derrida and Kenneth Burke. (1) Derrida: “It is well known that if there is one word that 
remains absolutely unassignable or unassigning with respect to its concept and to its thing-
ness, it is the word ‘death’.” Jacques Derrida, Aporias: Dying—Awaiting (One Another at) 
the Limits of Truth (trans. Thomas Dutoit) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 22. 
(2) Burke: “To experience Death is, by the same token, to be beyond the terms of our exist-
ence here and now.” Kenneth Burke, “Thanatopsis for Critics: A Brief Thesaurus of Death 
and Dying”, in Essays in Criticism 2 (1952), 373. Dan Mathewson, Death and Survival in 
the Book of Job: Desymbolization and Traumatic Experience (London: Bloomsbury [T & T 
Clark International], 2006), 20. The two quotations, taken together, suggest the inscrutabil-
ity of death as well as the inscrutability of the absence of continuation, and by “continua-
tion” we include that sense of continuation that memory provides in making language 
communicable by means of connections and references. Mathewson elicits this absence of 
continuation when he adds: “I am making a special case for death as an empty signifier that 
can be known only in reference to other signifiers, but as Derrida and others have demon-
strated, this is in the nature of all signification.” (21, n. 94). 
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Having pointed out the above, we are now ready to return to our original 
question: Does the time that just is, namely present time, give us enough to go 
on in order to answer the question of whether we die or not? The question is 
crucial in this respect: For if it turns out that present time fails to do the job, 
fails to provide an eyewitness answer to the question of death, it would seem 
that any other aspect of time – a future time, a past time, a time that takes time, 
a time that is not accessible to the immediacy of the present time of death –, all 
such aspects of time that partake of representational means, all these must fail 
as well. Quite obviously, death does not happen in a representational or virtual 
way. It is only its translation as 3rd person data that appears to do that, situate 
death along a linear schema of time, as an effect subsequent to a cause. But if all 
we had to rely on were schemas of this sort and representations in not-now time, 
there would, of course, be no evidence of actual death. There would be nothing 
on which to base its conceptualizing in linear terms.  
So then, how does the picture change when we turn from the linear to 
the experiential present, the time that hovers between past and future? Essen-
tially what comes about is the replacing of notions like “passing” and “passing 
away” and “afterlife”, replacing them with “transition” as we have been applying 
that term, the transition that does not take time.  
What present time does give us, as grist for this question of death, is this 
changed that we have frequently referred to, not a changed that is passing from 
a “what” to a “what” but a changed that does not take time. Given that death is a 
witnessable event, it becomes symptomatic of the world itself in its incessant 
change, its incessant stimuli of change and transition without which there would 
be no witnessable present time, and in fact no world we are awake to. Converse-
ly, were there to be no present time, there would be no death, for how could 
someone die except that it take place in this or that present time? Hence, we can 
see the vital role present time plays on this question of death, although tradition 
allots most of death’s explanations and answers to notions of temporality that 
apply to ongoing time, the time that takes time, rather than to present time.4  
But does any of what we have just said give us a glimmer of hope for 
that moment ago that Part 2 of this book has been arduously in search of, the 
retrieval of that lived past, even of that once living prehistoric corpse depicted 
at the beginning of this chapter? One commonly supposes, as does Sheets-
Johnstone’s stone-age ponderer, that death marks an end to one’s lived exist-
ence and experience – irretrievable at least in linear time. But does experience 
itself – considered in its temporal immediacy – have an end or a beginning? 
  
4 Discussed further in this author’s “The ‘After’ in Medieval Afterlife: a Vertical or Hori-
zontal Arrow of Time,” Thise Stories Beren Witnesse: The Landscape of the Afterlife in 
Medieval and Post-Medieval Imagination, ed. Liliana Sikorska (Warsaw: Peter Lang, 
2012): 59-62. 
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What would border the end of experiential reality – non-experiential reality?5 
And furthermore, should we even be looking for that moment ago “in” the 
past? 
But then, where are we going with this? 
 
  
5 Compare Strawson: There is zero observational evidence for the existence of nonexpe-
riential reality. . . . All there is, is one great big wholly ungrounded wholly question-begging 





    “When his family heard of this they came to take 
charge of him, saying, ‘He is out of his mind.’” 
 
                       Mark 3: 21 
Chapter 11 
Contra-lucidity?  
 So I happen to be passing in front of St. Luke’s Catholic Church on my way to 
Denny’s restaurant in Lake Worth, Florida, abruptly stopping literally on im-
pulse in front of the church. I enter just as the priest, Father Andrew, is giving 
his sermon and speaking the following words: 
. . . . It may be helpful to realize that Jesus’ resurrection is not simply the next thing 
that happened to him. It is not a case of: died on Friday, lay in the tomb Saturday, 
rose on Sunday. Jesus was not “3 days older” on Easter Sunday. . . . 
Coincidence in view of this chapter 11 of the book I had just finished. It begins as 
follows: 
 From our discussion of the just now in chapter 5 (sec. 2: “The changed and 
the mediated”), it can be detected that this “just now” shows itself as a slight mis-
nomer when one considers the fact that the changed from (i.e., this “just now”) of 
a present perception is inextricably tied into the same time frame as the changed 
to, that aspect of the present perception that stands in relief and chiaroscuro like, 
made so by its differentiation from the just now. What we stressed in that earlier 
discussion was the fact that the differentiation between these two aspects of 
nowness was not, in fact, one between the before of what memory records in the 
after of the present moment. Granted that so much of what is intelligible in our 
present perceptions – the familiarity of sensory objects, their recognized functions, 
people’s faces, the very recognized changes in general – is accounted for by 
memory and what our cognitive faculties bring to the scene, nonetheless when we 
speak of this instant we are talking about – this instant just now – from a 1st per-
son perspective it’s a before not accounted for by anything in the past, neither 
accounted for by traces of what our memory represents, but instead is an inherent 
part of the very presentational moment that one is awake to, that immediacy of 
time that distinguishes the present perception as present. And so it must be re-
membered that when we are using the term “just now”, it is intended in the sense 
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of now as well, even though chapter 8 considered it among the designations of the 
not-now for the purpose of tracking the moment ago of a lived experience in the 
past. Consequently, the important implication that arises as a result of this dual 
existence in the present is this: The just now, along with the now, derives external-
ly. Our judgments, our memory and mental representations, have no role in arbi-
trating either of these two aspects of the now, which instead come under the man-
date of the temporal constraint. However my cognitive faculties help in whatever 
judgments I make about today’s time and the field of view that is now present be-
fore me, whatever my memory does in aid of this or fails to do, even in providing a 
sense of duration or continuity – all that has nothing to do with this dual aspect of 
nowness we’ve been speaking about, the discernment of which is based not on 
cognitive input but on the experience of being awake to the just now and the now. 
That discernment falls, not into the category of cognitive input, but of mental lu-
cidity and contact with the world. 
 But now comes a sampling of moment ago scenarios, lived experiences 
from the past gleaned from a variety of genres, that have grounds to be taken 
seriously, at least in one respect or another, and that would seem to contest 
what has just been laid out. In what follows, the temporal constraint gets pur-
portedly trashed, apparent dysfunctioning shows up as purported insight, and a 
past that captures more than just the “just now” becomes part of the lived pre-
sent. Might there not be here, if such altered states can be taken seriously, a 
circuitous path to that moment ago we’ve been in search of?  
We will see immediately that these scenarios about to be described are 
faced in most instances by problems of corroboration, in particular corroborat-
ing witnesses in the present world, and are controversial on other grounds. Fur-
thermore, in the episodes taken from theater we cite only one attestation of time 
distortion in any real sense. The other two are openly fictitious elements of the 
plot, included only in giving circumstantial evidence of audience belief systems 
regarding the possibility of temporal anomalies. And as for our final source of 
temporal intrusion, while its genre as history is itself the subject of historical 
debate, it constitutes an episode about time aberration that bears considerable 
responsibility for having sewn the cultural seeds of Western civilization for its 
ensuing 2,000 years, however one might want to explain that outcome. 
1. Grotowski and the past/present  
In the 1960s the Polish theater director Jerzy Grotowski and his Polish Labora-
tory Theatre were giving performances of the play Akropolis. Grotowski was 
interested in breaking the barrier between stage and audience, and did this by 
various means – seating the audience on the stage or separate from one another, 
employing incantatory methods in actors’ speech and movements, and by lan-
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guage that was not so much communicative as emotive. This is how the British 
director Peter Brook describes his reactions as spectator to one of the perfor-
mances: 
Now it seems to me that in Akropolis by the same sincerity and mastery of deep 
rhythmic elements, the pulse of life in a concentration camp actually came out in the 
open, and I had the feeling of something nasty, truly repellent and one that stops 
speech. . . . Grotowski does something that no film can do. A film also refers to the 
past. He actually makes the sense of the concentration camp for a moment reappear. 
And it is there. And you can taste it, sense it, touch it, and feel it. And you can’t say 
that it doesn’t exist anymore in this world. . . . There it is again, a group of men make 
this come about. In that sense it’s like a black mass.1 
Has the past actually come back? What does Peter Brook mean by “sense”? Does 
he mean it literally – a past in the present – or is he intending a metaphor or an 
effect that merely seemed literal, an impression brought about by the affective 
and kinesthetic behavior of the actors? Of course we could ask him that question 
(if alive today), but any answer he might give in the literal direction would still 
pose the same questions, that of having us determine by his words the authen-
ticity of an event experientially incommunicable and ineffable, namely the im-
mediacy of a past in a present at the time of his attendance. Anything he might 
say to substantiate that lived past – the incidents, where it happened, recognized 
personalities, even the smallest details – could theoretically be accounted for by 
memory – a knowledge remembered about this or that concentration camp read 
about prior to Brook’s attendance at the performance. The one thing, however, 
that could not be accounted for by either knowledge or memory would be the 
authenticity of the spectator Brook’s knowing of that past immediacy by simply 
being there at the performance, a witnessing of skewed time not unlike the wit-
nessing we are seeking in our quest for that moment ago. A justified belief of 
that kind would amount to a kind of “the having is the knowing”, as the philoso-
pher Galen Strawson would say, an experiential knowing evinced by one’s being 
confronted by this skewed phenomenon.2 Knowledge, as opposed to this know-
  
1 Magda Romanska, The Post-traumatic Theatre of Grotowski and Kantor: History 
and Holocaust in Akropolis and the Dead Class (London: Anthem Press, 2012), 124. 
2 Strawson, “Mind and Being”, 95;  note also his comment:  “As for ‘knowing’: it sug-
gests a distinction between the knowing subject and the thing constituted as object of 
knowledge by the act of knowing that I also reject as inapplicable to acquaintance-
knowledge; perhaps one might better say ‘the knowing is the being’.” Strawson, 
“Panpsychism? Reply…,” 254.           
  In contrast to the problem of authenticating phenomenological evidence raised above, 
in the case of technically brain dead patients who recover and allegedly report details of the 
operation they underwent while in a brain-dead state, the details they provide would appear 
more persuasive in substantiating the immediacy of their attested perceptions while in a 
brain-dead state, since memory would presumably have been inoperative to either recall the 
Chapter 11 158
ing, does not help us here to understand or explain it, although knowledge of the 
fact that others in the audience reacted similarly to Brook would at least lend 
consensual support to his claim of temporal displacement, supposing his de-
scription literally meant just that. 
2. Ineffability and intrinsic properties: a debate 
 The issue underlying all of this, a factor that makes contra-lucidity accounts 
difficult to assess (and by “contra-lucidity” we mean specifically one’s direct 
acquaintance with an experiential time that violates the temporal constraint), is 
how any experience purporting to be ineffable – that is, exposed to a domain of 
truth that others don’t customarily share – can be convincingly communicated 
by words. How to verify verbal descriptions in this terrain, if at all? It is a ques-
tion that has been hotly debated, as represented by Daniel Dennett on the one 
side and Thomas Nagel on the other, with Richard Rorty serving as arbiter. 
Dennett writes:  
I let Nagel have everything he wants about his own intimate relation to his phenome-
nology except that he has some sort of papal infallibility about it; he can have all the in-
effability he wants; what he can’t have (without an argument) is in principle ineffability. 
. . . In objecting to the very idea of an objective standpoint from which to gather and as-
sess phenomenological evidence, Nagel is objecting to neutrality itself.3  
We can take it that by “objective standpoint” Dennett is invoking the distanced 
assessment, the 3rd person non-involved perspective of someone who uses logi-
cal discourse to assess the validity of truth claims. Rorty sees a problem with 
this “neutrality” stand that Dennett takes, a neutrality that presupposes lan-
guage (and heterophenomenology – Dennett’s method of analysis) can do the 
trick of resolving issues of experiential describability, qualia being an example: 
Notice that if we once admit that there are such things as intrinsic properties, 
knowledge of which is independent of the language we use, we can no longer think of 
heterophenomenology as a neutral method. For the hetero-phenomenologist’s privi-
lege of telling you what you were really talking about is not compatible with the 
claim that our knowledge of some things, e.g. of the existence of qualia, is knowledge 
which cannot be affected by changing the way we talk, abandoning the pictures we 
have previously used language to sketch. So Dennett’s suggestion that he has found 
neutral ground on which to argue with Nagel is wrong. By countenancing, or refusing 
                                                                                                                                       
medical procedure and in any case would have been inoperative during the procedure.  (An 
example of a book on that subject is Marjorie H. Woollacott’s Infinite Awareness: the 
Awakening of a Scientific Mind (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015). 
3 [italics his] Dennett, Daniel, “Back from the Drawing Boards,” 211.  
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to countenance, such knowledge, Nagel and Dennett beg all the questions against 
each other.4 
The relevant point in Rorty’s overview is that the knowledge that he speaks 
about – knowledge of intrinsic properties, knowledge of qualia such as colors 
and sensory features – is precisely what we have designated as “knowing”, a 1st 
person experiential acquaintance that brings us, for example, in contact with the 
now and its temporal constraint. What we have distinguished from this knowing 
is the knowledge that falls within the sphere of Dennett’s “objective” standpoint, 
namely a 3rd person approach that would deem illegitimate the ineffability that 
Nagel talks about, experiential content that language and discourse analysis 
would be incapable of describing. So the question we come back to in our tem-
poral probing is how and whether words can convey one’s exposure to a tem-
poral anomaly such as suggested in this first spectator episode at a Grotowski 
performance, or whether its ineffability rules that out? The answer to that ques-
tion would conceivably have bearing in our case – the likelihood of finding any 
precedent for that moment ago we’re in search of.  
 However, in this first example we have given of skewed temporality, the 
problem extends not only to the question about how literal the spectator intend-
ed his description, not only as well to the question of the literal happening of 
what the spectator appeared to verbally allege, but even the historical basis it-
self. Was there a specific circumstance to begin with – a locatable historical ref-
erence point, which allegedly came back to life on stage? 
3. The past/present from classical theater  
 Given these uncertainties, let us try yet another route to the evidence of a recap-
tured moment. The contra-lucidity episodes picked out in this second try belong 
as well to the fictional genre of theater and make no pretence of the audience 
taking anything as historically verifiable from the effects of staging. Instead, the 
basis for skewed temporality comes about in a different manner. The first of 
these episodes is taken from the scene in Shakespeare’s Hamlet where, having 
witnessed the words and visage of his reincarnated father, Hamlet speaks these 
lines to Horatio:  
There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your phi-
losophy.  Hamlet, Act 1, scene 5 
– which essentially amounts to “what you and I have just seen, Horatio, is some-
thing that can be believed only by being witnessed” – i.e., an ineffability. In this 
  
4 Richard Rorty, “Holism, Intrinsicality, Transcendence,” in Dennett and His Critics: 
Demystifying Mind, ed. Bo Dahlbom (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1993), 188.  
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case, however, the circumstances – being scripted in the play – are easily de-
scribed: The physical manifestation of Hamlet’s deceased father, his voice and 
utterances, the recognition of him by his son and by a second witness, the verac-
ity of the occasion supported by later evidence that the father’s allegations turn 
out to be true, affecting the outcome of the entire play. All this serving as objec-
tive evidence of an experience of revelation on Hamlet’s part. And yet there is 
the ineffable component, this contra-lucidity of a present perception that would 
include what unmistakably belongs to the past – a deceased person – as an in-
herent feature of an immediacy that is constrained to the now.  
 The second of the episodes we have selected of a scripted diaphanous 
past/present comes from ancient Greek theater and can be briefly summarized. 
It is the scene from Sophocles’ Oedipus the King where the prophet Tiresias 
confronts Oedipus and informs him of his horrendous past and doomed future. 
In this case it is the words of the prophet that render Oedipus the captive of a 
diaphanous past/present and present/future fate that he cannot escape from.  
 Why then these two incidents? First of all, the episodes provide us with an 
ineffability that’s plotted in the script, unambiguous in that it hinges neither on a 
spectator’s experiential evaluations nor on evidence from a factual source to back 
up the authenticity of a spectator’s impressions. In the first incident, the deceased 
father of Hamlet is bodily present, as scripted in the play. Furthermore, what the 
deceased father tells his son is the keystone on which the entire rest of the plot 
depends. And so how to explain this pivotal role of contra-lucidity in a classical 
drama with otherwise psychological acuity and character/situational realism as 
befitting a play in the genre of tragedy? A similar question can be asked of Oedipus 
the King – why the pivotal role of the past/present, future/present powers of Tire-
sias in determining the plot structure of the entire play that is otherwise convinc-
ing on non-contra-lucidity grounds? 
 The answer one might expect is that in previous times people were more 
superstitious. Their views were influenced by religious indoctrination and, lack-
ing insights provided by the development of science, they were more susceptible 
to beliefs in witchcraft and the paranormal. But this explanation simply begs the 
question about “intrinsic properties” that Rorty talks about. If intrinsicality or 
“ineffability in principle” is a feature of the world – the big question –, and if 
skewed time as in these scripted instances belongs in that category, it becomes 
no longer incongruous to find it being given a pivotal role in a serious drama 
about worldly events. Of course, such a species of script is rare in today’s world 
– except perhaps as comedy, fantasy, science fiction. There are many back-to-
the-future versions of time aberration, but not involving the policies of high 
government officials living in our familiar world. The reason, in fact, for includ-
ing these two examples from classical drama is precisely that they were not pre-
sented as comedy or fantasy. Judging from the two plays’ extraordinary success 
over the centuries, we can assume that the skewed temporal incidents in their 
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plot structures have not, for audiences in general, undermined the plausibility of 
the story line, suggesting that while, in terms of audience “knowledge”, such 
incongruity of time would have been taken as poetic license, in terms of the au-
dience’s “knowing”, on the other hand, the incidents of skewed time would not 
have been met with incredulity, or at least less so than today. Performed today, a 
deceased father’s dialogue with his son might pass as a period piece or as a cate-
gory of metaphysical or psychological drama, but it is hard to find such an ex-
ample in realistic drama portraying social/political events where skewed tempo-
rality is intended to be taken seriously.  
 In any case what these last two cited scenes from drama have given us is 
merely a scripted aberration of time, depicting a lived circumstance from the 
not-now of the past or future that comes back in one form or another to haunt 
the present. So let us now proceed in search of a better claim to precedents of a 
returning past by turning from the medium of fiction to instances of knowing 
that are recorded as non-fiction, namely gospel accounts in the New Testament 
that encompass a lived immediacy of the past in the immediacy of the present. 
The question behind this probe: Will it bring us any closer to precedent and 
plausibility of that lived experience we are in search of, that lived experience of a 
moment ago? 
4. Sensory knowing in New Testament gospel episodes  
 Though a measure of consensus becomes apparent in comparing these gospel 
accounts of Christ taken from the New Testament, there are of course numerous 
questions as to this or any religion’s historical basis, problems in determining 
records, the sources, and so forth. With the gospel accounts in particular, there 
arises the problem of accounting for the motif of a bodily resurrection that 
seemed alien to contemporary thinking at the time of Christ. On the other hand, 
a recent excavation from that period uncovered a slab tablet with the words “on 
the third day” and a word possibly decipherable as “live”, phraseology suggest-
ing the motif of resurrection was not all that foreign.5 Then there is the more 
fundamental problem of historical access, limited to the beliefs of the early dis-
ciples, and the question of reliable original sources. The puzzle deepens when 
one seeks to explain the crystallization of followers of Christ’s message, martyr-
dom, and the subsequent conversion of Rome. These are issues that extend in 
directions we will not pursue, as our purpose is limited to scrutinizing the tem-
poral cameos themselves.6 Our only argument given in defense of taking the 
  
5 See article in footnote that follows. 
6  Such issues are taken up, for example, in Nicholas T. Wright’s  The Resurrection 
 of the Son of God (Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 3)  (London: Society 
for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 2003): vol. 3: 9, 15, et al.  Reference to the slab tab-
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gospel descriptions as sufficiently plausible for our purposes is the extraordinary 
impact of the events they describe, and in particular the impact of those cameo 
scenes of violated temporal constraint about to be discussed. So let us see what 
we come up with in this exploration of what can be termed the temporally am-
biguous in scenes from the New Testament gospels. 
 The backdrop is Old Testament history, more or less conforming to our 
notion of linear line – time capable of calculation and measure – with the excep-
tion of an eschatological future, a future marked by the coming of the kingdom 
of God and the end of time in a quantitative and countable sense. Against this 
backdrop Jesus appears according to scripture, his message as much about his 
presence as it is his words. To begin with, we’ll take up the 2-in-1 cameo of a 
future/present: a future marked by immediacy that is doctrinally purported to 
have become present in the embodiment of Christ before his disciples. This is 
one of the ways that notion comes through, when Jesus says these words:  
No one comes to the Father except through me. . . . Whoever has seen me has seen 
the Father. (John 14: 6, 9) 
What emerges, at least by implication, is this suggestion of a doppelganger, as 
we shall call it, a commingling of two experiential nows at once, an eschatologi-
cal now of that Christ/Father embodiment and the now of that witnessed mo-
ment when Christ speaks. Let us pause here to discuss this in more detail. 
 What first of all should be pointed out is the very concreteness, the 
physicality of the circumstances wherein the purported bistable apprehension 
of time is implicitly conveyed. The second part of the message, at least if we 
are to take it literally, leaves little doubt that the recognition of this doppel-
ganger of time is achieved through the medium of a sensory knowing. What is 
grasped is what is immediately witnessed, exactly in the same way we have 
described the channel by which the immediacy of the now comes to be known, 
and exactly why we have conceived of it as thinglike. How at variance to the 
significance of this concreteness, and the sensory knowing that comes out of 
it, was the Greek skeptic’s distrust of sensory impressions, as epitomized by 
Socrates’ words: 
And . . . the soul when using the body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, 
when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (for the meaning of 
perceiving through the body is perceiving though the senses) were we not saying that 
the soul is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders 
                                                                                                                                       
let is in Ethan Bronner’s article “Tablet ignites debate on Messiah and Resurrection”; The 
New York Times, July 6, 2008. [www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/world/ mid-
dleeast/06stone.html].   
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and is confused; the world spins around her, and she is like a drunkard, when she 
touches change? 7 
But again, contrary to this, a version of this sensory knowing comes through in 
this gospel account of the deaf mute whose hearing is restored:  
And they brought to Him one who was deaf. . . . And He took him aside from the 
multitude by himself, and put His fingers into his ears, and after spitting, He touched 
his tongue with the saliva. (Mark 7: 32-33) 
 Turning back to the above mentioned present/future doppelganger, namely the 
Father-in-Christ exchange of words, the question of what this entails if taken 
literally, how it impinges on the time of history, has led to extensive eschatologi-
cal debate over the centuries. Had the future been realized in the present (the 
disciples’ present time)? Was that the intended message, God’s presence and the 
end of history? A prominent figure in this line of research, N.T. Wright gives this 
explanation, “This is what early Christian eschatology was all about: not the 
literal end of the space-time universe but the sense that world history was reach-
ing, or indeed had reached, its single intended climax.”8  
 But yet a third aspect comes out of this future/immediacy, Father-in-
Christ passage (John 14), and that is the dialogue adds more that would lead 
us to qualify, in any case, the plausibility of this doppelganger, this bi-
temporal witnessing of Christ. When Christ utters the words “Whoever has 
seen me has seen the Father”, those words are in response to Philip, one of his 
disciples, who has just addressed him with the words, “Lord, show us the Fa-
ther, and it is enough for us.” It is to this appeal that Christ answers according 
to scripture, “Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know me, 
Philip? Whoever has seen me has seen the Father.” (John 14: 8-9) Hence, 
though Christ implies a dual embodied identity, the literal intent of his word 
“seen” is thrown into question since the identity is not apparent, at least not 
visually, to one of the witnesses. And so it becomes unclear whether the in-
sight as to Jesus’ identity is intended to take the form of a knowledge or a 
knowing – that is to say, a knowledge based on what Jesus lectured about, 
precepts communicated by words, or an ineffable kind of knowing by direct 
acquaintance where the witness becomes immediately aware of the figure of a 
person comprising two time zones. From the added context of Jesus’ response 
– “Have I been with you so long, and you still do not know me, Philip?” – the 
meaning suggests the buildup of an understanding over time rather than any-
thing immediately understood by one’s being immediately present to it. Still, 
  
7 Plato, Phaedo [79], The Apology, Phaedo and Crito of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett. 
The Harvard Classics,  Vol. 2, part 1 (New York: Bartleby.com, 2001). 
8 Nicholas T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is 
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 22. 
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there is some uncertainty the other way when Jesus remarks, “Believe me that 
I am in the Father . . . or else believe on account of the works themselves.” 
(John 14: 11) In the latter case, the witnessing of healings and miraculous 
powers would show itself as an immediate understanding brought about in an 
immediate present time – a seeing is believing –, though the resulting image 
of the miracle worker, in the minds of the witnesses, could be other than that 
of a God or Father. 
5. Gospel accounts of past/present doppelganger encounters  
 However inconclusive the above evidence of skewed time, we now come to more 
substantial ground, again presupposing the narratives to be accurate descrip-
tions of witnessings. Here we take up Resurrection cameo episodes in the gos-
pels where, as depicted, it is evident the sensory knowing encompasses the 
commingling of nows from two time frames, past and present. 
 The most explicit of these commingling episodes occurs when Christ 
tells Thomas:  
Reach here your finger, and see my hands, and reach here your hand, and put it into 
my side; and be not unbelieving but believing.     (John 20: 27) 
And Thomas responds: 
My Lord and My God! (John 20: 28) 
And so the question: Is Thomas touching the pre-deceased body of Christ, the 
wound identifying it as such, which would insinuate that, by being pre-
deceased, it could not possibly have been a living presence solely in the pre-
sent? Or is Thomas touching the body of the person who is presently speaking 
to him, the present body of the present speaker? If we omit from considera-
tion what is doctrinally referred to as “glorified body”, he appears to be touch-
ing both. Hence, the doppelganger, past and present commingled. The same 
question can be asked of Lazarus rising from the dead – “Lazarus, come 
forth!” (John 11: 43). Which Lazarus is this? Which time zone? – a question 
equally pertinent to the other post-Resurrection scenes, Christ addressing 
Mary (John 20: 14-16), or giving evidence of his physicality to fellow travelers 
(Luke 24: 37-43): 
In their panic and fright they thought they were seeing a ghost. He said to them, 
“Why are you disturbed? Why do such ideas cross your mind? Look at my hands and 
my feet; it is really I. Touch me, and see that a ghost does not have flesh and bones as 
I do.” As he said this he showed them his hands and feet. They were still incredulous 
for sheer joy and wonder, so he said to them, “Have you anything here to eat?” They 
gave him a piece of cooked fish, which he took and ate in their presence.  
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Which voice? Which body? And from which time zone? It appears to be from 
both time zones. We can extend the indications of this doppelganger motif to 
centuries of its reported manifestation in devotional image veneration. In his 
book The Power of Images, David Freedberg describes the doubling of two 
time zones in one in the following way: “[J]ust as the god is in the stone, so he 
is also in the image (of the god). Responses to both classes of object are predi-
cated on the identity of sign and signified, or in the case of images, of the rep-
resented with that which it represents. The historical evidence for this identity 
is abundant. . . .”9 So, on the one hand, we have the image that is immediately 
present to the devotee. On the other hand, we have allegedly coming to life in 
the image that which the image represents, a devotional figure such as the 
Virgin Mary – an incursion of the past into the present. To all of this we have 
applied in this chapter the label “contra-lucidity” because it contradicts the 
principle of perceptual lucidity that Part 1 of this book has been established 
on, namely our captivity in, and involuntary adherence to, the immediacy of 
present time, which we have dubbed the “temporal constraint”. Of course, one 
can simply dismiss, as a general rule, reported instances of doppelganger and 
reclassify them as misguided impressions. But that is too swift and simple an 
explanation. As we shall see shortly, “history”, “knowledge”, “fact” cannot hold 
up as arbiters of sensory knowing. The temporal schema on which their ac-
creditations are based is determined by linear time, a distancing structure of 
analysis. Furthermore, given the range and tradition of significance attached 
to this field of experiential contact (and found in various religious traditions), 
and the plain meaning of the words in some of these descriptions, it would 
seem unwarranted to brush aside, as misguided, this record of testimony alto-
gether. And as it is a subject that weighs in on the meaning of the now, we will 
posit these bi-temporal episodes as worthy of serious consideration and rank 
them as a second exception (the first being the immediacy of the “just now”) 
that introduces a contingency into what has previously been stated axiomati-
cally as the now’s temporal constraint. 
 Let us recapitulate the prototypical descriptive value these witnessings 
have for the bi-temporal experience we’ve been looking for, that moment ago. 
What is found here, first of all, is something concrete – a tableau or scene 
portraying a disciple’s or involved spectator’s knowing by acquaintance, a 
sensory knowing by virtue of the very flesh-and-blood otherness of what is 
immediately at hand. Second, this otherness, temporally speaking, shows it-
self as directly present and meaningful to the viewer. By this, we are not refer-
ring to doctrinal knowledge, words of counsel, ideas in the abstract, but rather 
an image or spectacle that is being brought to one’s sensory attention – and in 
  
9 David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Re-
sponse (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 77. 
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particular the aspect of its temporality. Such a cameo, by its very exposure, is the 
message. By contrast, there is the role of what we, our cognitive faculties, bring 
to our sense perception – memory, intelligibility, interpretation. As said before, 
necessarily they play a major role in the recognition of what is being brought to 
the witness’s attention. But as to the currency of what might qualify as that mo-
ment ago – the fact of a witnessed scene’s experienced temporality – that aspect 
we have necessarily plotted externally as part of the otherness of the scene itself. 
At least as regards the immediate present in general, however the purported 
ways it is claimed to be manifested, that is not something we invent. It is some-
thing we wake up to. If it were not so, as we’ve reiterated throughout, it would 
spell knowledge’s doom, the latter thereupon consigned to nothing other than a 
past-to-present brain or evolutionary-manufactured simulation. 
6. Implications of the bi-temporal hypothesis 
 Taking these cited witnessings of bi-temporal immediacy as having necessarily 
occurred in someone’s present time, and given our discussion in Part 1 in de-
fense of present time as being only present time, only this present time, the 
question that invariably strikes our attention is how to reconcile the bi-
temporal experience in the present time of Jesus’ day – assuming its authen-
ticity – with the present time of today. Are they not obviously two different 
present times, two “nows”, necessarily evoking an unavoidable plurality?  
 N.T. Wright, in defending the thesis that, as he puts it, the Resurrection 
poses “at least a historical problem”, begins his work on this subject by analyzing 
meanings of “history” – history as event, as significant event, provable event, writ-
ings about events in the past, and what modern historians can say about it. In ad-
dressing our question in the paragraph above – the apparent contradiction about 
nows –, we will go about our answer by likewise starting there, only limiting our 
focus to the meaning of history in its temporal layout, its spreadsheet of events 
over time, history in other words as sequence and chronology, as “the not-now of 
extended time”, the category we assigned it in chapter 9. It will be remembered 
that what we concluded from our brief perusal of that branch of the non-now – 
history in a linear sense – was that a search in that direction in the hope of finding 
in that branch of knowledge a lived moment from the past, or what we dubbed “a 
moment ago”, was in vain. What was shown there serves in fact to earmark our 
answer as to why we can speak of one now, even in the face of what obviously 
seems a stark distinction between the then present time of the witnesses in the 
gospel accounts and our own present time.  
 Let us clarify our point here by alluding once again to that time-lag 
discussion of the star gazed at in the sky in chapter 9. Knowledge tells me it’s 
extinct, but only on the basis of my and others’ presumed lucidity – that is, on 
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the basis of a uniformity of immediate time I am aligned to with the otherness 
of that star that I presently see. Without that lucidity, without that shareable 
experiential contact with the starlight, I cannot even go the next step of gain-
ing knowledge about measured time and that star’s existence in that calculat-
ed respect. Upon taking that next step, however, what subsequent knowledge 
informs me of is measured time and measured distances and what I can con-
clude about the star on that basis. What such knowledge cannot inform me of 
is the now of that star that I perceive, perceive as other and as directly evident, 
and which I perceive as uniform in time with the same now of my act of per-
ceiving. The “when” of that perceived star, the “when” of that now, is therefore 
the question. Pre-extinct? Post-extinct? Knowledge cannot tell us. Precisely 
this absence of knowledge is how we proceed to go about answering the ques-
tion of two nows from two different historical eras. And so our answer: Both 
the now then and the now of the present world are indeterminable and indis-
tinguishable in linear time language, ungraspable in the sequentially discrete 
language that fact and knowledge – the knowledge of history – provide us 
with. In a nutshell: such knowledge cannot be the means to track down the 
now from either era, anymore than it can find the now (or earlier now) of that 
star that is gazed at. 
 What we are leading to is this. The doppelganger witnessings alleged 
in the gospel accounts confront us with a different question. Not – “Do the 
witnessings qualify as history?” – but rather – “Do the witnessings disqualify 
history as arbiter?” What answer we give to either, and which question we 
choose to answer, ultimately rides on which perspective we choose to adopt, 
namely a 3rd person or 1st person perspective. Evaluating the gospel witness-
ings in terms of a distanced appraisal and sequential time, there seems no 
alternative other than to consign the perceptual intermingling of before and 
after to the category of “historical problem” or perhaps “false impressions”. 
Evaluating the witnessings, on the other hand, on the basis of a 1st person per-
spective, one discerns the alternative path of a mode of sensory knowing that 
has no linear dimension to it, no distancing in linear time. History, in that 
situation, cannot get at this doppelganger witnessing because history cannot 
get into it. Speaking of them ahistorically, we can say the witnessings are plau-
sibly there – as a sensory knowing – but are plausibly here just as well. Hence, 
not two “nows”, but one. Of course, this does not mean that one’s 1st person 
perspective in today’s world can be any more successful than one’s 3rd person 
perspective in penetrating the sensory knowing of witnesses from Christ’s era, 
or for that matter in penetrating the sensory knowing of a trauma victim or 
spectator of Grotowski’s Acropolis. What it does mean is that standards of 
truth become different, simply because a 1st person perspective applied to 
these witnessings would take its cue from what they purport, their descrip-
tions at face value, rather than screen them through the lens of linear time. 
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Moreover, in this 1st person respect, the feature of their being reportable only 
as sensory knowing, rather than coming through as a non-immediate source of 
knowledge, would not cast a subjective light on them as it would from a 3rd 
person perspective. Author of Revelation as History, Wolfhart Pannenberg 
points out how the 3rd person perspective does this when he writes, “It is so 
difficult, in our tradition, to avoid an alternative; either what is conceived by 
human knowledge is taken as something quite independent from being 
known, or it is considered to be merely subjective.”10 
 So now where does this bring us in our quest for that moment ago? Be-
ing other and not lost to linearity, we can say that it nonetheless “subsists” – 
the word Milic Capek uses when speaking about the past. On the other hand, it 
can as well be stated, from our previous not-now analysis, that this moment 
ago veers off from two of the very categories Capek speaks about when he adds 
the words we have quoted earlier, namely that, “If the past were a mere noth-
ingness, the whole distinction between the faithful and false memory, between 
history and myth would collapse.”11 The problem is, in this Part 2 of the book, 
we have looked and yet in neither of those locations did we find that moment 
ago, that lived immediacy in the past, to be faithful or false – that is, neither in 
memory nor in history. But then again, even to speak of that lived immediacy 
as in the past is a misnomer, as shown above, for lived immediacies do not 
function according chronologies and sequential time.  
 And so we arrive at Part 3 of this book, “Nature in the Now”, the final 
stage of our journey, the final frontier in our search for that moment ago.  
 
  
10 Quoted from an exchange with physicist John A. Wheeler, in Richard Q. Elvee, ed., 
Mind in Nature, 29. 










The “in” Question Anew  
 We sit by the pool. I have never seen her before. She speaks Finnish, I speak 
English. No communication in that sense, just two conversation tracks. How-
ever, a familiarity in her eyes conveys the impression that this woman, about 
50 years old, already knows me, intuits the gist of what I’m saying, how I think 
about things, so much so that I continue to talk in English, she in Finnish, like 
it’s a normal conversation. Her male friend – or husband – comes by and sits 
down. I ask her a question, ask him to translate. He sums up her answer in a 
word – gibberish. Coherent speech, the Finnish and English she once knew, a 
relic of the past. She looks too young for Alzheimer’s, I’m thinking. I sit there 
puzzled. The lucidity of that self/other contact was there. The interaction, 
spontaneity of the moment, seeming alertness – none of that was absent, 
however deeply the disease had struck her memory – and most conspicuously 
had struck the memory of sentence structure. Of course, one could argue that 
at a later stage of the disease even that would be wiped out – any remnants of 
lucidity, social interaction, seeming alertness. All a matter of time. But then 
again, one could look at it in an entirely different way. Which “time” are we 
speaking about?  
 There is the linear time by which we calculate distances into the past 
and future, as if calculation were inherently a part of distances and distances 
moved into the past and future. Then there is the time that defines our awak-
ened connection to the world, a uniformity of time connecting self and other, 
and that eludes calculation in the very connecting, such as between two people 
in conversation by the pool. What we are speaking about in this second in-
stance of temporality is an entwined time that neither moves to the past, nor 
becomes an “ago”, nor is in relation to any other time that does. It just is. To 
take this one step further, this connecting uniformity of time between self and 
other is not so describable as to be strictly “in” relation, or “in” anything at all 
– spatial or temporal, not even in a linearly extended or timelessly extended 
universe. 
 That is what this chapter will argue. 
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1. An entwined now that was 
 An entwined now between two people sitting by the pool. Something so fleeting, 
so immediate, so unextracted from the concrete, that it is impossible I could be 
writing about it as it occurs. Necessarily it’s all in retrospect. In fact, a moment 
long gone. Where did it go, one wonders. Into the past? A now no longer? A now 
“ago”? Did it go anywhere? But we have already discussed this in chapter 5. It 
can’t have gone anywhere, given the temporal constraint of its staying put – 
even in its countenance as a changed to! And yet here I am writing about it – 
this entwined now such as is exemplified in that conversation by the pool – writ-
ing about it as if it were something that belonged to the past and “in” time, as if 
it had gone somewhere in linear time and space. How do we explain this incon-
sistency? 
 One, of course, is not at a loss at expressing words to designate its place 
in the past, such as the very words “an entwined now that was”, thereby convey-
ing the suggestion of a non sequitur or a poetic circumlocution of some sort, or 
perhaps a notion that spins in some metaphorical way with concepts like com-
plementarity in theoretical science or a time-warp plot in science fiction. But 
what would clearly deprive the expression of any coherent logic at all would be 
to deem “the entwined now that was” a knowledge claim. It would be as fruitless 
(and self-contradictory) to attempt to find this entwined now in any of 
knowledge’s not-now repositories, just as it was shown fruitless in chapters 8 
and 9 to retrieve that moment ago in such places. The reason is evident in the 
time-that-takes-time implied by knowledge’s very approach, its very records as 
knowledge, the very words of a text. By abstracting from the concrete, words and 
records effectuate a distancing from the now, rather than bring the knowledge-
seeker close in and so merge (from a 1st person perspective) the witness with the 
external terrain of the witnessed and immediate. Hence, no “now that was” in 
these not-now fields of knowledge.  
 That being so, however, a paradox naturally arises. How is it possible 
one can proceed to write about the now at all, or about an entwined now that 
language necessarily thrusts into the past, being made representational, if 
accessibility to any now is only by way of the instantaneous and immediate? 
This seeming quandary epitomizes a gap in knowledge that only knowing – 
the immediacy of awareness as it is taking place – can fill. “Ago” and “was” are 
linear-based terms, but the “entwined now that was” is, in fact, about a time 
that – lacking measurable and countable features – is inseparable from any 
other now. After all, what evidence is there to show to the contrary? Empirical 
investigation has yet to divulge a delay between immediacies of now time, 
such as an immediacy of now delay. What one can conclude from this is that 
any time that was, any description of the past, any record, any text – while 
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necessarily configured as past by the very nature of the medium and mode of 
construal – they are all platformed on the immediate present time, the now 
from which, by the distancing mechanism of language, the past becomes iden-
tified as past, knowledge becomes implicitly received as that which is config-
ured as distanced from immediacy. I can write about an entwined now that 
was, such as happened by the pool, but the “happened” performs as an artifact 
of what is actually happening: my remembering something now and writing 
about it. Hence, a better way to interpret this “entwined now that was” is not 
as a knowledge claim but as a recalling that occurs in an immediate setting of 
knowing. 
 This brings us back to that distinction which several scholars on the sub-
ject have brought out between “knowledge” and “knowing”. Sarah Waterlow, for 
one, has noted the need of a present time for the constructing and verifying of 
statements about events, or what comes to be treated as knowledge. But that 
need she ascribes to “conditions of our knowledge, not to what it is that we claim 
to know”. Hence, her differentiation between the present-time conditions and 
knowledge itself. Another commentator on the subject, Jesse Butler, contrasts 
the “acts of knowing that sustain or originate knowledge” with the knowledge 
itself, the former being “irrelevant” to the latter.1 What we have come to see, 
however, is that – temporally speaking – knowledge is separable only in an ab-
stract and linear sense from acts of knowing and present-time conditions. The 
past and future that knowledge pertains to are, timewise, linear configurations 
brought about by the 3rd person distanced appraisal, language, record keeping, 
and so on. There is no repository out “there” in the past, for example, where the 
source of knowledge, the experienced times it refers to, is to be found, anymore 
than there is for an “entwined now” or “an entwined now that was—their past 
amounting to a verbal artifice.” 
 And so how does all this pertain to the topic presented in this chapter’s 
title – the “in” question anew? And how is it that, in view of what’s been said, the 
meaning of the now’s external designation we gave at the start of the book must 
now be amplified in such a way as to require a reversal of relation between the 
two components of our conceptual framework, nature and the now? Instead of 
the “now in nature”, the relation turns out to be more aptly described as “nature 
in the now”, the first of the two components taken in the sense of a dimensional-
ly accessible universe, and the latter as signifying a temporality that pervades, 
and is without any locatability, any relatable attribute whatsoever, in linear time 
  
1 (1) Sarah Waterlow, “Aristotle’s Now,” The Philosophical Quarterly 34/135 (April 
1984), 116; (2) Jesse Butler, “Knowledge and the NOW: What Is the Epistemic Standing 
of the Present Moment?” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 3/10 (2014), 
7. Their knowledge/knowing distinctions are discussed further in chapter 4, n. 28.  
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and space. A useful analogy is come across in the description of the “experience 
of time” given by Silberstein and Chemero: 
The experience of time, for example, is neither in the head (the subject) nor the ex-
ternal world (the object), the experience is fundamentally relational or extended. It is 
the self-consistency relation between subject and object that allows for the experi-
ence of time. This relation or structure is not in anything nor located anywhere.2 
Let us proceed to further demonstrate how the now, in our version, eludes linear 
space and time, doing this by tracking the three elements of our schema of 
alignment and how they bear and impact on each other.  
2. The alignment itself 
 The first of these elements is the alignment itself, a uniformity of time that 
linear measurement is predicated on but which itself is inscrutable to meas-
urement. We have variously described this alignment as a connective immedi-
acy, an experiential contact that testifies to awakenness, and as a self/other 
alignment where time is fused in such a way as to elude measureability, 
countability, or any notion of determinable and specifiable extension. In es-
sence, all of this comes through first in the word “lucidity”, as we have under-
stood the term – the fact that I am speaking to a present you and not a 3-
minute ago you – and second in the meaning of “perception”, perception un-
derstood as that which opens a channel of experiential contact to the world-
as-other. Casting perception in this way, as outward and exposed to the world-
as-other and nature-as-other, gives it a direct realist slant – contingent, how-
ever, on how world-as-other and nature-as-other are intended to be under-
stood in this context, the next element in our schema which we come to below. 
We can see, at any rate, a similarity between this outward perception model 
espoused here and its version in Ted Honderich’s radical externalism where 
he distinguishes between a necessary condition in the brain responsible for 
this perceptual outlet and, on the other hand, what does not come from the 
brain, that which the outlet puts us in contact with. He notes that this theory 
of consciousness, as he refers to it, “undercuts the only argument for the irri-
tating possibility that it’s all a kind of dream.” Hence, external perception, in 
his version as well as ours, is not a condition of the brain that causes but an 
outlet that the brain enables.3 
  
2 Michael Silberstein and Anthony Chemero, “Extending Neutral Monism to the 
Hard Problem,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 22/3-4 (2016), 192. 
3 Ted Honderich, “Radical Externalism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 13/7-8 
(2006), 8. As he puts it, “According to Radical Externalism, there isn’t a sufficient neural 
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3. Otherness in the alignment 
 But now let us turn to the second element of our alignment schema, it being mate-
rial nature-as-other. A certain ambiguity needs to be addressed about this notion 
of material nature-as-other, although it would seem obvious that whatever kind of 
nature sentient beings like ourselves inquire about, it must necessarily display 
itself as other, or object, in relation to the person doing the inquiring. Neverthe-
less, the ambiguity emerges in the consequent conception. On the one hand, there 
is this here and now of a material nature that is close and immediate, such as we 
have postulated it in chapter 2. And on the other hand, there is the material nature 
that is linear-based irrespective of otherness, a nature about which scientific ad-
vances are made in its comprehensibility, given the distanced appraisal from a 3rd 
person perspective. Our way of resolving this ambiguity has been, first of all, to 
show the former as preconditional. The closeness of that 1st person perspective 
comes before all else. Our percepts in an immediate present time precede the in-
terpretation, the former being the bedrock, the initial data on which the edifice of 
inferences are built. Secondly, we have noted how knowledge is anchored to the 
now, as discussed above, the fact that knowledge – while itself about content that 
is not now – is nowhere except in the now recipients, the immediate time of senso-
ry knowers like ourselves. One finds no other temporal location to allocate 
knowledge, unless by resorting to the linear artifice. 
 The first characterization, therefore, that can be made about this second 
component, material nature-as-other, is that in its here-and-now aspect, its 
basis in immediacy, it provides the necessary condition by which knowledge of 
nature comes about. In other words, that condition becomes fundamental, a 
bedrock in any analysis of nature. This bedrock can be described as an ontic or 
ontological prerequisite of the analysis, “analysis” qualifying as knowledge but 
only as grounded on the bedrock priority of otherness in the direct experiential 
encounter. It follows that our percepts, even such as the color blue that we di-
rectly perceive as other, are present-to-past – that is to say, already presupposed 
by any reductive attempt to explain them by past-to-present means, such as by 
their emerging from complex brain states. The explanation, in other words, begs 
the question by presuming a cause that is predicated on the effect – this other 
that we directly perceive. And so it becomes clear in our characterization of this 
second element, nature’s otherness, how the centerpiece of the now enters in. 
Material nature-as-other is manifested by how things, objects, entities concre-
tize in this or that present time. The you that I see is always the present you, not 
the you three minutes ago. It is that palpable manifestation which distinguishes 
                                                                                                                                       
condition for perceptual consciousness – whatever is true of reflective or affective con-
sciousness”, 8. 
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material nature-as-other from conceptions of nature that rest on abstracting and 
inferential stages from this step 1, the concrete. 
 This leads to a second consideration about this element of otherness in 
our schema, which is that with respect to material nature-as-other the past is 
secondary, an outcome arising from the existence of the present. If it were the 
other way around, if the present were but a derivative product of the past, there 
again we would end up with only an illusion of the present, the illusion that one 
could stand apart from the past-to-present causal chain, and have something we 
call “knowledge” of it or of anything else. This essentially recaps considerations 
we have earlier pointed out.  
  What we shall do here is offer a fruitful way to illustrate this dominance 
of the present in material nature-as-other by comparing its temporal horizon 
with a version of aligned otherness proposed by Peter McInerney, it too based 
on notions of perceptual lucidity and matching time between self and nature.4 
He describes “perception”, in his take on that word, as a “reaching across” of 
consciousness, not markedly different from how we have described it as a chan-
nel of openness. He points out a problem with a view that holds to the contrary, 
based on the mechanics of perception, that would explain this reaching across as 
instead an influx of sensory sensation – that is, as transmission of sensory stim-
uli onto the lens of the eye or on the eardrum. The problem lies in the failure of 
this alternate explanation to explain adequately our distancing perception, the 
fact that we perceive objects as spatially distant.5 If vision were simply a matter 
of stimuli on the retina of the eye, it would seem impossible to distinguish the 
source of the stimuli from the retinal sensations. Even if one cites cases of blind 
people who after many years have recovered the ability to see, but with their 
recovery – at least at first – impeded by absence of perceptual depth, the prob-
lem still remains of explaining how the experiential field of spatial depth can 
come about from surface stimuli on the retina of the eye.  
 However, an even more pertinent question occurs when McInerney 
turns from spatial depth to the issue of temporal depth, and whether what one 
perceives as otherness in nature’s terrain can occur prior or at a different time 
from that of the present perception of the perceiver. We have in essence already 
given our attention to this question – our answer based on the temporal con-
straint –, but at any rate it proves insightful to compare our otherness evalua-
tion in this temporal context with what McInerney has to say on the subject. 
Leaving aside for a moment his meaning of “time”, he contends – as we do – 
that “at any given time there is a distinct perceptual act-phase that portrays a 
distinct phase of the world to be present or temporally focal”.6 [italics his] We 
  
4 Peter McInerney, 187. 
5 [italics his] McInerney, 230.  
6 McInerney, 231. 
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can propose this as a comparable view on the alignment aspect we’ve discussed. 
He then takes up the question of seeing into the past, such as when someone 
gazes at a stellar event in the night sky that may have occurred (based on linear 
time) before the gazer was even born. His discussion here is where there can be 
seen a divergence in view that highlights how the temporal now of nature-as-
other in our conception stands apart by contrast. Addressing this time-lag issue, 
he offers two alternatives without arguing the case for either one (at least not in 
the book footnoted below): One possibility would translate the solar event as a 
“simultaneous” appearance, an explanation amenable to the scientific notion of 
sensory data stimulating the retinas of our eyes. In that case, we “understand” 
that the entity is temporally distant, but we do not perceive it as such. Alterna-
tively, it is the distant source itself of the stellar event that we are actually per-
ceiving (seeing into the past).7 That word “simultaneous” above – it is in that 
word that we detect the divergence between his explanations of the stellar event, 
or of how a perceived past can be interpreted, as compared to the priority of 
present time we have shown nature’s otherness to have. “Simultaneous” implies 
the capability of a linear-based determination by which to gauge that two events 
are concurrent or have co-occurred. Linear-based time, in other words, is the 
basis for the temporal correspondence he proposes between acts of perception 
and events in the world. By contrast, our alignment framework gives the imme-
diacy of that stellar event, the immediacy of events in general, a time basis that 
knowledge – in the form of linear-based determination – has no access to. It 
(this immediacy) can only be known from a 1st person perspective. The 
knowledge side of the stellar sightings McInerney puts this way: “We under-
stand that the entities are temporally distant”. That statement in the context of 
our schema would translate as an inferential determination that reflects an un-
derstanding of otherness that is linear-based, which in our schema would be 
contingent on the otherness that is temporally aligned to the observer and is 
temporally immediate from the 1st person perspective.  
4. The self in this alignment 
 With this much said about two of the elements of the self/other alignment, let us 
now move to the remaining component, the self. It is here where the basis can be 
shown for the “nature in the now” designation and why it is that the now is re-
calcitrant to any description of its being “in”, in any locality, in anything.  
 Given this alignment schema as we have portrayed it, the self’s func-
tioning in this temporal setting can be described as a perceptual act by which 
the present is distinguished from the past, or more precisely the changed to is 
  
7 McInerney: 187, 225-226, 230-231, 275 n. 19. 
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exposed as contrast to the changed from. What is implied by “perceptual act” 
in this instance is a fusion of self/other time brought about by the non-
linearity of the self’s alignment, understood as taking place from the 1st person 
perspective. The participant “self” in this perceptual act is necessarily intend-
ed to mean the subject of perceptual experience, not the conceptual self.8 As 
for the temporal fusion itself, it can depicted this way: The immediate present 
time of the perceptual act is, from the 1st person perspective, one and the same 
for perceiver, perceiving, and object perceived. Any time delay that one claims 
to detect between perceiver and object (based on distance or the object’s re-
flected light) falls outside of the immediacy venue and relies on linear 
knowledge. It is not, in other words, that the 1st person perspective that elicits 
immediacy is biased by an experiential accounting or a phenomenology that 
doesn’t paint the picture of reality accurately, but rather that any time delay 
estimates one calculates or infers derive from the necessity of there being a 
lucid accounting in the first place, which in fact is what we mean by an experi-
ential accounting.  
 And so, in line with this experiential accounting, the self is fused in tem-
poral alignment with the otherness of the world, the otherness of material na-
ture. And this, in turn, demonstrates why the now cannot be in anything. This 
alignment, first of all being non-spatial, is not part here and part there. Its im-
mediacy is of a kind that makes inseparable, time-wise, the concrete world we 
are awake to and the “we”. Hence, no “in” in this temporal picture. Spatially, 
linearly, and conceptually, we separate ourselves from the objects we perceive, 
but nonlinearly there is no “in” location for the now to belong to, neither in us 
nor in our perceptions. And that accords with how the now has been depicted in 
these pages – as non-discrete, non-data-oriented, non-divisible, non-multiple, 
and all pervasive. Even to speak of the now as “in” time – implicit in such ex-
pressions as “changing times”, “succession of perceptions”, or “perception of 
succession” – imposes a linear sequentiality into the picture that changes the 
subject of what it is we are talking about. The now, as we have seen, comes with-
out a history, without absent nows in abeyance, though we have not ruled out 
the possibility of a contra-lucidity encounter, nor of the retrieving of that mo-
ment ago, which in any case would come in the form of nowness. How we have 
explained the abstruseness of this uncountable now that is with us all our days 
and yet cannot be numbered the way days are numbered is by using the analogy 
of a “quality instance” or “instance acquaintance” – namely, that of an experien-
tial quality such as the color blue that would strike the awareness of someone for 
the first time, thereby appearing as a totally unique quality that would enable no 
  
8 The wording of that distinction between subject and self comes from Alex Seemann, 
“The Other Person in Joint Attention: A Relational Approach,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 17/5-6 (2010), 178.  
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conceptual means by which to compare this first-time occurrence with anything 
else. That is how we might describe the perplexity of this one-time now. After all, 
what comparison can be made between this now and any other, considering this 
anomaly solely in terms of its instantaneity? 
 One coda to add here that bears on this comparison between the now 
and the quality instance is that in the latter case an issue has been raised in phil-
osophical circles as to whether the quality instance – that color blue, for in-
stance – necessitates some sentient being’s awareness of it. Given its designation 
as a quality, does that define it as an experience that someone necessarily expe-
riences, or can such qualities sustain themselves without experiencers?9 Howev-
er one might speculate in that direction, insofar as the quality analogy pertains 
to the now the answer is clear. Given the temporal fusion of the self as perceiver 
with the nowness of external content, given – that is – our 1st person restriction 
in the case of the now, there is no outside (3rd person) way to determine the now 
as a non-experiential quality. It is not as if the issue concerned a stimu-
lus/response or cause-and-effect distinction. There is no temporal disjunction 
between the now apart from the conscious subject’s experienced present percep-
tion. The starting point is all at once, not here or there. The “external” now, as 
we have described it, has been simply intended to mean that it is not a subjec-
tively manufactured impression. Returning to the analogy of a quality instance, 
we can therefore conclude that insofar as the now is cast in the role of a quality, 
it cannot be separated from its awareness. But then the follow-up question: 
What if this quality instance should take the form of another person’s now or an 
animal’s now that the perceiving self is not aware of? Might not that show the 
now in the light of a quality instance bearing its own autonomy, irrespective of 
the perceiver’s awareness? The problem is that we have here intruded a 3rd per-
son countability factor. Separable nows make argumentative sense from a 3rd 
person perspective, but not from how an understanding of the now, requiring a 
1st person perspective, has been discussed throughout this book. 
  
9 David Chalmers, for example, takes the position that qualities need not always 
be instantiated – i.e. experienced – by conscious subjects. “We can certainly make 
sense of the idea of a red object that is not a subject of experience.” That, however, 
is to adopt a 3rd person approach which cannot apply in the case of the now.  
David Chalmers, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism,” Panpsychism: Contempo-
rary Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 42. For more on the issue of unexperienced qualities, see 
note 197. 
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5. Challenges: now or then? 
 Let us propose, as our final remarks in this chapter, several challenges to this 
schema of self/other alignment, the immediacy of which has been shown not to 
conform to an “in” relation – in particular, an “in” in relation to the space/time 
coordinates of a universe conceived of in linear terms. 
 The first challenge comes about in a discussion of temporal temperaments, 
episodic and diachronic. In his essay “What’s Missing in Episodic Self-
Experience?”, Patrick Stokes begins his discussion by taking up the subject of the 
episodic self, using Galen Strawson – a self-proclaimed episodic – as guide. Stokes 
points out several time-related features of the episodic personality, such as living 
close to immediate concerns, the here and now, with the consequence of the epi-
sodic individual having a weak sense of identification with the extended history of 
one’s lifetime self, thereby feeling a weak sense of identification (as opposed to 
knowledge of that fact) between one’s present self and one’s self in the past. As 
Strawson puts it, “For me as I am now, the interest (emotional or otherwise) of my 
personal memories lies in their experiential content considered independently of 
the fact that what is remembered happened to me – i.e. to the me that is now re-
membering.”10 That “me that is now remembering” tilts the discussion toward our 
direction, linking the episodic temperament to the emphasis we have put on the 
self in its temporal alignment with present world and present nature-as-other. 
From an episodic perspective there can arise, as Stokes points out, the suspicion 
that the connection that the diachronic personality claims to experience – namely, 
a persistence in time that knits past and present into their sense of identity – is an 
illusion, a fiction: “the presence of a persistence that in fact isn’t there.” On the 
other hand, diachronics contend that feelings of remorse, guilt, and regret are 
integral to one’s past/present sense of identity. Any absence in that respect would 
reflect a deficiency in one’s sense of moral responsibility. 
 And so here the challenge. A now that cannot be past. A present self that 
cannot be past. And yet the claim of the diachronic that the self’s present identi-
ty extends – or at least should extend – to the past. It is, for the diachronic, as if 
this self that I am now is that self living at a now time that was. Not simply line-
arly, conceptually, and cognitively, but as lived experience, an immediacy in the 
past that one returns to, identifies with. Referring to this as “co-presence”, 
Stokes recognizes the problem of attesting to such a self-experience, noting that 
it would amount to “a sense that the phenomenal self I am now was present in 
the past and will be present in the future”.11 And so let us see how Stokes seeks 
  
10 [italics his] Quoted in Patrick Stokes, “What’s Missing in Episodic Self-
Experience?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 17/1-2 (2010), 123, and further, 120, 122, 
126-127. 
11 [italics his] Stokes, 130, 128. 
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to solve this problem, which will serve as our answer as well to the challenge 
posed here. Taking his cue in this instance from Kierkegaard, Stokes sees the 
solution, not in a lived present that entails a lived past, but in a lived present 
that brings past to the present. One’s experience of responsibility is said to re-
flect this. I become “contemporary” with distant events from my past to the ex-
tent that, by my being obligated and affected by them, they steer me morally in 
my immediate present.12 Stokes notes Kierkegaard’s notion of “contemporanei-
ty” in this context, a notion to be contrasted with our usage of “con-
temporaneity” (chapter 6), the latter signifying the pervading social milieu of 
nowness, co-presence in a more literal sense. What comes out of this Kierke-
gaardian adaptation is, loosely speaking, a recrudescence of the notion “contra-
lucidity”, as discussed in the last chapter. On the one hand, one retains – from 
Stokes’s line of thinking – the temporal constraint in our framework that dic-
tates lucid experience to be strictly within the bounds of immediate experience, 
while at the same time allowing a version of lived experience from the past to 
penetrate into that experience. Stokes explains this as “not an experience of 
temporal extension, but a synchronic experience of past and present”. He adds, 
“Perhaps what is at issue is our experience of the past as past but experientially 
qualified in some way as if it was present: not so much Me* being present in the 
past, as the past being present here with Me*” (i.e. “Me*”, the mental entity or 
self I am now, as opposed to “me”, the human being).13 Drawing as he does on 
Kierkegaard, it is not coincidental that Stokes brings up a kind of past/present 
doppelganger from his Kierkegaardian readings that recalls in some respects the 
gospel accounts cited in the last chapter that depict the dual past/present and 
future/present Christ. The difference is that the bi-temporal experiential en-
counters in the Kierkegaardian version, as Stokes alludes to them, involve not 
the gospel witnesses but people of present times who, by an inwardness and 
achieved mental outlook, are said to achieve a kind of con-temporaneity with 
Christ – a leap of faith–, thereby collapsing the temporal distinction (in linear 
terms) between the immediacy of the witnessings in Christ’s day and the imme-
diacy of those in today’s world for whom that past is integrated in their sense of 
time. It is as if that moment ago – or some version of it – could be recovered 
after all, even after 2,000 years, and thereby made concurrent with one’s 
self/other alignment. We might speak of it as a back-to-the-present scenario. 
 Another challenge to this self/other alignment, the temporal schema 
we’ve advanced, is drawn from the many worlds interpretation of the measure-
ment problem in quantum physics. The challenge in this case targets our notion 
of the non-multiple now, the now exclusive to the 1st person experiential per-
spective. Here we will use as our source of debate an article by Felline and Bac-
  
12 Stokes, 129-131. 
13 [italics his] Stokes, 128.  
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ciagaluppi. They discuss how, according to the many minds interpretation, the 
range of probable outcomes of a quantum measurement necessarily involves not 
just the consciousness of the observer – the quantum measurer – but as well a 
scenario of diverse minds and diverse worlds of conscious observers, each an 
outcome of the various probabilities. The challenge that their article poses is 
this: Either one ends up with a scenario of diverse nows of diverse conscious 
observers, a consequence of performing the measurement, or one subscribes to 
the single mind hypothesis, the mind of the experimenter performing the meas-
urement, but a mind nonetheless with transtemporal connections to a past in 
the past and a future in the future. Felline and Bacciagaluppi consider the ap-
parent irreconcilability of the two options: 
On the other hand, without transtemporal identity of branches there is no hope of 
making sense of statements like “the probability I will register spin-up = c2”, for 
nothing allows us to identify me before the measurement with any me existing after 
the measurement.14 
In other words, in the many worlds interpretation, how can there be the proba-
bility that “I” – the me in particular – will register, i.e. in the future, if all out-
come possibilities, all the registering, will be played out among here-and-now 
selves in multiple worlds? The challenge given us is on the one hand this sugges-
tion of multiple nows, and on the other hand transtemporal linearity. 
 First of all, it is to be recalled from our discussion of starlight and stellar 
spectacles that any knowledge, theoretical or otherwise, temporally constructed 
in accordance with the not-now of extended time, cannot permeate the nowness 
that is experientially based – meaning the immediate now of something wit-
nessed by someone in a lucid state –, nor can it determine whether the now of 
that exclusively 1st person witnessing is experientially past or present or future. 
It therefore becomes erroneous to conceive of knowledge as applying linear-
based tense to the question of now or multiple nows. Doing so contradicts an 
understanding of “knowledge” as premised on non-immediacy, or in other 
words on the not-now of extended time. Consequently, the many minds scenar-
io, however legitimate on theoretical (knowledge) grounds, or as a mathematical 
model, fails to apply, as knowledge, to the now that is experientially known and 
that consists in the self/other alignment. 
 Second of all, “transtemporal” misses the boat in terms of order of pri-
ority. It is not that there exists in some enclave of nature this spreadsheet of 
multiple “me’s” extending into the past and future, with the particular me, the 
conscious experimenter, doing the transtemporal probing in both directions. 
  
14 [italics theirs] Laura Felline and Guido Bacciagaluppi, “Locality and Mentality in 
Everett Interpretations: Albert and Loewer’s Many Minds,” Mind and Matter 11/2 
(2013), 225-226, 229. 
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Instead, there is that which this edifice of the transtemporal rests on, it being 
this dimensionless now, which is another way of speaking about the immedia-
cy of one’s experiential contact with the world. The dimensionless now fits 
neither between a past in the past nor a future in the future, nor into any of 
the categories of the not-now we’ve discussed except the “just now” which, as 
we have seen, is now as well. The order of priority, as has previously been 
shown, is dimensionless being first – this now, or present time, we’re awake to 
– necessarily preceding the dimensional and divisible. It is not, therefore, that 
the now, as we’ve thus portrayed it, precludes the notion of selves in dimen-
sional time, or of one’s present self in transtemporal relation to them, but 
rather that selves, past and future, connote a division of time which is not 
applicable in the case of the now, it being without number and yet prerequisite 
for any statement, transtemporal or otherwise. Hence, transtemporal state-
ments with wording such as the above “the probability I will” or “identify me 
before the measurement with any me existing after” – however much they 
collide with the many minds interpretation in quantum theory, turn out less 
incompatible with the now, its designation having nothing to do with meas-
ured time. Specifying no dimensional position “in” time, its aspect of tempo-
rality nonetheless carries the prerequisite of its being locked in as a condition 
for statements such as the above or any statements whenever they are made. 
Not being in time or space, the now turns out even compatible with a specula-
tive multiverse (i.e. multi-spacetimes) consisting of multiple selves – just as 
long as we distinguish the linear from the nonlinear! It is there; it is there; it is 
there; and yet there is only one now that is there. 
 As for our final scenario we take up that poses a seeming challenge to 
the self/other alignment, this one comes from the seminal distinction made by 
the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio, namely that between core consciousness 
and extended consciousness.  
 Damasio describes extended consciousness as a “complex biological 
phenomenon” that “depends on memory and working memory”. It “provides the 
organism with an elaborate sense of self – an identity and a person, you or me, 
no less – and places that person at a point in historical time, richly aware of the 
lived past and of the anticipated future, and keenly cognizant of the world beside 
it.”15 What appears from this description so far is a sketch out similar to that of 
the transtemporal mind conceived as transcending linear distances, reaching 
across into the past and future, and even – with memory as an aid – coming into 
acquaintance with the “lived past”, as if knowledge were capable of assuming the 
role of sensory knowing, the kind of experiential familiarity that comes with the 
now’s immediacy and the self/other alignment. Additionally, he speaks of this 
extended consciousness as a “complex biological phenomenon” which moreover 
  
15 Damasio, The Feeling…, 16. 
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is “built on the foundation of core consciousness”.16 So let us see what he has to 
say about the latter. Noting that it too is a biological phenomenon, he gives the 
following account of core consciousness, namely that it:  
provides the organism with a sense of self about one moment – now – and about one 
place – here. The scope of core consciousness is the here and now. Core conscious-
ness does not illuminate the future, and the only past it vaguely lets us glimpse is that 
which occurred in the instant just before. There is no elsewhere, there is no before, 
there is no after. . . . [I]t is the very evidence, the unvarnished sense of our individu-
al organism in the act of knowing.17 [italics his] 
And there is this relevant piece too to add to the picture of core consciousness as 
he describes it: 
[a] transient entity, ceaselessly re-created for each and every object with 
which the brain interacts. . . . Because of the permanent availability of provoking 
objects, it is continuously generated and thus appears continuous in time.18 
One might take this description as not antithetical to the portrayal of the 
now as it’s been given in these pages. One simply has to frame the phraseology 
“ceaselessly re-created”, “continuously generated”, and “continuous in time” as a 
recasting through a 3rd person perspective of the authentic self/other alignment 
that denies time any of these linear attributes. So then where is the challenge in 
this case? The challenge comes in the prioritizing that is being given to linear time, 
implied by the “extended” of extended consciousness, by the intimated deficiency 
of core consciousness in that it “does not illuminate the future, and the only past it 
vaguely lets us glimpse is that which occurred in the instant just before”, and by 
the very contextualizing of the core description in 3rd person terms.  
 Let us now endeavor to surmount this challenge so as to preserve the 
priority of the self/other alignment. The way we shall go about this is to reassign 
the labels. What Damasio labels “extended consciousness” we will treat as core 
consciousness, meaning that aspect of awareness and perception that derives 
from brain-based neural functioning and cognitive capabilities that give us the 
power to divide the world into myriad categories and divisible parts, such as 
past and future, the days of the week, discrete objects, and so on. As for what 
Damasio designates “core consciousness”, we shall apply that term to sensory 
knowing, our lucid contact with the world, the chair and person I see that are 
not a 3 second ago chair and person I’m seeing but are part of the immediacy of 
my self/other alignment. In this way we save waking up in the morning from any 
imputation of its being a cognitive or linguistic artifice. And we save knowledge 
as well!  
  
16 Damasio, 17. 
17 Damasio, 16, 125. 
18 Damasio, 17, 175.  
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The Nonlinear (i.e. Non-Sequential) Universe  
vs. Metaphysical  Variants  
 In 2007 Alwyn Scott’s book came out, The Nonlinear Universe: Chaos, Emer-
gence, Life.1 The book has as its thesis the limitations of much of accepted sci-
ence that follows the direction of reasoning from causal past-to-present, regard-
less of whether the sequence at issue is in the form of deterministic forces that 
obey general laws, explainable outcomes based on reductionist analyses of trig-
ger components, or more generally the before and after of a rationally accessible 
universe. Hence, in that book’s view, chaos for example is seen as an intrinsic 
component of nature, emergence as an unpredictable outcome, including the 
emergence of life itself. 
 Let us start here with Scott’s nonlinear universe and explore in a com-
parative way how the now’s immediacy – the subject of this book – steers its 
own course on nonlinearity, and in particular how the priority we have given to 
the present, and its present-to-past directionality, differentiates this nature in 
the now, as we have postulated it in Part 3, from metaphysical variants, such as 
panpsychism and Berkeleyan idealism, schemas where our counter-
directionality (present-to-past) is an element that plays a role as well. 
 Scott’s nonlinear universe takes us part way, his thesis being that there 
are nonlinear aspects “in” nature. One might cite, for example, the synchro-
nous patterns of birds in flight. By contrast, how in Part 3 we have plotted this 
“in” is by applying it not to phenomena in nature but to dimensional nature 
itself being “in” – that is, dimensional nature as a whole –, its setting “in” the 
non-sequential (i.e. nonlinear) context of the now. And by this plotting of di-
mensional nature – its being “in” – we mean most crucially not material na-
ture with the appendage we have given it – material nature here and now –, 
but rather the otherness of its comprehensibility that gets structured by linear 
time. What, in other words, turns out unbounded by an “in” is time itself, time 
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Springer-Verlag, 2007). 
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understood nonlinearly and non-sequentially, time as that which we are ex-
posed to by means of our alignment with the world and nature via experiential 
immediacy.  
 It will be noticed that throughout this book the tendency has been to 
avoid the word “consciousness” and instead substitute expressions like “expe-
riential contact”, “awakenness to the world”, “alignment”, and “lucidity”. The 
primary reason for this emerges from the pivotal distinction, brought out ear-
lier, between the traditional notion of consciousness as cranium enclosed, 
emanating from a particular cognitive and brain-based substructure, and the 
notion of the now as endorsed in these pages, a now or present time that orig-
inates not from one’s mind or self but externally, or more precisely from with-
out any location at all, being all pervasive and not restricted by spatial or di-
mensional specifications. If one is to speak of this now insofar as it pertains to 
consciousness, the most that can be said is that it brings about a conscious 
awareness on a very fundamental level, namely, experiential contact with the 
immediate world. Such awareness, to a greater or lesser extent, is evident in 
all sentient species – rabbits, snakes, birds – otherwise there’d be no commu-
nicative possibilities among species. They’d (and we’d) individually all be ex-
periencing our lives in different temporal realities. Something close to solip-
sism. Consequently, from this brief review and what follows, it will be seen 
that the self/other alignment schema we have put forth, based on experiential 
contact, steers clear of many of the hurdles that confront metaphysical sche-
mas that take consciousness or the material world, or both, or some neutral 
substratum of primal reality, as their starting point or cause for all that comes 
about as a result, namely the world and nature as we find them to be. For ex-
ample, issues such as the relationship between consciousness and matter, 
which of the two derives from the other, and how either emerges and from 
what prior state or from what fundamental bedrock of reality – such are 
among the questions that either become non-issues or at least take on a dif-
ferent cast in the setting of this book, where the focus is on the self/other 
alignment as starting point rather than the givens of either consciousness or 
physical matter.  
1. Differentiating the now’s non-sequential model  
 Let us now proceed to exemplify further how the schema proposed in this book 
diverges from others that likewise resonate with primal and metaphysical ques-
tions about nature. Our plan by which to go about this will be as follows, namely 
to show in this order: 
a. How the notion of “beginning” becomes both inapplicable and applicable in our 
schema, and how this compares with that notion as employed in other conceptions. 
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b. How the self/other alignment entails a non-sequential beginning: i.e., a beginning 
– not beginnings –, contrary to the proverbial notion of succession as an explanatory 
device, whether of mental or physical events, in other frameworks of nature. 
c. How, according to the self-other alignment in our schema, the linear arises as an 
outcome of the nonlinear – i.e. non-sequential – starting point, and how this distin-
guishes from some traditional problems of mind/body dualism. 
d. Given the denial of sequentiality entailed by the now, how it can be maintained, 
nonetheless, that a past split off from present time (i.e. a “happened” split off from 
“happens”) is not tantamount to an ontological extinguishing of that past, or its re-
duction to a mere relic of memory. And how it can be, given the radical 1st person 
perspective that our schema adopts, that accusations of a relativistic ontology and 
the now’s cut off from the wider domain of knowledge can be answered. 
2. The now that doesn’t begin; the alignment that does  
 We start with this notion of an absent beginning. The now, as has been dis-
cussed, has no beginning earlier than itself. Being traceless, being evidenced 
only by its immediacy, its beginning is direct encounter. We have characterized 
it as being “external”; that, however, is not to imply a place of origination, a 
source. To speak of it as if it did, to ask such questions as, “Where does it come 
from?” “How did it emerge?” or “When did it happen?”, all such questions in-
sinuate a linear subtext, as if the now’s nonlinearity could somehow be tracked 
as an event in linear spacetime or as a process evolving over sequential time. So 
questions of the Big Bang type we eliminate from the start as they do not pertain 
in our schema. But still, what about one’s brain-based consciousness? Might the 
now’s origin and operation be, in fact, situated there? – a question which again 
introduces linearity into the picture in the form of cause/effect, a trigger mecha-
nism that suggests locatability in linear time and a subsequent result in linear 
time. Our methodology takes one’s lucid state at face value. Being awake to the 
world tells, in itself, something significant about the world. That tree I see out 
there. It is no less a tree now than it is a tree. We have only to ask: Is it possible 
to observe a tree that is not a tree now? By so asking we follow a strain of Berke-
leyan idealism. In other words, our very experiential contact, the foundation for 
all knowledge, gives palpable demonstration that the now pervades whatever we 
are capable of observing – trees, landscape, the stars. But then there is this dif-
ference that separates our schema from the Berkeleyan: The now in our frame-
work is localized neither in one’s sensory impressions nor in the mind or con-
scious awareness of the individual. Its exposure is not from us but to us, simply 
by our being awake to the world. Hence, as to origination or beginning, the now 
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is neither from us nor from a measurement-based nature, in that it has no be-
ginning in (linear) time. 
 On the other hand, the notion of a beginning does have its place in our 
temporal schema. It consists in this self/other alignment that fuses, in tem-
poral fashion, the self in its 1st person perspective to the experiential immedia-
cy of whatever field of otherness the self encounters. This notion of a begin-
ning recalls chapter 7, and it would appear to starkly collide with what we 
have just portrayed as the beginingless now. How then can there be this be-
ginning of time in the self/other alignment when the self/other alignment is 
itself built upon the foundation of a beginingless now? One would suppose, as 
a matter of trivial truth, that percepts, aligned as they are by an immediacy of 
contact with the world, are inextricably multiple, beginning perhaps at birth 
but from thereon sequential, being an obvious multiplicity of percepts mo-
ment by moment, a succession of perceptions. How could it be otherwise? 
Again, however, we see the insinuation of space/time linearity in the very 
question, in the very suggestion of sequentiality and “succession of percep-
tions”. Our way to address this issue of the alignment’s beginning is, first of 
all, to take into consideration the perspective that is integral with this begin-
ning, and that is the perspective of immediacy that aligns us experientially to 
the world. This of course is the 1st person perspective, and the knowing that 
comes by way of it. It marks a “beginning” in several senses of the word. 
3. A non-sequential beginning 
 For one thing, the self’s temporal alignment to the present world stands as pre-
condition, as we have shown. The lucidity that it gives us is prerequisite for cog-
nitive output in all the myriad areas – measured time, inferential reasoning, 
knowledge in general. If it were brain cells or physiology that came first, if it 
were they that instigated lucidity, then lucidity would be nothing other than a 
past-to-present effect of mental mechanisms or sensory organs, and no one 
would really be awake in the first place. All our communications would be illuso-
ry; the temporal connection between self and other would amount to a solipsis-
tic impression, a product of deterministic forces. Of course, from a 3rd person 
perspective it makes perfect sense to say that there must be a past before the 
present, but even such a judgment rests on the priority of an alignment if we are 
to suppose that judgment has any basis in lucidity. Added to this sense of the 
alignment’s beginning, there is that consideration about the now we have talked 
about, its being without a past, or in other words without a beginning. The now 
is the precondition for there being the past in the past. And that provides us, in 
fact, with another basis for speaking of this self/other connection as a beginning. 
It is this thinglike now that instills everything with concreteness and immediacy, 
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without which there can be neither our tangible surroundings nor the tangible 
evidence of the past we witness in the present. But this “now” comes through to 
our sensory awareness precisely in the mode of that immediacy, without a past 
or future. Hence, this alignment comes through only in present time, neither 
multiple nor sequential in before-and-after linear time. One can apply multiplic-
ity and sequence to it but only conceptually, from a distanced appraisal, as if one 
were not a part of it. But then we are no longer judging the experiential on its 
own terms. That key word “experiential”, moreover, leads us to yet a third and 
final respect by which we can come to understand this self/other alignment as a 
beginning, namely in the analogy previously made to a quality instance. That 
exposure of color that colorblind Mary sees for the first time is so unique, unex-
pected, and different from her previous colorblind experience that Mary has no 
way of classifying it, or comparing it, or translating it into language compatible 
with her colorblind experience: It is that example of quality instance that she 
awakens to for the first time which is exactly how and why the medium of 
alignment that we awaken to, and are awake to, comes through as a first-time 
experience, even day after day, moment after moment. After all, what can the 
now be compared to or classified as? What property does it share with, or what 
distinguishes it from, anything else, even another now? Any such efforts at type 
casting or classification presume that which is already there, preexisting before 
classification, namely the now’s immediacy. It is precisely what precedes which 
marks out what is utterly incomparable, unrecognizable by comparison, and 
hence utterly novel and new, just as for Mary it is that exposure to color for the 
first time. 
4. Nonlinear/linear as opposed to mind/body 
 And so on to the next nonlinear nuance that highlights our schema. It is encap-
sulated in this question: How does the linear arise from the nonlinear? Or to put 
it another way: How can the before and after of measured time emerge from the 
measureless and beginningless now? Here, at the start, a clarification in wording 
is called for. We can apply the words “derive” and “derivative” to indicate linear 
time’s subordinate relation to the now, but only in the sense of the former’s con-
tingent role, its coming about in consequence of nonlinear time in the first place, 
the former being predicated on the latter. This is not, however, to depict the 
relation as causal, a linear outcome caused, effectuated, or evolving from non-
linearity’s primal role. Similarly, in the cameo description we have given of the 
now, its being invested with the dyadic aspects of both the “just now” (changed 
from) and the “now” (changed to), neither in this context is there an intended 
suggestion of a causal link, implicating a before and after. Instead, what both 
aspects of “from” and “to” highlight is the now’s immediacy, holistic and irre-
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ducible, and exclusively demonstrated in its 1st person alignment between self 
and other.2 
 But still, in our confronting this contra-causal feature of nonlinear time, 
are we not back to troubling issues comparable to the mind/body problem, how 
either nonlinear or linear emerges from the other, or if not how they stand with 
respect to each other as elemental constituents of nature? 
 In the introduction to this book we referred to the now and not-now as 
both having primal standing “from which all else follows”, according to the 
framework we’ve endorsed. On the other hand, from what’s been pointed out 
above and in previous pages, it’s been emphasized that linear extension – such 
as the past defined by chronological time – is what comes about as a result of 
the present and in consequence of there being this self/other alignment. Even, 
however, with this contingency imposed on the linear past, there appears like-
wise a contingency imposed on the present as well, the present that from a 3rd 
person perspective comes about as a result of the past. Simply put, it is as im-
possible to conceive of the present without the effects (the present effects) of the 
past as it is impossible to conceive of a nowless past, a past without a precondi-
tional present, and in a similar vein just as it is equally impossible to conceive of 
a nowless – yet physically existing – chair or for that matter a nowless yet physi-
cally existing universe. It follows from this that a mutual interdependency must 
apply on both sides, at least with respect to the concrete manifestations in front 
of us of both present occurrences and the past we recognize in the present. To 
that extent the two are equally assignable a primal designation, or metaphysical 
imprimatur – and we mean by the “two” both time schemas, the nonlinear now 
and linear time in the various ways we have labeled the latter – “the time that 
takes time”, “measured time”, “the not-now of extended time”.3  
 On the other hand, it can be seen as well that the questions our temporal 
schema provokes are not, for example, about causal processes, or the emerging or 
  
2 One might compare this notion to that of “simplicity” as Bhakti Madhava Puri de-
scribes it: “The philosophical concept of simplicity is that which is elemental and cannot be 
reduced to or explained by anything other than itself. For example, thought is thought, 
being is being. Neither can be explained by anything other than themselves. This infers that 
the opposite of simple, is not what is complex, but what is compound and can be reduced or 
explained by its different elements.” Email “Re: [Sadhu Sanga] Why Aristotle May Not Be 
Considered a Materialist” (Online_Sadhu_Sanga@ googlegroups.com) (April 27, 2018). 
3 An analogy that comes very close in portraying this interdependency is found in Sil-
berstein and Chemero’s notion of “neutral” in their metaphysic of neutral monism and how 
it applies to presence: “[T]he subject/object cut is a self-consistency relation, there is only 
one reality (the field of ‘pure’ experience as James might say). Third, there is no ontic priori-
ty of presence over the external world – they are co-fundamental . . . Presence can be 
thought of as temporality or ‘nowness’ itself; there is nothing phenomenologically more 
basic than the nowness or presence of experience. Perceiver (subject) and perceived (object) 
are co-dependent aspects of presence.” (Silberstein and Chemero, 2016, 193) 
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evolving of the now from the not-now, or the other way around. We have already 
explained their relation as uncaused, underived, the one from the other, which 
otherwise would introduce a linear background into the setting, a Paleolithic origin 
or an evolving in linear time, and then the perplexity would be confronted of how 
that evolving of the now could come about. That kind of problem is beset by other 
metaphysical systems – how consciousness emerges from non-consciousness or 
how life evolved from matter, questions which presuppose a linear background. 
Whereas in the schema we’re advancing, linear time is the very issue in question. 
And so instead, the issue our schema pertains to is this: Taking into consideration 
that linear time, and the structure of knowledge based on it, has its own necessary 
role in present experience – in intelligible present experience –, still the question 
remains how past experience – that moment ago of the source of the past – might 
be demonstrated as being more than just a mental reformulation, more than just 
an extraction in the form of communal memory and records that invariably limit 
themselves to representing and doing so in the abstracted manner of the before 
and after of extended time. All this premised on there being a presentation of the 
present to begin with. And why not as well the premise of a presentation – still 
existing -- of the past, i.e. of the source of the past?  
5. The past and linear time: the bedrock they stand on 
 The task we’ve yet to accomplish recalls Part 2 of this book, our endeavor at 
probing the substantivity, the source, of the past, notwithstanding how memory 
and the past as organized sequentially play an interdependent role with the pre-
sent. What in essence we are pursuing here is our final attempt at retrieving at 
least a piece of the not-now’s concreteness in the form of that moment ago. And 
so we start this attempt by re-emphasizing this distinction between the lived 
past and linear time. That moment ago, we discovered in our previous search, 
was not to be found in linear time, at least not in our search for it in the not-now 
of extended time and its designated branches. So where then, if at all (excluding 
paradigms that violate the temporal constraint) is that source to be found, the 
concreteness of that not-nowness, and in particular the not-nowness of that 
moment ago? 
 Here we come to this fork in the road, and the question of what substan-
tive basis, what ontological standing of the past, is to be come upon by proceed-
ing either way – in either the linear vs. nonlinear direction. It was in chapter 7, 
“The Notion of a Beginning”, that Ricoeur’s differentiation was pointed out, 
between the lived past and our sequential way of organizing and representing. 
His description of the present and lived past as “confused, multiform, and unin-
telligible” connects, temporally speaking, to our description of the now’s imme-
diacy (including the immediacy of the lived past) as impenetrable to representa-
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tional and structural configuration. And his description of history’s research into 
the past as “an organized vision, established upon chains of causal or teleologi-
cal relations” steers in another direction, to a past structured by linear time and 
characterized by sequentiality, as we have described it. What this comes down to 
is, on the one hand, a conflated past – both a nonlinear past that has never left 
its state of being immediate –, and on the other hand a linear past made acces-
sible to representation, or as Ricoeur puts it, to “knowledge . . . on the basis of 
meanings and values.” Hence, we see again a picture of how the primal divide – 
the immediate vs. the not-now of extended time – manifests itself. In any case, 
the linear time we impose on the past, the selective way we recollect and repre-
sent, as well as memory’s fallibility and failure to recollect, all this is but one 
part of the metaphysical problem of the past – namely, what standing, what 
primal reality, is to be accorded the chronological past in view of the abstracted 
nature of sequential and extended time. On the other hand, there is that other 
direction at the fork in the road. It points to the source, which we’ve encapsulat-
ed as that moment ago that appears so irretrievable. The goal here has been to 
find in its concreteness the very substratum that the past rests on, the past in its 
immediacy, an immediacy that doesn’t go anywhere, not even from the present. 
The problem here, it seems most obvious to point out, is that this immediacy is 
not the immediacy we are aware of. So how do we gauge its standing?  
 But then again, could it be that traces of the immediacy of the lived past, 
indications of it that suggest more than the work of memory and ordered time, 
might be evidenced even here and now, its immediacy our immediacy?  
  Here we come back to Capek’s question quoted in chapter 2 and left un-
resolved: “If the future history of the universe pre-exists timelessly (or, as it is 
fashionable to say, ‘tenselessly’) in its totality, why is it not already present?”4 
That mode of inquiry, it turns out, as easily applies to the question we’ve just 
raised. We have only to change “future” to “past”. It goes then this way: If the 
lived past doesn’t go anywhere, not even from the present, why is it we aren’t 
aware of it? Taking it as indisputable that we aren’t, can one even speak of this 
lived past as immediate and concrete? Concluding that one cannot, does it not 
follow that this source turns out as much of an abstraction, as much of a repre-
sentation, as linear time and the structure of knowledge built on it?  
 We abstrained from giving more than a preliminary answer when first 
raising Capek’s question, but there is one we can now give that subsequent pages 
have prepared us for, and it is this. First of all, if the past (or future) were to 
have an equal footing in our perceptions, the now or present time would no 
longer be what we have found it to be, at least as advanced in this book – name-
ly, a precondition, that which constitutes itself as starting point in a present-to-
past order of orientation. Instead of waking up to this now and its self/other 
  
4 Capek, The Concepts of Space and Time…, p. LI.  
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alignment that connects us to the world and makes knowledge possible, there 
would – in a temporal omniscience scenario – be only an indiscriminate expo-
sure of past, present, and future confronting the immediacy of one’s perceptual 
experience. In such circumstances it is hard to see how we’d be awake at all. 
What would “waking” mean? Aside from that, the very linearity of the past, and 
the knowledge that’s built on it, depends, as we have seen, on this now and its 
priority, the fact that it doesn’t come immersed in a triple time frame of past, 
present and future.  
 On the other hand, where does this leave the lived past and the immedi-
acy of history’s source if what we are intimating is that there is no evidence of its 
immediacy, its concrete happening? Where does this leave that moment ago? 
 The answer that we can conclude with is that there is evidence, perhaps 
not of that particular moment ago we have in mind, but at least of the lived past, 
and it is found in the present, the immediate present. 
 I look up at that star. It’s now. It’s immediate. It’s immediacy is what I’m 
awake to and aware of, being in a state of lucidity that defines my self/other 
alignment. Science tells me – according to the temporal structure of linear time, 
according to the before and after – that that star is extinct, long gone eons of 
years ago. Insofar as that star’s temporality is defined by linear distance from 
the present, in other words, that star is in the past. And yet its light is present, 
immediate. Light travels and takes (linear) time; nevertheless, the observer en-
counters it in its lived, temporally immediate state that knowledge has no access 
to. So, it would seem here we have evidence of a past, a concrete, experientially 
immediate past in the present, at least in the sensory presentness of the specta-
tor. Paul in France calls Freddy in Texas, both are in time zones 5 or 6 hours 
apart. Yet here occurs the lived connection of dialogue despite, according to 
linear time, the difference in time zones, the one 5 or 6 hours in the past relative 
to the other. Take the twin paradox, the one returning to Earth after a near-light 
speed voyage in space, the other already old and senile relative to his twin. As 
immediate as their meeting is, is the immediacy of the concrete manifestation of 
the past staring each other in the face, as well. Or take the light from objects 
around us that, according to calculation, takes a scintilla though quantifiable 
amount of (linear) time to hit the retinas of our eyes. Given that discrepancy, the 
whole world is testament to a past that is concretized and manifested in its im-
mediacy before our very eyes. Hence, that moment ago, not that moment ago 
we’ve been looking for, but in any case evidence of a past that doesn’t violate the 
temporal constraint, a past that is more than its linearity, more than its memory, 




 “You see what we did in those three years, Heisenberg? Not 
to  exaggerate we turned the world inside out! … We put man 
 back at the centre of the universe … Throughout history we  
 keep finding ourselves displaced. We keep exiling ourselves 
to  the periphery of things … Until we come to the beginning 
of  the twentieth century, and we’re suddenly forced to rise 
from  our knees again.” 
 Ascribed to Niels Bohr; cited by Raymond Tallis, p. 150  
Chapter 14 
The Sun also Rises 
 Defending what he refers to as Husserlian idealism, a panpsychist defender Uwe 
Meixner explains the importance given to experience in Husserl’s system of 
self/other construal, portraying it in so many words as that of transparency or 
“lucidity” (my coinage), or as Meixner puts it: “Husserlian idealism does not 
contradict the testimony of our senses since it accepts – as objects of experience 
– all objects that our senses present to us, and just as they are presented there.”1 
[italics his] But then he adds the key proviso that the “objects of experience” are 
intended by Husserl to be understood in a broader temporal context: 
My experiences of X at other times, my experience of X with a greater content and tem-
poral extension than my original experience of X, experiences of X had by other mani-
fest subjects – all of these experiences are bound to lead to corrected and, going in the 
direction of the totality of experience, increasingly objectively correct views of X.2 
To what extent an appropriate segment of Husserl’s phenomenology fits this 
description of how the otherness of the world – or specifically that experience of 
X – is given to one’s awareness is not the issue of importance here and it is not 
what draws us to this quotation. Instead, it is the “temporal extension” and its 
  
1 [italics his] Uwe Meixner, “Idealism and Panpsychism,” Panpsychism: Contempo-
rary Perspectives, ed. Godehard Bruntrup and Ludwig Jaskolla (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2016), 398. 
2 Meixner, 398.  
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context that becomes key to our discussion here. For it is that quoted passage 
that points almost in reverse direction from where our temporal schema pro-
poses the emphasis should be put in determining a correct and corrected version 
of the experience of object X. It is a case of comparing the subtext given by the 
nonlinear and immediate as opposed to the image of reality that temporal exten-
sion provides us with.  
 Let us start with a nonlinear and non-sequential profile of experience of 
X, that experience of X understood in its immediacy. What can we say about its 
correctness, the veridicality of that experience of object X, even without tem-
poral extension? 
 The first thing that can be affirmed, drawing on all that we have said so 
far, is that by the very fact of there being this perception of an external object, 
even in its immediacy and the immediacy of that self/other contact, there is 
something instantly correct – namely, the very lucidity implied by this contact in 
the first place. It means one is in touch with the world now. The identity of the 
object, features and conditions of the surrounding landscape, they may be mis-
taken on first impression, but that they are all a part of a present otherness is 
something that can be immediately and correctly discerned, as swiftly as the 
realization (on whatever basis) that one is awake to the world, that this is not a 
dream. The analogy we have adopted by way of illustration is the experience of 
color that colorblind Mary sees for the first time. It’s a totally novel experience. 
Cognitively untranslatable, the appearance of color for the first time. No means 
by which to compare it to something else. Yet it’s immediately there. It can be 
seen as a correct assessment of a new now existence without the need for ex-
tended time. And yet one might ask, could it not be a hallucination after all, that 
experience of object X? Indeed it could be, but that changes the scenario. What 
we were talking about was an experience of object X – i.e., what one is lucidly 
exposed to, not what a malfunction of the mind has induced oneself to believe is 
there. The source in our case is outward and external if it’s to be an experience 
of object X, and necessarily if it’s to be perceived as an object X now. Perhaps, 
however, we’re all mistaken about the possibility of there being an experience of 
object X. Perhaps you’re not really reading this text I’ve written. You just think 
you are. Perhaps we don’t wake up in the morning. It’s all a dream. But then, as 
we have seen, knowledge itself becomes unsustainable except as an illusion and 
we end up with self-contradiction. So we avoid that alternative and continue 
with this experience of object X and see what else about that experience is im-
mediately correct, correct without temporal extension.  
 What additionally comes through in that experience is that object X, no 
matter how opaque to our initial efforts of analysis, manifests itself in the temporal 
format of changed from and changed to. Quite likely the object X I’m inspecting 
hasn’t itself changed as I look at it, but nevertheless it is part of a total scene that 
hasn’t stopped exhibiting its nowness. It hasn’t become frozen in time. No doubt 
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part of the sense of change is my own changing perspectives of the object, my own 
movements that contribute to this ambience of difference in the scene as a whole, 
what makes it different from the “moment before” that lacks the changed to of the 
now. Nevertheless, the difference that accounts for the now is not my mind’s doing 
or yours, as we have contended throughout these pages. It is as much a part of 
what authenticates the perception of that object X, even without temporal exten-
sion into not-nowness, as it is a part of what authenticates the you now, the con-
crete you, or the concrete scene in front of us, rather than you or the scene at any 
other time. Take away the changed from and changed to, take away that and 
what? The world – that object X included – becomes unfamiliar and untranslata-
ble experientially in a way that no amount of extended time can rectify and give 
objective credence to. And this leads us to the last consideration about the experi-
ence of object X in its immediacy – namely, familiarity. We may be totally unfamil-
iar with the object itself in terms of how to classify it, what recognizable properties 
it can be said to have. Nonetheless, it is familiar – strangely enough, it would seem 
– in being immediately there, a part of a present time we’re awake to, just as if the 
now had a past, the same old now we had long acquaintance with. Just as if the 
now had a long history as a then. 
 So much for the kind of at-once objectivity that the experience of ob-
ject X gives us, objectivity that comes from the start and not as a product of 
“the direction of the totality of experience.” Let us compare that with the ob-
jectivity that Meixner speaks about, an accrual of accuracy gained by further 
experiences of X, both by oneself and others over a period of time. Hence, the 
consensus that comes into play that offsets partiality and subjective misjudg-
ments and, of course, relies on corrections reached by virtue of continued 
access to object X. And so this principle of repeatability comes into play as 
well, lending further credence to the veracity of one’s conclusions about the 
experience of object X. 
 It amounts to a trivial truth to point out that experiential objectivity of 
the kind that Meixner talks about, an objectivity attained by experiential exten-
sion in time, is what scientific knowledge is founded on. It has given us precisely 
what science has achieved, what it has taught us about nature. Nevertheless, it is 
equally evident that the kind of objectivity that comes with successive experi-
ances of object X in linear time holds up only to a degree, since debates about 
interpretation, which models to use, what questions to ask – may be pertinent 
and not wholly resolvable, leaving uncertainty for example about the nature of a 
particular experience of X. Furthermore, there is the issue that comes about in 
the abstracting from the experience, drawing away from the concreteness of the 
immediate object X, resulting from our cognitive habit of inquiry, our ways of 
categorizing, comparing, representing, describing by means of property/feature 
distinctions, and other ways of delineating and configuring, all predicated on 
the assumption of an object’s (and our) sequential constancy in linear space and 
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time. One may legitimately ask how much of that cognitive input from ourselves, 
and our 3rd person, before-and-after outlook, accurately portrays what is out 
there, that object X. Constructivists would pose the question, cited by Cooper: 
“Is an articulable world anything but the ‘product’ or ‘construct’ of human 
thought and attitude?”3 
 And so it seems there is a defensible case for limited yet well grounded 
objectivity at both ends of the timeline: that what we have termed “material 
nature-as-other” entails both this here and now before linear time even begins 
and the linear thereafter of extended time. In this bipolarity in its various as-
pects exhibited by nature itself and ourselves, we see again demonstrated these 
two archetypes of time we’ve been discussing, the now and the not-now. Having 
completed with that much of our task, and by way of moving toward this book’s 
conclusion, let us put this thesis of time, the thesis of this book, to a final test. 
 According to how it’s been described, the schema we’ve been advancing 
posits a now that comes neither with a past nor as a plurality but only through 
the conduit of one’s self/other alignment. The notorious problem this raises or 
seems to raise, a problem addressed in our discussion on the transtemporal self 
and elsewhere, is how a spreadsheet of experiences in extended time, each with 
its own immediacy and each with its experiencer, can combine (or incorporate) 
into an experience now that is only mine (or yours) and that is only now in the 
singular. We shall call this our version of the “combination problem”, and here 
include a statement of the problem as given by Galen Strawson, who addresses 
the challenge it poses in the context of conflicting schools of metaphysics: 
The central idea [of the combination problem] is that a group of distinct experi-
encings or patches of experientiality, each of which necessarily has its own subject, 
can’t possibly interact or fuse or co-resonate in such a way as to constitute or gener-
ate a single experience with a single subject. Why not? Simply because . . . a plurality 
of subjects can’t possibly combine to form or generate a single subject.4 
 Experiencer – experiencing – experiencing of object X. The problem in our case 
begins not with the combination but in what coherent manner such an experi-
enced unit as designated can be uncombined?5 Can there be an experiencer 
without the other two components? Or an experience of X without an experi-
encer and an experiencing? What therefore can be stated at the outset is that the 
challenge the combination problem poses for the framework of time presented 
in this book, a framework centered on the self/other alignment, lies in one re-
  
3 David E. Cooper, The Measure of Things (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1. 
4 Galen Strawson, “Mind and Being…,”, 102.  
5 For more on this, see Strawson’s “What is the Relation Between an Experience, the 
Subject of an Experience, and the Content of the Experience?”; Real Materialism and 
Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003/2008). 
The Sun also Rises 199
spect not in the combination but in the conceivability of its being otherwise, 
having an unraveled state, a piecemeal experiential circumstance other than 
combination.6 In our schema of time, experience and the experiencing of, for 
example, object X, cannot but come in the format of an alignment that fuses the 
experiential connection between experience – experiencing – experience of ob-
ject X. I am an awake experiencer who cannot even exist as such without the 
other two components, an experiencing and something experienced in the world 
I’m awake to. Let’s take any absent object, object Y. The temporal constraint and 
my own lucidity make it self-evident that I cannot have an experience of object Y 
that is not yet there or is no longer there, something I cannot yet, or no longer 
be, presently aware of; nor can object X be experienced minus an experiencer, 
some sentient being. What seals then the combination, what makes it unfractur-
able, is precisely this present time, this now alignment of self/other. Here in this 
instance we see there is no combination problem, only in the hypothesis of an 
uncombining.  
 But what about those past experiences, that un-combination of lifetime 
experiences not riveted to the now, even if at one time they must necessarily have 
been adjoined to some experiencer and object of experience, call it object X? The 
answer, from what was said when the question was previously addressed, can be 
proposed in two ways. First, according to the schema of time brought out in this 
book, the past is not cut off from the now but positioned in such a way as to be an 
outcome of there being a present already in existence, the latter bearing a pre-
positional role in the order of time. Past-to-present sequentiality and the 
knowledge based on it can be described as predicated on a present-to-past ontic 
base, the foundation by which such sequentiality and knowledge become attaina-
  
6 On the putatively related issue of a quality’s existence apart from one who experi-
ences that quality, we have already pointed out that insofar as a quality instance serves 
(in the Livingston context, see discussion cited in chapter 4,  n. 31) as analogy in under-
standing how the now is without comparable data, without – that is – type or property 
characterization by which it can be compared to other nows, such analogy applies only 
where “quality instance” is intended to mean an experienced quality instance. The now 
cannot be approached otherwise, given its 1st person restriction and the temporal con-
straint. Obviously, the word “experience” presupposes the involvement of an experiencer 
and experienced object implied in the very meaning of the word “experience”. Conse-
quently, on the question of whether there is a now apart from the self/other alignment, I 
have answered this by attributing the now as external, yet on both sides of that align-
ment, running as a conduit so to speak, rather than housed in some cranium recess of our 
mind or brain. To be more informative than what derives from the conduit of one’s sen-
sory knowing would require a non-experiential (3rd person) approach by way of 
knowledge, but knowledge has no access to the now. For more on qualities, and whether 
the notion of unexperienced qualities comes across as incoherent, or whether there might 
be qualities not experienced consciously, see, for example, Coleman, “Panpsychism and 
Neutral Monism”, 249, 274 n.3, and [https://phenomenalqualities. wordpress.com]. 
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ble. But then the question arises about the past-to-present order of time and the 
reality basis of its linear sequencing in enabling configural and cognitive intelligi-
bility out of perceptual content at any present time. Here we meet up with the 
second part of the answer. On the one hand, indispensable as the linear past-to-
present is for any configurable recognition in present time, its distancing that de-
rives from the not-now of extended time is inferential. It is we who do its compu-
ting, rather than something we come across in external events themselves. The 
words of Mach (from chapter 2) remind us that “time [i.e. in the linear sense] is an 
abstraction”. On the other hand, the now’s foundational role shows up in the con-
sideration that you need the prerequisite of the now – and the immediate world 
it’s linked to – to do the measuring that goes into measured time, but you don’t 
need measured time and its linearity to have that prerequisite. But more im-
portantly as pertains to that second meaning of the past, that road that forks the 
other way – namely the source of the past – it itself does not locate in any linear-
based temporal, spatial, or configural distance from the present. How can it? The 
source of the past is the lived past, meaning that it therefore must necessarily be 
(or “have been” – to throw in misleading tense usage) a lived present. Hence, the 
misnomer of speaking of (linear) gaps between lived experiences, past or present, 
is done away with, as it does nothing but introduce a linear resetting of a nonlinear 
issue.7 All this can be summed up with simple observations we have consistently 
applied throughout this book: There is no history of the now. The now doesn’t go 
anywhere. Nor does one find it in the past. 
 And yet, given what we have just said, the uncombination problem even 
so comes back at us on the rebound in the form of uncombined nows in the pre-
sent, including those of everyone alive – thus contradicting how, from the 1st 
person perspective the now has been all along portrayed in the singular, and 
along with it the singular self/other alignment. We have spoken of this now 
alignment as a cohesion of experiencer – experiencing – experience of object X. 
But nonetheless still at large is this daunting plurality, this seemingly infinite 
immensity of experiencers and their immediately present experiences. I’m not 
part of your now alignment, nor are you part of mine or everyone else’s. At-
tempting to solve this plethora of uncombined now alignments by somehow 
deeming them amalgamated into one – just mine or yours, for example – inevi-
tably tailspins us into solipsism.8 The world becomes only my world I’m awake 
to, or yours. Nobody else’s. So how do we avoid that? 
  
7 For a comparison of this treatment of linear-base gaps with how Bergson theorizes 
how such putative gaps are filled in by memory, see Bergson’s discussion in Duration 
and Simultaneity, 33 (quoted and discussed in chapter 5 (sec. “The changed and the 
mediated”), and the Bergson quotation is cited in chapter 2, n. 7. 
8 The problem is similarly posed by Meixner in discussing Husserlian idealism. 
Meixner, Idealism and Panpsychism, 395.  
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 Drawing again on earlier discussion, the answer we find proposed takes 
cognizance of the modality of 1st person sensory knowing that the self/other 
alignment gives access to, and of the impenetrability by knowledge’s 3rd person 
means to access this kind of knowing that comes by direct acquaintance. Pro-
ceeding inferentially, knowledge applies a different currency of time to the im-
mediate scene, replacing the indivisible with divisibility. But that won’t answer 
the question of nows. Knowledge rides on knowing’s sensory grasp which, tem-
porally speaking, consists of an immediacy that comes with being awake to the 
world. It is the latter which tells our story, an immediacy in the form of a 
self/other alignment. Furthermore, the story this immediacy of self/other 
alignment tells is one of con-temporaneity, a world of shared experiences with 
others where the now amalgamates, fuses into a common immediateness that 
connects self to otherness and to the others in one’s midst. So there is nothing 
solipsistic in this picture, at least not so far. On the other hand, given that the 
now is only now, the fact remains there is no experiential immediacy, no experi-
ential now, before it occurs. No connective now to others and to otherness be-
fore it occurs. One can, of course, apply 3rd person reasoning, knowledge, and 
the linearity they are based on to sketch into this connective portrayal further 
details that come not by way of sensory knowing. That, however, will not answer 
the question of other nows but only abstract from the scene, from its concrete-
ness where the connective temporality of the now is found. Hence, we are left 
with only the access route of one’s sensory knowing.9  
 Restricted by this 1st person experiential access, one cannot but remon-
strate, “Are there not, in fact, these multiple and sequential nows, mine, yours, 
and all the others? The very question demonstrates the predilection we all have 
to apply numbers to format reality on a linear basis, to understand 1st person 
experience in 3rd person terms, and to apply standards of objectivity exclusively 
to the distanced appraisal, judgments arrived at from a temporally extended 
vantage point.”10 
 We see in this the tension, the discordance, between two modalities of 
time that implicate two profoundly different conceptions of nature. In the one 
there is the familiarity of the intelligible and the constant, nature made reasona-
bly comprehensible by the before and after. In the other there is the familiarity 
  
9 Obviously, as in the case of consciousness and its “something it is like”, the experi-
entially nonlinear does not preclude a rendition of it in linear (sentence structure) and 
representational terms, as exemplified by Chalmers’ book, The Character of Conscious-
ness, noted earlier.  
10 This is essentially our answer to the plurality-of-the-now issue raised in the intro-
duction, and how our approach to the now (in the singular) differs from that of Barbour, 
who for example conceives of the now as a kind of structure (Babour, 53). Cp. Strawson 
(“Mind and Being”, sec. 16, p. 85): “[P]hysics has no terms with which to characterize the 
intrinsic experiential-qualitative nature of concrete reality.” [italics his]. 
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of a kind of time common to us and the interpersonal world our senses give us to 
know, a time the immediacy of which has no before or after, but without which 
there is no before and after to give nature its intelligibility.  
 That “almost in reverse” we spoke of earlier, the almost in reverse of our 
temporal schema’s claim to instant objectivity, in contrast to how temporal ex-
tension is generally the standard adhered to as the benchmark for objective find-
ings, defies a long tradition of skepticism toward sensory experience, experience 
that in its bald appearance and immediacy would have us sometimes miscon-
strue what is actually there. The bent stick under water, the rainbow, the thun-
der heard after the lightning, the flat Earth, the coin size of the moon and pigmy 
size of people at a distance. The visible orbits of sun and moon vs. the invisible 
orbit sleuthed by reason and deduction to accurately predict the solar eclipse. It 
is no surprise that, as Husserl puts it, there occurred “the surreptitious substitu-
tion of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world, 
the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and 
experienceable – our everyday life-world.”11 One may take as the epitome of that 
substitution an occasion in history that triggered a spike in that gradual replac-
ing of idealities for the concretely real, brought on by one man in particular. As 
Richard Tarnas puts it: 
In retrospect it is evident that the fundamental intellectual turning point of West-
ern civilization was the Copernican revolution, understood in its largest sense. 
Nothing so effectively bestowed confidence in the supreme power of human rea-
son. Nothing so emphatically and comprehensively affirmed the superiority of the 
modern Western mind over all others – all other world views, all other eras, all 
other cultures, all other modes of cognition. Nothing emancipated the modern self 
from a cosmos of established pregiven meanings more profoundly or more dra-
matically. It is impossible to think of the modern mind without the Copernican 
revolution.12 
And yet, on any ordinary day when I look up at the sun, it is first and foremost 
changed. It has risen a bit. It is now. I may understand, of course, that the 
sun’s rising is due to the Earth’s orbiting. But that’s apart from the immediacy 
of that changed. Apart from the otherness I see directly. Just as when I look at 
you, it’s not a “you then” I’m looking at, whatever the fractional time light 
takes to travel from you to me. Moreover, if it were to happen that I failed to 
discern that present changed, the change in the sun’s position, the change that 
you discern and that others around me discern in the sky, and instead find 
myself witnessing a sun then or a you then, the reason would likely not be put 
  
11 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenome-
nology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 48-49. 
12 Richard Tarnas, Cosmos and Psyche (New York: Viking Penguin, 2006), 27. 
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down to a feat of discernment but to a profound failure to distinguish what it 
means to be present, or as our temporal schema would diagnose it, a break-
down in self/other alignment. 
 It all must begin with the immediate present, the momentary now that 
connects self and other. All else is contingent on that. And not just the Coperni-
can revolution or any other revolution in our knowledge about nature. Even 
material nature itself is caught up in this preconditional vise. That, at least, has 
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